diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-12015.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-12015.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a33deaf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-12015.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From ae65651eab053fc6dc4590dbb863a268215c1fc5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20P=C3=ADsa=C5=99?= <ppisar@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2018 11:45:40 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] [PATCH] Remove existing files before overwriting them
+
+Archive should extract only the latest same-named entry.
+Extracted regular file should not be writtent into existing block
+device (or any other one).
+
+https://rt.cpan.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=125523
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-12015
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/jib/archive-tar-new/commit/ae65651eab053fc6dc4590dbb863a268215c1fc5]
+
+Signed-off-by: Chris 'BinGOs' Williams <chris@bingosnet.co.uk>
+Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <jkrishnanjanappa@mvista.com>
+---
+ lib/Archive/Tar.pm | 14 ++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/cpan/Archive-Tar/lib/Archive/Tar.pm b/cpan/Archive-Tar/lib/Archive/Tar.pm
+index 6244369..a83975f 100644
+--- a/cpan/Archive-Tar/lib/Archive/Tar.pm
++++ b/cpan/Archive-Tar/lib/Archive/Tar.pm
+@@ -845,6 +845,20 @@ sub _extract_file {
+         return;
+     }
+ 
++    ### If a file system already contains a block device with the same name as
++    ### the being extracted regular file, we would write the file's content
++    ### to the block device. So remove the existing file (block device) now.
++    ### If an archive contains multiple same-named entries, the last one
++    ### should replace the previous ones. So remove the old file now.
++    ### If the old entry is a symlink to a file outside of the CWD, the new
++    ### entry would create a file there. This is CVE-2018-12015
++    ### <https://rt.cpan.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=125523>.
++    if (-l $full || -e _) {
++	if (!unlink $full) {
++	    $self->_error( qq[Could not remove old file '$full': $!] );
++	    return;
++	}
++    }
+     if( length $entry->type && $entry->is_file ) {
+         my $fh = IO::File->new;
+         $fh->open( '>' . $full ) or (
+-- 
+2.13.3
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-6797.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-6797.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b56ebd3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-6797.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From abe1e6c568b96bcb382dfa4f61c56d1ab001ea51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Karl Williamson <khw@cpan.org>
+Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2018 15:14:27 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] (perl #132227) restart a node if we change to uni rules
+ within the node and encounter a sharp S
+
+This could lead to a buffer overflow.
+
+(cherry picked from commit a02c70e35d1313a5f4e245e8f863c810e991172d)
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-6797
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://perl5.git.perl.org/perl.git/commitdiff/abe1e6c568b96bcb382dfa4f61c56d1ab001ea51]
+
+Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <jkrishnanjanappa@mvista.com>
+---
+ regcomp.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/regcomp.c b/regcomp.c
+index 3b9550b10d..a7dee9a09e 100644
+--- a/regcomp.c
++++ b/regcomp.c
+@@ -13543,6 +13543,18 @@ S_regatom(pTHX_ RExC_state_t *pRExC_state, I32 *flagp, U32 depth)
+                          * /u.  This includes the multi-char fold SHARP S to
+                          * 'ss' */
+                         if (UNLIKELY(ender == LATIN_SMALL_LETTER_SHARP_S)) {
++
++                            /* If the node started out having uni rules, we
++                             * wouldn't have gotten here.  So this means
++                             * something in the middle has changed it, but
++                             * didn't think it needed to reparse.  But this
++                             * sharp s now does indicate the need for
++                             * reparsing. */
++                            if (RExC_uni_semantics) {
++                                p = oldp;
++                                goto loopdone;
++                            }
++
+                             RExC_seen_unfolded_sharp_s = 1;
+                             maybe_exactfu = FALSE;
+                         }
+-- 
+2.15.1-424-g9478a660812
+
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-6798-1.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-6798-1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3477162
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-6798-1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+From 0abf1e8d89aecd32dbdabda5da4d52a2d57a7cff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Karl Williamson <khw@cpan.org>
+Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2018 14:50:48 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] [perl #132063]: Heap buffer overflow
+
+The proximal cause is several instances in regexec.c of the code
+assuming that the input was valid UTF-8, whereas the input was too short
+for what the start byte claimed it would be.
