diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/bzip2/bzip2_1.0.6.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/bzip2/bzip2_1.0.6.bb
index de668d6..acbf80a 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/bzip2/bzip2_1.0.6.bb
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/bzip2/bzip2_1.0.6.bb
@@ -2,13 +2,13 @@
 DESCRIPTION = "bzip2 compresses files using the Burrows-Wheeler block-sorting text compression algorithm, and \
 Huffman coding. Compression is generally considerably better than that achieved by more conventional \
 LZ77/LZ78-based compressors, and approaches the performance of the PPM family of statistical compressors."
-HOMEPAGE = "http://www.bzip.org/"
+HOMEPAGE = "https://sourceware.org/bzip2/"
 SECTION = "console/utils"
 LICENSE = "bzip2"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;beginline=8;endline=37;md5=40d9d1eb05736d1bfc86cfdd9106e6b2"
 PR = "r5"
 
-SRC_URI = "http://www.bzip.org/${PV}/${BP}.tar.gz \
+SRC_URI = "http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/mirror/sources/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://fix-bunzip2-qt-returns-0-for-corrupt-archives.patch \
            file://configure.ac;subdir=${BP} \
            file://Makefile.am;subdir=${BP} \
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "00b516f4704d4a7cb50a1d97e6e8e15b"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "a2848f34fcd5d6cf47def00461fcb528a0484d8edef8208d6d2e2909dc61d9cd"
 
-UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://www.bzip.org/downloads.html"
+UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://www.sourceware.org/bzip2/"
 
 PACKAGES =+ "libbz2"
 
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14503.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14503.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..42fa68c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14503.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 2c8c83b9731ff822fad6cc8c670ea5519c366a14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Joerg Sonnenberger <joerg@bec.de>
+Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2018 21:14:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Reject LHA archive entries with negative size.
+
+CVE: CVE-2017-14503
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/2c8c83b9731ff822fad6cc8c670ea5519c366a14]
+
+Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <jkrishnanjanappa@mvista.com>
+---
+ libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c
+index b8ef4ae1..95c99bb1 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c
+@@ -701,6 +701,12 @@ archive_read_format_lha_read_header(struct archive_read *a,
+ 	 * Prepare variables used to read a file content.
+ 	 */
+ 	lha->entry_bytes_remaining = lha->compsize;
++	if (lha->entry_bytes_remaining < 0) {
++		archive_set_error(&a->archive,
++		    ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
++		    "Invalid LHa entry size");
++		return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
++	}
+ 	lha->entry_offset = 0;
+ 	lha->entry_crc_calculated = 0;
+ 
+-- 
+2.13.3
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.3.2.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.3.2.bb
index 5daca27..3269716 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.3.2.bb
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.3.2.bb
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
            file://CVE-2017-14166.patch \
            file://CVE-2017-14502.patch \
            file://non-recursive-extract-and-list.patch \
+           file://CVE-2017-14503.patch \
           "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "4583bd6b2ebf7e0e8963d90879eb1b27"
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/CVE-2018-1124.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/CVE-2018-1124.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc78faf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/CVE-2018-1124.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+From bdd058a0e676d2f013027fcfb2b344c313112a50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
+Date: Thu, 1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 074/126] proc/readproc.c: Fix bugs and overflows in
+ file2strvec().
+
+Note: this is by far the most important and complex patch of the whole
+series, please review it carefully; thank you very much!
+
+For this patch, we decided to keep the original function's design and
+skeleton, to avoid regressions and behavior changes, while fixing the
+various bugs and overflows. And like the "Harden file2str()" patch, this
+patch does not fail when about to overflow, but truncates instead: there
+is information available about this process, so return it to the caller;
+also, we used INT_MAX as a limit, but a lower limit could be used.
+
+The easy changes:
+
+- Replace sprintf() with snprintf() (and check for truncation).
+
+- Replace "if (n == 0 && rbuf == 0)" with "if (n <= 0 && tot <= 0)" and
+  do break instead of return: it simplifies the code (only one place to
+  handle errors), and also guarantees that in the while loop either n or
+  tot is > 0 (or both), even if n is reset to 0 when about to overflow.
+
+- Remove the "if (n < 0)" block in the while loop: it is (and was) dead
+  code, since we enter the while loop only if n >= 0.
+
+- Rewrite the missing-null-terminator detection: in the original
+  function, if the size of the file is a multiple of 2047, a null-
+  terminator is appended even if the file is already null-terminated.
