diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/0001-Disable-use-of-syslog-for-sysroot.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/0001-Disable-use-of-syslog-for-sysroot.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index fa1532c..0000000
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/0001-Disable-use-of-syslog-for-sysroot.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-From 85d0444229ee3d14fefcf10d093f49c862826f82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
-Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2022 23:11:53 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Disable use of syslog for shadow-native tools
-
-Disable use of syslog to prevent sysroot user and group additions from
-writing entries to the host's syslog. This patch should only be used
-with the shadow-native recipe.
-
-Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [OE specific configuration]
-Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
-Signed-off-by: Peter Kjellerstedt <peter.kjellerstedt@axis.com>
-
----
- configure.ac      | 2 +-
- src/login_nopam.c | 3 ++-
- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 924254a..603af81 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PASSWD_PROGRAM, "$shadow_cv_passwd_dir/passwd",
- 	[Path to passwd program.])
- 
- dnl XXX - quick hack, should disappear before anyone notices :).
--AC_DEFINE(USE_SYSLOG, 1, [Define to use syslog().])
-+#AC_DEFINE(USE_SYSLOG, 1, [Define to use syslog().])
- if test "$ac_cv_func_ruserok" = "yes"; then
- 	AC_DEFINE(RLOGIN, 1, [Define if login should support the -r flag for rlogind.])
- 	AC_DEFINE(RUSEROK, 0, [Define to the ruserok() "success" return value (0 or 1).])
-diff --git a/src/login_nopam.c b/src/login_nopam.c
-index df6ba88..fc24e13 100644
---- a/src/login_nopam.c
-+++ b/src/login_nopam.c
-@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@
- #ifndef USE_PAM
- #ident "$Id$"
- 
--#include "prototypes.h"
-     /*
-      * This module implements a simple but effective form of login access
-      * control based on login names and on host (or domain) names, internet
-@@ -57,6 +56,8 @@
- #include <netinet/in.h>
- #include <arpa/inet.h>		/* for inet_ntoa() */
- 
-+#include "prototypes.h"
-+
- #if !defined(MAXHOSTNAMELEN) || (MAXHOSTNAMELEN < 64)
- #undef MAXHOSTNAMELEN
- #define MAXHOSTNAMELEN 256
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/0001-Fix-can-not-print-full-login.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/0001-Fix-can-not-print-full-login.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 89f9c05..0000000
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/0001-Fix-can-not-print-full-login.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-commit 670cae834827a8f794e6f7464fa57790d911b63c
-Author: SoumyaWind <121475834+SoumyaWind@users.noreply.github.com>
-Date:   Tue Dec 27 17:40:17 2022 +0530
-
-    shadow: Fix can not print full login timeout message
-    
-    Login timed out message prints only first few bytes when write is immediately followed by exit.
-    Calling exit from new handler provides enough time to display full message.
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/670cae834827a8f794e6f7464fa57790d911b63c]
-
-diff --git a/src/login.c b/src/login.c
-index 116e2cb3..c55f4de0 100644
---- a/src/login.c
-+++ b/src/login.c
-@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ static void get_pam_user (char **ptr_pam_user);
- 
- static void init_env (void);
- static void alarm_handler (int);
-+static void exit_handler (int);
- 
- /*
-  * usage - print login command usage and exit
-@@ -391,11 +392,16 @@ static void init_env (void)
- #endif				/* !USE_PAM */
- }
- 
-+static void exit_handler (unused int sig)
-+{
-+	_exit (0);
-+}
- 
- static void alarm_handler (unused int sig)
- {
- 	write (STDERR_FILENO, tmsg, strlen (tmsg));
--	_exit (0);
-+	signal(SIGALRM, exit_handler);
-+	alarm(2);
- }
- 
- #ifdef USE_PAM
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/0001-Overhaul-valid_field.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/0001-Overhaul-valid_field.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ac08be5..0000000
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/0001-Overhaul-valid_field.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-From 2eaea70111f65b16d55998386e4ceb4273c19eb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
-Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2023 14:46:50 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Overhaul valid_field()
-
-e5905c4b ("Added control character check") introduced checking for
-control characters but had the logic inverted, so it rejects all
-characters that are not control ones.
-
-Cast the character to `unsigned char` before passing to the character
-checking functions to avoid UB.
-
-Use strpbrk(3) for the illegal character test and return early.