+
+I grepped through the core for any other similar uses, and did not find
+any.
+
+(cherry picked from commit fe7d8ba0a1bf567af8fa8fea128e2b9f4c553e84)
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-6798
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://perl5.git.perl.org/perl.git/patch/0abf1e8d89aecd32dbdabda5da4d52a2d57a7cff]
+
+Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <jkrishnanjanappa@mvista.com>
+---
+ regexec.c              | 29 ++++++++++++++++-------------
+ t/lib/warnings/regexec |  7 +++++++
+ 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/regexec.c b/regexec.c
+index 5735b997fd..ea432c39d3 100644
+--- a/regexec.c
++++ b/regexec.c
+@@ -1466,7 +1466,9 @@ Perl_re_intuit_start(pTHX_
+                                            ? trie_utf8_fold                         \
+                                            :   trie_latin_utf8_fold)))
+ 
+-#define REXEC_TRIE_READ_CHAR(trie_type, trie, widecharmap, uc, uscan, len, uvc, charid, foldlen, foldbuf, uniflags) \
++/* 'uscan' is set to foldbuf, and incremented, so below the end of uscan is
++ * 'foldbuf+sizeof(foldbuf)' */
++#define REXEC_TRIE_READ_CHAR(trie_type, trie, widecharmap, uc, uc_end, uscan, len, uvc, charid, foldlen, foldbuf, uniflags) \
+ STMT_START {                                                                        \
+     STRLEN skiplen;                                                                 \
+     U8 flags = FOLD_FLAGS_FULL;                                                     \
+@@ -1474,7 +1476,7 @@ STMT_START {
+     case trie_flu8:                                                                 \
+         _CHECK_AND_WARN_PROBLEMATIC_LOCALE;                                         \
+         if (utf8_target && UTF8_IS_ABOVE_LATIN1(*uc)) {                             \
+-            _CHECK_AND_OUTPUT_WIDE_LOCALE_UTF8_MSG(uc, uc + UTF8SKIP(uc));          \
++            _CHECK_AND_OUTPUT_WIDE_LOCALE_UTF8_MSG(uc, uc_end - uc);                \
+         }                                                                           \
+         goto do_trie_utf8_fold;                                                     \
+     case trie_utf8_exactfa_fold:                                                    \
+@@ -1483,7 +1485,7 @@ STMT_START {
+     case trie_utf8_fold:                                                            \
+       do_trie_utf8_fold:                                                            \
+         if ( foldlen>0 ) {                                                          \
+-            uvc = utf8n_to_uvchr( (const U8*) uscan, UTF8_MAXLEN, &len, uniflags ); \
++            uvc = utf8n_to_uvchr( (const U8*) uscan, foldlen, &len, uniflags );     \
+             foldlen -= len;                                                         \
+             uscan += len;                                                           \
+             len=0;                                                                  \
+@@ -1500,7 +1502,7 @@ STMT_START {
+         /* FALLTHROUGH */                                                           \
+     case trie_latin_utf8_fold:                                                      \
+         if ( foldlen>0 ) {                                                          \
+-            uvc = utf8n_to_uvchr( (const U8*) uscan, UTF8_MAXLEN, &len, uniflags ); \
++            uvc = utf8n_to_uvchr( (const U8*) uscan, foldlen, &len, uniflags );     \
+             foldlen -= len;                                                         \
+             uscan += len;                                                           \
+             len=0;                                                                  \
+@@ -1519,7 +1521,7 @@ STMT_START {
+         }                                                                           \
+         /* FALLTHROUGH */                                                           \
+     case trie_utf8:                                                                 \
+-        uvc = utf8n_to_uvchr( (const U8*) uc, UTF8_MAXLEN, &len, uniflags );        \
++        uvc = utf8n_to_uvchr( (const U8*) uc, uc_end - uc, &len, uniflags );        \
+         break;                                                                      \
+     case trie_plain:                                                                \