+
+- Replace "if (n <= 0 && !end_of_file)" with "if (n < 0 || tot <= 0)":
+  originally, it was equivalent to "if (n < 0)", but we added "tot <= 0"
+  to handle the first break of the while loop, and to guarantee that in
+  the rest of the function tot is > 0.
+
+- Double-force ("belt and suspenders") the null-termination of rbuf:
+  this is (and was) essential to the correctness of the function.
+
+- Replace the final "while" loop with a "for" loop that behaves just
+  like the preceding "for" loop: in the original function, this would
+  lead to unexpected results (for example, if rbuf is |\0|A|\0|, this
+  would return the array {"",NULL} but should return {"","A",NULL}; and
+  if rbuf is |A|\0|B| (should never happen because rbuf should be null-
+  terminated), this would make room for two pointers in ret, but would
+  write three pointers to ret).
+
+The hard changes:
+
+- Prevent the integer overflow of tot in the while loop, but unlike
+  file2str(), file2strvec() cannot let tot grow until it almost reaches
+  INT_MAX, because it needs more space for the pointers: this is why we
+  introduced ARG_LEN, which also guarantees that we can add "align" and
+  a few sizeof(char*)s to tot without overflowing.
+
+- Prevent the integer overflow of "tot + c + align": when INT_MAX is
+  (almost) reached, we write the maximal safe amount of pointers to ret
+  (ARG_LEN guarantees that there is always space for *ret = rbuf and the
+  NULL terminator).
+[carnil: backport for 3.3.9: Add include for limits.h and use of MAX_INT]
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-1124
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/procps-ng/procps/commit/36c350f07c75aabf747fb833f52a234ae5781b20]
+
+Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <jkrishnanjanappa@mvista.com>
+---
+ proc/readproc.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
+ 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
+
+diff -Naurp procps-ng-3.3.12_org/proc/readproc.c procps-ng-3.3.12/proc/readproc.c
+--- procps-ng-3.3.12_org/proc/readproc.c	2016-07-09 14:49:25.825306872 -0700
++++ procps-ng-3.3.12/proc/readproc.c	2018-07-24 00:46:49.366202531 -0700
+@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
+ #include <dirent.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <limits.h>
+ #ifdef WITH_SYSTEMD
+ #include <systemd/sd-login.h>
+ #endif
+--- a/proc/readproc.c
++++ b/proc/readproc.c
+@@ -600,11 +601,12 @@ static int file2str(const char *director
+ 
+ static char** file2strvec(const char* directory, const char* what) {
+     char buf[2048];	/* read buf bytes at a time */
+-    char *p, *rbuf = 0, *endbuf, **q, **ret;
++    char *p, *rbuf = 0, *endbuf, **q, **ret, *strp;
+     int fd, tot = 0, n, c, end_of_file = 0;
+     int align;
+ 
+-    sprintf(buf, "%s/%s", directory, what);
++    const int len = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", directory, what);
++    if(len <= 0 || (size_t)len >= sizeof buf) return NULL;
+     fd = open(buf, O_RDONLY, 0);
+     if(fd==-1) return NULL;
+ 
+@@ -612,18 +614,23 @@ static char** file2strvec(const char* di
+     while ((n = read(fd, buf, sizeof buf - 1)) >= 0) {
+ 	if (n < (int)(sizeof buf - 1))
+ 	    end_of_file = 1;
+-	if (n == 0 && rbuf == 0) {
+-	    close(fd);
+-	    return NULL;	/* process died between our open and read */
++	if (n <= 0 && tot <= 0) { /* nothing read now, nothing read before */
++	    break;		/* process died between our open and read */
+ 	}
+-	if (n < 0) {
+-	    if (rbuf)
+-		free(rbuf);
+-	    close(fd);
+-	    return NULL;	/* read error */
++	/* ARG_LEN is our guesstimated median length of a command-line argument
++	   or environment variable (the minimum is 1, the maximum is 131072) */
++	#define ARG_LEN 64
++	if (tot >= INT_MAX / (ARG_LEN + (int)sizeof(char*)) * ARG_LEN - n) {
++	    end_of_file = 1; /* integer overflow: null-terminate and break */
++	    n = 0; /* but tot > 0 */
+ 	}
+-	if (end_of_file && (n == 0 || buf[n-1]))/* last read char not null */
++	#undef ARG_LEN
++	if (end_of_file &&
++	    ((n > 0 && buf[n-1] != '\0') ||	/* last read char not null */