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/2eaea70111f65b16d55998386e4ceb4273c19eb4]
-
-Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com>
----
- lib/fields.c | 24 ++++++++++--------------
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/fields.c b/lib/fields.c
-index fb51b582..53929248 100644
---- a/lib/fields.c
-+++ b/lib/fields.c
-@@ -37,26 +37,22 @@ int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
- 
- 	/* For each character of field, search if it appears in the list
- 	 * of illegal characters. */
-+	if (illegal && NULL != strpbrk (field, illegal)) {
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
- 	for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
--		if (strchr (illegal, *cp) != NULL) {
-+		unsigned char c = *cp;
-+		if (!isprint (c)) {
-+			err = 1;
-+		}
-+		if (iscntrl (c)) {
- 			err = -1;
- 			break;
- 		}
- 	}
- 
--	if (0 == err) {
--		/* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
--		for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
--			if (!isprint (*cp)) {
--				err = 1;
--			}
--			if (!iscntrl (*cp)) {
--				err = -1;
--				break;
--			}
--		}
--	}
--
- 	return err;
- }
- 
--- 
-2.34.1
-
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/CVE-2023-29383.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/CVE-2023-29383.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f53341d..0000000
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/CVE-2023-29383.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-From e5905c4b84d4fb90aefcd96ee618411ebfac663d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: tomspiderlabs <128755403+tomspiderlabs@users.noreply.github.com>
-Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2023 23:39:38 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Added control character check
-
-Added control character check, returning -1 (to "err") if control characters are present.
-
-CVE: CVE-2023-29383
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-Reference to upstream:
-https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/e5905c4b84d4fb90aefcd96ee618411ebfac663d
-
-Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com>
----
- lib/fields.c | 11 +++++++----
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/fields.c b/lib/fields.c
-index 640be931..fb51b582 100644
---- a/lib/fields.c
-+++ b/lib/fields.c
-@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@
-  *
-  * The supplied field is scanned for non-printable and other illegal
-  * characters.
-- *  + -1 is returned if an illegal character is present.
-- *  +  1 is returned if no illegal characters are present, but the field
-- *       contains a non-printable character.
-+ *  + -1 is returned if an illegal or control character is present.
-+ *  +  1 is returned if no illegal or control characters are present,
-+ *       but the field contains a non-printable character.
-  *  +  0 is returned otherwise.
-  */
- int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
-@@ -45,10 +45,13 @@ int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
- 	}
- 
- 	if (0 == err) {
--		/* Search if there are some non-printable characters */
-+		/* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
- 		for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
- 			if (!isprint (*cp)) {
- 				err = 1;
-+			}
-+			if (!iscntrl (*cp)) {
-+				err = -1;
- 				break;
- 			}
- 		}
--- 
-2.34.1
-
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/CVE-2023-4641.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/CVE-2023-4641.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1fabfe9..0000000
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/CVE-2023-4641.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,147 +0,0 @@
-From 25dbe2ce166a13322b7536ff2f738786ea2e61e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
-Date: Sat, 10 Jun 2023 16:20:05 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] gpasswd(1): Fix password leak
-
-How to trigger this password leak?
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-When gpasswd(1) asks for the new password, it asks twice (as is usual
-for confirming the new password).  Each of those 2 password prompts
-uses agetpass() to get the password.  If the second agetpass() fails,
-the first password, which has been copied into the 'static' buffer
-'pass' via STRFCPY(), wasn't being zeroed.
-
-agetpass() is defined in <./libmisc/agetpass.c> (around line 91), and
-can fail for any of the following reasons:
-
--  malloc(3) or readpassphrase(3) failure.
-
-   These are going to be difficult to trigger.  Maybe getting the system
-   to the limits of memory utilization at that exact point, so that the
-   next malloc(3) gets ENOMEM, and possibly even the OOM is triggered.
-   About readpassphrase(3), ENFILE and EINTR seem the only plausible
-   ones, and EINTR probably requires privilege or being the same user;
-   but I wouldn't discard ENFILE so easily, if a process starts opening
-   files.
-
--  The password is longer than PASS_MAX.
-
-   The is plausible with physical access.  However, at that point, a
-   keylogger will be a much simpler attack.
-
-And, the attacker must be able to know when the second password is being
-introduced, which is not going to be easy.
-
-How to read the password after the leak?
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-Provoking the leak yourself at the right point by entering a very long
-password is easy, and inspecting the process stack at that point should
-be doable.  Try to find some consistent patterns.
-
-Then, search for those patterns in free memory, right after the victim
-leaks their password.
-
-Once you get the leak, a program should read all the free memory
-searching for patterns that gpasswd(1) leaves nearby the leaked
-password.
-
-On 6/10/23 03:14, Seth Arnold wrote:
-> An attacker process wouldn't be able to use malloc(3) for this task.
-> There's a handful of tools available for userspace to allocate memory:
->
-> -  brk / sbrk
-> -  mmap MAP_ANONYMOUS
-> -  mmap /dev/zero
-> -  mmap some other file
-> -  shm_open
-> -  shmget
->
-> Most of these return only pages of zeros to a process.  Using mmap of an
-> existing file, you can get some of the contents of the file demand-loaded
-> into the memory space on the first use.
->
-> The MAP_UNINITIALIZED flag only works if the kernel was compiled with
-> CONFIG_MMAP_ALLOW_UNINITIALIZED.  This is rare.
->
-> malloc(3) doesn't zero memory, to our collective frustration, but all the
-> garbage in the allocations is from previous allocations in the current
-> process.  It isn't leftover from other processes.