+         uvc = (UV)*uc;                                                              \
+@@ -2599,10 +2601,10 @@ S_find_byclass(pTHX_ regexp * prog, const regnode *c, char *s,
+                     }
+                     points[pointpos++ % maxlen]= uc;
+                     if (foldlen || uc < (U8*)strend) {
+-                        REXEC_TRIE_READ_CHAR(trie_type, trie,
+-                                         widecharmap, uc,
+-                                         uscan, len, uvc, charid, foldlen,
+-                                         foldbuf, uniflags);
++                        REXEC_TRIE_READ_CHAR(trie_type, trie, widecharmap, uc,
++                                             (U8 *) strend, uscan, len, uvc,
++                                             charid, foldlen, foldbuf,
++                                             uniflags);
+                         DEBUG_TRIE_EXECUTE_r({
+                             dump_exec_pos( (char *)uc, c, strend,
+                                         real_start, s, utf8_target, 0);
+@@ -5511,8 +5513,9 @@ S_regmatch(pTHX_ regmatch_info *reginfo, char *startpos, regnode *prog)
+ 		    if ( base && (foldlen || uc < (U8*)(reginfo->strend))) {
+ 			I32 offset;
+ 			REXEC_TRIE_READ_CHAR(trie_type, trie, widecharmap, uc,
+-					     uscan, len, uvc, charid, foldlen,
+-					     foldbuf, uniflags);
++                                             (U8 *) reginfo->strend, uscan,
++                                             len, uvc, charid, foldlen,
++                                             foldbuf, uniflags);
+ 			charcount++;
+ 			if (foldlen>0)
+ 			    ST.longfold = TRUE;
+@@ -5642,8 +5645,8 @@ S_regmatch(pTHX_ regmatch_info *reginfo, char *startpos, regnode *prog)
+ 			while (foldlen) {
+ 			    if (!--chars)
+ 				break;
+-			    uvc = utf8n_to_uvchr(uscan, UTF8_MAXLEN, &len,
+-					    uniflags);
++			    uvc = utf8n_to_uvchr(uscan, foldlen, &len,
++                                                 uniflags);
+ 			    uscan += len;
+ 			    foldlen -= len;
+ 			}
+diff --git a/t/lib/warnings/regexec b/t/lib/warnings/regexec
+index 900dd6ee7f..6635142dea 100644
+--- a/t/lib/warnings/regexec
++++ b/t/lib/warnings/regexec
+@@ -260,3 +260,10 @@ setlocale(&POSIX::LC_CTYPE, $utf8_locale);
+ "k" =~ /(?[ \N{KELVIN SIGN} ])/i;
+ ":" =~ /(?[ \: ])/;
+ EXPECT
++########
++# NAME perl #132063, read beyond buffer end
++# OPTION fatal
++"\xff" =~ /(?il)\x{100}|\x{100}/;
++EXPECT
++Malformed UTF-8 character: \xff (too short; 1 byte available, need 13) in pattern match (m//) at - line 2.
++Malformed UTF-8 character (fatal) at - line 2.
+-- 
+2.15.1-424-g9478a660812
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-6798-2.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-6798-2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fb9b41a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-6798-2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From f65da1ca2eee74696d9c120e9d69af37b4fa1920 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tony Cook <tony@develop-help.com>
+Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2018 15:11:42 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] (perl #132063) we should no longer warn for this code
+
+The first patch for 132063 prevented the buffer read overflow when
+dumping the warning but didn't fix the underlying problem.
+
+The next change treats the supplied buffer correctly, preventing the
+non-UTF-8 SV from being treated as UTF-8, preventing the warning.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 1e8b61488f195e1396aa801c685340b156104f4f)
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-6798
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://perl5.git.perl.org/perl.git/commitdiff/f65da1ca2eee74696d9c120e9d69af37b4fa1920]
+
+Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <jkrishnanjanappa@mvista.com>
+---
+ t/lib/warnings/regexec | 3 ---
+ 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/t/lib/warnings/regexec b/t/lib/warnings/regexec
+index 6635142dea..c370ddc3c7 100644
+--- a/t/lib/warnings/regexec
++++ b/t/lib/warnings/regexec
+@@ -262,8 +262,5 @@ setlocale(&POSIX::LC_CTYPE, $utf8_locale);
+ EXPECT
+ ########
+ # NAME perl #132063, read beyond buffer end
+-# OPTION fatal
+ "\xff" =~ /(?il)\x{100}|\x{100}/;
+ EXPECT
+-Malformed UTF-8 character: \xff (too short; 1 byte available, need 13) in pattern match (m//) at - line 2.