++	     (n <= 0 && rbuf[tot-1] != '\0')))	/* last read char not null */
+ 	    buf[n++] = '\0';			/* so append null-terminator */
++
++	if (n <= 0) break; /* unneeded (end_of_file = 1) but avoid realloc */
+ 	rbuf = xrealloc(rbuf, tot + n);		/* allocate more memory */
+ 	memcpy(rbuf + tot, buf, n);		/* copy buffer into it */
+ 	tot += n;				/* increment total byte ctr */
+@@ -631,29 +638,34 @@ static char** file2strvec(const char* di
+ 	    break;
+     }
+     close(fd);
+-    if (n <= 0 && !end_of_file) {
++    if (n < 0 || tot <= 0) {	/* error, or nothing read */
+ 	if (rbuf) free(rbuf);
+ 	return NULL;		/* read error */
+     }
++    rbuf[tot-1] = '\0'; /* belt and suspenders (the while loop did it, too) */
+     endbuf = rbuf + tot;			/* count space for pointers */
+     align = (sizeof(char*)-1) - ((tot + sizeof(char*)-1) & (sizeof(char*)-1));
+-    for (c = 0, p = rbuf; p < endbuf; p++) {
+-	if (!*p || *p == '\n')
++    c = sizeof(char*);				/* one extra for NULL term */
++    for (p = rbuf; p < endbuf; p++) {
++	if (!*p || *p == '\n') {
++	    if (c >= INT_MAX - (tot + (int)sizeof(char*) + align)) break;
+ 	    c += sizeof(char*);
++	}
+ 	if (*p == '\n')
+ 	    *p = 0;
+     }
+-    c += sizeof(char*);				/* one extra for NULL term */
+ 
+     rbuf = xrealloc(rbuf, tot + c + align);	/* make room for ptrs AT END */
+     endbuf = rbuf + tot;			/* addr just past data buf */
+     q = ret = (char**) (endbuf+align);		/* ==> free(*ret) to dealloc */
+-    *q++ = p = rbuf;				/* point ptrs to the strings */
+-    endbuf--;					/* do not traverse final NUL */
+-    while (++p < endbuf)
+-    	if (!*p)				/* NUL char implies that */
+-	    *q++ = p+1;				/* next string -> next char */
+-
++    for (strp = p = rbuf; p < endbuf; p++) {
++	if (!*p) {				/* NUL char implies that */
++	    if (c < 2 * (int)sizeof(char*)) break;
++	    c -= sizeof(char*);
++	    *q++ = strp;			/* point ptrs to the strings */
++	    strp = p+1;				/* next string -> next char */
++	}
++    }
+     *q = 0;					/* null ptr list terminator */
+     return ret;
+ }
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps_3.3.12.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps_3.3.12.bb
index ecf215f..6e15b0a 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps_3.3.12.bb
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps_3.3.12.bb
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 
 SRC_URI = "http://downloads.sourceforge.net/project/procps-ng/Production/procps-ng-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://sysctl.conf \
+           file://CVE-2018-1124.patch \
           "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "957e42e8b193490b2111252e4a2b443c"
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/CVE-2018-7169.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/CVE-2018-7169.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..36887d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/CVE-2018-7169.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+From fb28c99b8a66ff2605c5cb96abc0a4d975f92de0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
+Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 23:49:40 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] newgidmap: enforce setgroups=deny if self-mapping a group
+
+This is necessary to match the kernel-side policy of "self-mapping in a
+user namespace is fine, but you cannot drop groups" -- a policy that was
+created in order to stop user namespaces from allowing trivial privilege
+escalation by dropping supplementary groups that were "blacklisted" from
+certain paths.
+
+This is the simplest fix for the underlying issue, and effectively makes
+it so that unless a user has a valid mapping set in /etc/subgid (which
+only administrators can modify) -- and they are currently trying to use
+that mapping -- then /proc/$pid/setgroups will be set to deny. This
+workaround is only partial, because ideally it should be possible to set
+an "allow_setgroups" or "deny_setgroups" flag in /etc/subgid to allow
+administrators to further restrict newgidmap(1).