->
-> The avenues available for reading the memory:
-> -  /dev/mem and /dev/kmem (requires root, not available with Secure Boot)
-> -  /proc/pid/mem (requires ptrace privileges, mediated by YAMA)
-> -  ptrace (requires ptrace privileges, mediated by YAMA)
-> -  causing memory to be swapped to disk, and then inspecting the swap
->
-> These all require a certain amount of privileges.
-
-How to fix it?
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-memzero(), which internally calls explicit_bzero(3), or whatever
-alternative the system provides with a slightly different name, will
-make sure that the buffer is zeroed in memory, and optimizations are not
-allowed to impede this zeroing.
-
-This is not really 100% effective, since compilers may place copies of
-the string somewhere hidden in the stack.  Those copies won't get zeroed
-by explicit_bzero(3).  However, that's arguably a compiler bug, since
-compilers should make everything possible to avoid optimizing strings
-that are later passed to explicit_bzero(3).  But we all know that
-sometimes it's impossible to have perfect knowledge in the compiler, so
-this is plausible.  Nevertheless, there's nothing we can do against such
-issues, except minimizing the time such passwords are stored in plain
-text.
-
-Security concerns
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-We believe this isn't easy to exploit.  Nevertheless, and since the fix
-is trivial, this fix should probably be applied soon, and backported to
-all supported distributions, to prevent someone else having more
-imagination than us to find a way.
-
-Affected versions
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-All.  Bug introduced in shadow 19990709.  That's the second commit in
-the git history.
-
-Fixes: 45c6603cc86c ("[svn-upgrade] Integrating new upstream version, shadow (19990709)")
-
-CVE: CVE-2023-4641
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/65c88a43a23c2391dcc90c0abda3e839e9c57904]
-
-Reported-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
-Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-Cc: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
-Cc: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
-Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
-Cc: Balint Reczey <rbalint@debian.org>
-Cc: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
-Cc: David Runge <dvzrv@archlinux.org>
-Cc: Andreas Jaeger <aj@suse.de>
-Cc: <~hallyn/shadow@lists.sr.ht>
-Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
-Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com>
----
- src/gpasswd.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/gpasswd.c b/src/gpasswd.c
-index 5983f787..2d8869ef 100644
---- a/src/gpasswd.c
-+++ b/src/gpasswd.c
-@@ -896,6 +896,7 @@ static void change_passwd (struct group *gr)
- 		strzero (cp);
- 		cp = getpass (_("Re-enter new password: "));
- 		if (NULL == cp) {
-+			memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
- 			exit (1);
- 		}
- 
--- 
-2.34.1
-
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/commonio.c-fix-unexpected-open-failure-in-chroot-env.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/commonio.c-fix-unexpected-open-failure-in-chroot-env.patch
index 85d9175..4a932d2 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/commonio.c-fix-unexpected-open-failure-in-chroot-env.patch
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/commonio.c-fix-unexpected-open-failure-in-chroot-env.patch
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 21583da072aa66901d859ac00ce209bac87ddecc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From a773c6b240d27e23d6be41decef0edf24fcee523 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Chen Qi <Qi.Chen@windriver.com>
 Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 15:53:34 +0800
 Subject: [PATCH] commonio.c-fix-unexpected-open-failure-in-chroot-env
@@ -15,35 +15,37 @@
 the codes.
 
 Signed-off-by: Chen Qi <Qi.Chen@windriver.com>
-
 ---
  lib/commonio.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
  1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/lib/commonio.c b/lib/commonio.c
-index 9a02ce1..61384ec 100644
+index 73fdb3a..d1231e9 100644
 --- a/lib/commonio.c
 +++ b/lib/commonio.c
-@@ -616,10 +616,18 @@ int commonio_open (struct commonio_db *db, int mode)
+@@ -606,10 +606,18 @@ int commonio_open (struct commonio_db *db, int mode)
  	db->cursor = NULL;
  	db->changed = false;
  
 -	fd = open (db->filename,
 -	             (db->readonly ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR)
--	           | O_NOCTTY | O_NONBLOCK | O_NOFOLLOW);
+-	           | O_NOCTTY | O_NONBLOCK | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
 -	saved_errno = errno;
 +	if (db->readonly) {
 +		fd = open (db->filename,
 +			   (true ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR)
-+			   | O_NOCTTY | O_NONBLOCK | O_NOFOLLOW);
++			   | O_NOCTTY | O_NONBLOCK | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
 +		saved_errno = errno;
 +	} else {
 +		fd = open (db->filename,
 +			   (false ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR)
-+			   | O_NOCTTY | O_NONBLOCK | O_NOFOLLOW);
++			   | O_NOCTTY | O_NONBLOCK | O_NOFOLLOW| O_CLOEXEC);
 +		saved_errno = errno;
 +	}
 +
  	db->fp = NULL;
  	if (fd >= 0) {
  #ifdef WITH_TCB
+-- 
+2.30.2
+