+-Malformed UTF-8 character (fatal) at - line 2.
+-- 
+2.15.1-424-g9478a660812
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-6913.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-6913.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..157af7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl/CVE-2018-6913.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+From f17fed5006177dce8ac48229c424a2da0d6ba492 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tony Cook <tony@develop-help.com>
+Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2017 09:32:58 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] (perl #131844) fix various space calculation issues in
+ pp_pack.c
+
+- for the originally reported case, if the start/cur pointer is in the
+  top 75% of the address space the add (cur) + glen addition would
+  overflow, resulting in the condition failing incorrectly.
+
+- the addition of the existing space used to the space needed could
+  overflow, resulting in too small an allocation and a buffer overflow.
+
+- the scaling for UTF8 could overflow.
+
+- the multiply to calculate the space needed for many items could
+  overflow.
+
+For the first case, do a space calculation without making new pointers.
+
+For the other cases, detect the overflow and croak if there's an
+overflow.
+
+Originally this used Size_t_MAX as the maximum size of a memory
+allocation, but for -DDEBUGGING builds realloc() throws a panic for
+allocations over half the address space in size, changing the error
+reported for the allocation.
+
+For non-DEBUGGING builds the Size_t_MAX limit has the small chance
+of finding a system that has 3GB of contiguous space available, and
+allocating that space, which could be a denial of servce in some cases.
+
+Unfortunately changing the limit to half the address space means that
+the exact case with the original issue can no longer occur, so the
+test is no longer testing against the address + length issue that
+caused the original problem, since the allocation is failing earlier.
+
+One option would be to change the test so the size request by pack is
+just under 2GB, but this has a higher (but still low) probability that
+the system has the address space available, and will actually try to
+allocate the memory, so let's not do that.
+
+Note: changed 
+plan tests => 14713;
+to 
+plan tests => 14712;
+in a/t/op/pack.t
+to apply this patch on perl 5.24.1.
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-6913
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://perl5.git.perl.org/perl.git/commitdiff/f17fed5006177dce8ac48229c424a2da0d6ba492]
+
+Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <jkrishnanjanappa@mvista.com>
+---
+ pp_pack.c   | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++----
+ t/op/pack.t | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/pp_pack.c b/pp_pack.c
+index 8937d6d715..5e9cc64301 100644
+--- a/pp_pack.c
++++ b/pp_pack.c
+@@ -357,11 +357,28 @@ STMT_START {							\
+     }								\
+ } STMT_END
+ 
++#define SAFE_UTF8_EXPAND(var)	\
++STMT_START {				\
++    if ((var) > SSize_t_MAX / UTF8_EXPAND) \
++        Perl_croak(aTHX_ "%s", "Out of memory during pack()"); \
++    (var) = (var) * UTF8_EXPAND; \
++} STMT_END
++
++#define GROWING2(utf8, cat, start, cur, item_size, item_count)	\
++STMT_START {							\
++    if (SSize_t_MAX / (item_size) < (item_count))		\
++        Perl_croak(aTHX_ "%s", "Out of memory during pack()");	\
++    GROWING((utf8), (cat), (start), (cur), (item_size) * (item_count)); \