+
+We also don't write anything in the "allow" case because "allow" is the
+default, and users may have already written "deny" even if they
+technically are allowed to use setgroups. And we don't write anything if
+the setgroups policy is already "deny".
+
+Ref: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/shadow/+bug/1729357
+Fixes: CVE-2018-7169
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/fb28c99b8a66ff2605c5cb96abc0a4d975f92de0]
+Reported-by: Craig Furman <craig.furman89@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
+Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <jkrishnanjanappa@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/newgidmap.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 80 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/newgidmap.c b/src/newgidmap.c
+index b1e33513..59a2e75c 100644
+--- a/src/newgidmap.c
++++ b/src/newgidmap.c
+@@ -46,32 +46,37 @@
+  */
+ const char *Prog;
+ 
+-static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range)
++
++static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range, bool *allow_setgroups)
+ {
+ 	/* An empty range is invalid */
+ 	if (range->count == 0)
+ 		return false;
+ 
+-	/* Test /etc/subgid */
+-	if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count))
++	/* Test /etc/subgid. If the mapping is valid then we allow setgroups. */
++	if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count)) {
++		*allow_setgroups = true;
+ 		return true;
++	}
+ 
+-	/* Allow a process to map it's own gid */
+-	if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower))
++	/* Allow a process to map its own gid. */
++	if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower)) {
++		/* noop -- if setgroups is enabled already we won't disable it. */
+ 		return true;
++	}
+ 
+ 	return false;
+ }
+ 
+ static void verify_ranges(struct passwd *pw, int ranges,
+-	struct map_range *mappings)
++	struct map_range *mappings, bool *allow_setgroups)
+ {
+ 	struct map_range *mapping;
+ 	int idx;
+ 
+ 	mapping = mappings;
+ 	for (idx = 0; idx < ranges; idx++, mapping++) {
+-		if (!verify_range(pw, mapping)) {
++		if (!verify_range(pw, mapping, allow_setgroups)) {
+ 			fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: gid range [%lu-%lu) -> [%lu-%lu) not allowed\n"),
+ 				Prog,
+ 				mapping->upper,
+@@ -89,6 +94,70 @@ static void usage(void)
+ 	exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ 
++void write_setgroups(int proc_dir_fd, bool allow_setgroups)
++{
++	int setgroups_fd;
++	char *policy, policy_buffer[4096];
++
++	/*
++	 * Default is "deny", and any "allow" will out-rank a "deny". We don't
++	 * forcefully write an "allow" here because the process we are writing
++	 * mappings for may have already set themselves to "deny" (and "allow"
++	 * is the default anyway). So allow_setgroups == true is a noop.
++	 */
++	policy = "deny\n";
++	if (allow_setgroups)
++		return;
++
++	setgroups_fd = openat(proc_dir_fd, "setgroups", O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC);
++	if (setgroups_fd < 0) {
++		/*
++		 * If it's an ENOENT then we are on too old a kernel for the setgroups
++		 * code to exist. Emit a warning and bail on this.
++		 */
++		if (ENOENT == errno) {
++			fprintf(stderr, _("%s: kernel doesn't support setgroups restrictions\n"), Prog);
++			goto out;
++		}
++		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: couldn't open process setgroups: %s\n"),
++			Prog,
++			strerror(errno));
++		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++	}
++
++	/*
++	 * Check whether the policy is already what we want. /proc/self/setgroups
++	 * is write-once, so attempting to write after it's already written to will
++	 * fail.