++} STMT_END
++
+ #define GROWING(utf8, cat, start, cur, in_len)	\
+ STMT_START {					\
+     STRLEN glen = (in_len);			\
+-    if (utf8) glen *= UTF8_EXPAND;		\
+-    if ((cur) + glen >= (start) + SvLEN(cat)) {	\
++    STRLEN catcur = (STRLEN)((cur) - (start));	\
++    if (utf8) SAFE_UTF8_EXPAND(glen);		\
++    if (SSize_t_MAX - glen < catcur)		\
++        Perl_croak(aTHX_ "%s", "Out of memory during pack()"); \
++    if (catcur + glen >= SvLEN(cat)) {	\
+ 	(start) = sv_exp_grow(cat, glen);	\
+ 	(cur) = (start) + SvCUR(cat);		\
+     }						\
+@@ -372,7 +389,7 @@ STMT_START {					\
+ STMT_START {					\
+     const STRLEN glen = (in_len);		\
+     STRLEN gl = glen;				\
+-    if (utf8) gl *= UTF8_EXPAND;		\
++    if (utf8) SAFE_UTF8_EXPAND(gl);		\
+     if ((cur) + gl >= (start) + SvLEN(cat)) {	\
+         *cur = '\0';				\
+         SvCUR_set((cat), (cur) - (start));	\
+@@ -2126,7 +2143,7 @@ S_pack_rec(pTHX_ SV *cat, tempsym_t* sym
+ 	    if (props && !(props & PACK_SIZE_UNPREDICTABLE)) {
+ 		/* We can process this letter. */
+ 		STRLEN size = props & PACK_SIZE_MASK;
+-		GROWING(utf8, cat, start, cur, (STRLEN) len * size);
++		GROWING2(utf8, cat, start, cur, size, (STRLEN)len);
+ 	    }
+         }
+ 
+diff --git a/t/op/pack.t b/t/op/pack.t
+index 664aaaf1b0..cf0e286509 100644
+--- a/t/op/pack.t
++++ b/t/op/pack.t
+@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ my $no_endianness = $] > 5.009 ? '' :
+ my $no_signedness = $] > 5.009 ? '' :
+   "Signed/unsigned pack modifiers not available on this perl";
+ 
+-plan tests => 14712;
++plan tests => 14717;
+ 
+ use strict;
+ use warnings qw(FATAL all);
+@@ -2044,3 +2044,25 @@ ok(1, "argument underflow did not crash"
+     is(pack("H40", $up_nul), $twenty_nuls,
+        "check pack H zero fills (utf8 source)");
+ }
++
++SKIP:
++{
++  # [perl #131844] pointer addition overflow
++    $Config{ptrsize} == 4
++      or skip "[perl #131844] need 32-bit build for this test", 4;
++    # prevent ASAN just crashing on the allocation failure
++    local $ENV{ASAN_OPTIONS} = $ENV{ASAN_OPTIONS};
++    $ENV{ASAN_OPTIONS} .= ",allocator_may_return_null=1";
++    fresh_perl_like('pack "f999999999"', qr/Out of memory during pack/, { stderr => 1 },
++		    "pointer addition overflow");
++
++    # integer (STRLEN) overflow from addition of glen to current length
++    fresh_perl_like('pack "c10f1073741823"', qr/Out of memory during pack/, { stderr => 1 },
++		    "integer overflow calculating allocation (addition)");
++
++    fresh_perl_like('pack "W10f536870913", 256', qr/Out of memory during pack/, { stderr => 1 },
++		    "integer overflow calculating allocation (utf8)");
++
++    fresh_perl_like('pack "c10f1073741824"', qr/Out of memory during pack/, { stderr => 1 },
++		    "integer overflow calculating allocation (multiply)");
++}
+-- 
+2.15.1-424-g9478a660812
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.24.1.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.24.1.bb
index 91f310d..5fed896 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.24.1.bb
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.24.1.bb
@@ -66,6 +66,11 @@
         file://perl-5.26.1-guard_old_libcrypt_fix.patch \
         file://CVE-2017-12883.patch \
         file://CVE-2017-12837.patch \
+        file://CVE-2018-6798-1.patch \
+        file://CVE-2018-6798-2.patch \
+        file://CVE-2018-6797.patch \
+        file://CVE-2018-6913.patch \
+        file://CVE-2018-12015.patch \
 "
 
 # Fix test case issues