++	 */
++	if (read(setgroups_fd, policy_buffer, sizeof(policy_buffer)) < 0) {
++		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to read setgroups: %s\n"),
++			Prog,
++			strerror(errno));
++		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++	}
++	if (!strncmp(policy_buffer, policy, strlen(policy)))
++		goto out;
++
++	/* Write the policy. */
++	if (lseek(setgroups_fd, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
++		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to seek setgroups: %s\n"),
++			Prog,
++			strerror(errno));
++		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++	}
++	if (dprintf(setgroups_fd, "%s", policy) < 0) {
++		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to setgroups %s policy: %s\n"),
++			Prog,
++			policy,
++			strerror(errno));
++		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++	}
++
++out:
++	close(setgroups_fd);
++}
++
+ /*
+  * newgidmap - Set the gid_map for the specified process
+  */
+@@ -103,6 +172,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 	struct passwd *pw;
+ 	int written;
++	bool allow_setgroups = false;
+ 
+ 	Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
+ 
+@@ -145,7 +215,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 				(unsigned long) getuid ()));
+ 		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+ 	}
+-	
++
+ 	/* Get the effective uid and effective gid of the target process */
+ 	if (fstat(proc_dir_fd, &st) < 0) {
+ 		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for target %u\n"),
+@@ -177,8 +247,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	if (!mappings)
+ 		usage();
+ 
+-	verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings);
++	verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings, &allow_setgroups);
+ 
++	write_setgroups(proc_dir_fd, allow_setgroups);
+ 	write_mapping(proc_dir_fd, ranges, mappings, "gid_map");
+ 	sub_gid_close();
+ 
+-- 
+2.13.3
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow.inc b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow.inc
index 6efe4a9..9691c38 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow.inc
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow.inc
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
            file://0001-shadow-CVE-2017-12424 \
            file://CVE-2017-2616.patch \
            ${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'pam', '${PAM_SRC_URI}', '', d)} \
+           file://CVE-2018-7169.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI_append_class-target = " \
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/0001-unzip-fix-CVE-2018-1000035.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/0001-unzip-fix-CVE-2018-1000035.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..37289d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/0001-unzip-fix-CVE-2018-1000035.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From 349f566e6e757458843fa164a0f0584280e1501e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
+Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2018 16:20:53 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] unzip: fix CVE-2018-1000035
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-1000035
+
+backport from unzip6.10c23
+
+Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
+---
+ fileio.c | 11 ++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/fileio.c b/fileio.c
+index 36bfea3..7605a29 100644
+--- a/fileio.c
++++ b/fileio.c
+@@ -1582,6 +1582,8 @@ int UZ_EXP UzpPassword (pG, rcnt, pwbuf, size, zfn, efn)
+     int r = IZ_PW_ENTERED;
+     char *m;
+     char *prompt;
++    char *ep;
++    char *zp;
+ 
+ #ifndef REENTRANT
+     /* tell picky compilers to shut up about "unused variable" warnings */
+@@ -1590,9 +1592,12 @@ int UZ_EXP UzpPassword (pG, rcnt, pwbuf, size, zfn, efn)
+ 
+     if (*rcnt == 0) {           /* First call for current entry */
+         *rcnt = 2;
+-        if ((prompt = (char *)malloc(2*FILNAMSIZ + 15)) != (char *)NULL) {
+-            sprintf(prompt, LoadFarString(PasswPrompt),
+-                    FnFilter1(zfn), FnFilter2(efn));
++        zp = FnFilter1( zfn);
++        ep = FnFilter2( efn);
++        prompt = (char *)malloc(    /* Slightly too long (2* "%s"). */
++         sizeof( PasswPrompt)+ strlen( zp)+ strlen( ep));
++        if (prompt != (char *)NULL) {
++            sprintf(prompt, LoadFarString(PasswPrompt), zp, ep);
+             m = prompt;
+         } else
+             m = (char *)LoadFarString(PasswPrompt2);
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/symlink.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/symlink.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a38f6f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/symlink.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+Unzip doesn't handle large zip files well and crashes:
+
+"This only happens if you have more then 16k entries and when one of
+the 16k entry infos is reused it happend to be previously used for
+a symlink entry."
+
+This patch is taken from Fedora (https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=972427)
+
+Upstream-Status: Pending (upstream is dead)
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
+
+--- unzip60/process.c.sav	2013-06-09 12:08:57.070392264 +0200
++++ unzip60/process.c	2013-06-09 12:10:08.641696988 +0200
+@@ -1751,6 +1751,12 @@
+         = (G.crec.general_purpose_bit_flag & (1 << 11)) == (1 << 11);
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef SYMLINKS
++    /* Initialize the symlink flag, may be set by the platform-specific
++       mapattr function.  */
++    G.pInfo->symlink = 0;
++#endif 
++
+     return PK_COOL;
+ 
+ } /* end function process_cdir_file_hdr() */
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb
index 105d048..a47491e 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
 	file://fix-security-format.patch \
 	file://18-cve-2014-9913-unzip-buffer-overflow.patch \
 	file://19-cve-2016-9844-zipinfo-buffer-overflow.patch \
+	file://symlink.patch \
+	file://0001-unzip-fix-CVE-2018-1000035.patch \
 "
 UPSTREAM_VERSION_UNKNOWN = "1"