diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc
index d41cc8f..b1c822b 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc
@@ -32,6 +32,10 @@
 	   file://CVE-2020-13361.patch \
 	   file://find_datadir.patch \
 	   file://CVE-2020-10761.patch \
+	   file://CVE-2020-13362.patch \
+	   file://CVE-2020-13659.patch \
+	   file://CVE-2020-13800.patch \
+	   file://CVE-2020-13791.patch \
 	   "
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
 
@@ -140,7 +144,7 @@
 PACKAGECONFIG_remove_mingw32 = "kvm virglrenderer glx gtk+"
 
 PACKAGECONFIG[sdl] = "--enable-sdl,--disable-sdl,libsdl2"
-PACKAGECONFIG[virtfs] = "--enable-virtfs --enable-attr,--disable-virtfs,libcap-ng attr,"
+PACKAGECONFIG[virtfs] = "--enable-virtfs --enable-attr --enable-cap-ng,--disable-virtfs,libcap-ng attr,"
 PACKAGECONFIG[aio] = "--enable-linux-aio,--disable-linux-aio,libaio,"
 PACKAGECONFIG[xfs] = "--enable-xfsctl,--disable-xfsctl,xfsprogs,"
 PACKAGECONFIG[xen] = "--enable-xen,--disable-xen,xen-tools,xen-tools-libxenstore xen-tools-libxenctrl xen-tools-libxenguest"
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13362.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13362.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af8d4ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13362.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+From f50ab86a2620bd7e8507af865b164655ee921661 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Thu, 14 May 2020 00:55:38 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] megasas: use unsigned type for reply_queue_head and check
+ index
+
+A guest user may set 'reply_queue_head' field of MegasasState to
+a negative value. Later in 'megasas_lookup_frame' it is used to
+index into s->frames[] array. Use unsigned type to avoid OOB
+access issue.
+
+Also check that 'index' value stays within s->frames[] bounds
+through the while() loop in 'megasas_lookup_frame' to avoid OOB
+access.
+
+Reported-by: Ren Ding <rding@gatech.edu>
+Reported-by: Hanqing Zhao <hanqing@gatech.edu>
+Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Acked-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Message-Id: <20200513192540.1583887-2-ppandit@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [f50ab86a2620bd7e8507af865b164655ee921661]
+CVE: CVE-2020-13362
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/scsi/megasas.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/scsi/megasas.c b/hw/scsi/megasas.c
+index af18c88b65..6ce598cd69 100644
+--- a/hw/scsi/megasas.c
++++ b/hw/scsi/megasas.c
+@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ typedef struct MegasasState {
+     uint64_t reply_queue_pa;
+     void *reply_queue;
+     int reply_queue_len;
+-    int reply_queue_head;
++    uint16_t reply_queue_head;
+     int reply_queue_tail;
+     uint64_t consumer_pa;
+     uint64_t producer_pa;
+@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ static MegasasCmd *megasas_lookup_frame(MegasasState *s,
+ 
+     index = s->reply_queue_head;
+ 
+-    while (num < s->fw_cmds) {
++    while (num < s->fw_cmds && index < MEGASAS_MAX_FRAMES) {
+         if (s->frames[index].pa && s->frames[index].pa == frame) {
+             cmd = &s->frames[index];
+             break;
+-- 
+2.20.1
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13659.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13659.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4d12ae8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13659.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From 77f55eac6c433e23e82a1b88b2d74f385c4c7d82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Tue, 26 May 2020 16:47:43 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] exec: set map length to zero when returning NULL
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+When mapping physical memory into host's virtual address space,
+'address_space_map' may return NULL if BounceBuffer is in_use.
+Set and return '*plen = 0' to avoid later NULL pointer dereference.
+
+Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Fixes: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1878259
+Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Suggested-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Message-Id: <20200526111743.428367-1-ppandit@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [77f55eac6c433e23e82a1b88b2d74f385c4c7d82]
+CVE: CVE-2020-13659
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ exec.c                | 1 +
+ include/exec/memory.h | 3 ++-
+ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/exec.c b/exec.c
+index 9cbde85d8c..778263f1c6 100644
+--- a/exec.c
++++ b/exec.c
+@@ -3540,6 +3540,7 @@ void *address_space_map(AddressSpace *as,
+ 
+     if (!memory_access_is_direct(mr, is_write)) {
+         if (atomic_xchg(&bounce.in_use, true)) {
++            *plen = 0;
+             return NULL;
+         }
+         /* Avoid unbounded allocations */
+diff --git a/include/exec/memory.h b/include/exec/memory.h
+index bd7fdd6081..af8ca7824e 100644
+--- a/include/exec/memory.h
++++ b/include/exec/memory.h
+@@ -2314,7 +2314,8 @@ bool address_space_access_valid(AddressSpace *as, hwaddr addr, hwaddr len,
+ /* address_space_map: map a physical memory region into a host virtual address
+  *
+  * May map a subset of the requested range, given by and returned in @plen.
+- * May return %NULL if resources needed to perform the mapping are exhausted.
++ * May return %NULL and set *@plen to zero(0), if resources needed to perform
++ * the mapping are exhausted.
+  * Use only for reads OR writes - not for read-modify-write operations.
+  * Use cpu_register_map_client() to know when retrying the map operation is
+  * likely to succeed.
+-- 
+2.20.1
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13791.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13791.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..049dab9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13791.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+From f7d6a635fa3b7797f9d072e280f065bf3cfcd24d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2020 17:05:25 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] pci: assert configuration access is within bounds
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+While accessing PCI configuration bytes, assert that
+'address + len' is within PCI configuration space.
+
+Generally it is within bounds. This is more of a defensive
+assert, in case a buggy device was to send 'address' which
+may go out of bounds.
+
+Suggested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Message-Id: <20200604113525.58898-1-ppandit@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [f7d6a635fa3b7797f9d072e280f065bf3cfcd24d]
+CVE: CVE-2020-13791
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/pci/pci.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/pci/pci.c b/hw/pci/pci.c
+index 70c66965f5..7bf2ae6d92 100644
+--- a/hw/pci/pci.c
++++ b/hw/pci/pci.c
+@@ -1381,6 +1381,8 @@ uint32_t pci_default_read_config(PCIDevice *d,
+ {
+     uint32_t val = 0;
+ 
++    assert(address + len <= pci_config_size(d));
++
+     if (pci_is_express_downstream_port(d) &&
+         ranges_overlap(address, len, d->exp.exp_cap + PCI_EXP_LNKSTA, 2)) {
+         pcie_sync_bridge_lnk(d);
+@@ -1394,6 +1396,8 @@ void pci_default_write_config(PCIDevice *d, uint32_t addr, uint32_t val_in, int
+     int i, was_irq_disabled = pci_irq_disabled(d);
+     uint32_t val = val_in;
+ 
++    assert(addr + l <= pci_config_size(d));
++
+     for (i = 0; i < l; val >>= 8, ++i) {
+         uint8_t wmask = d->wmask[addr + i];
+         uint8_t w1cmask = d->w1cmask[addr + i];
+-- 
+2.20.1
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13800.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13800.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..52bfafb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13800.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+From a98610c429d52db0937c1e48659428929835c455 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2020 14:38:30 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] ati-vga: check mm_index before recursive call
+ (CVE-2020-13800)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+While accessing VGA registers via ati_mm_read/write routines,
+a guest may set 's->regs.mm_index' such that it leads to infinite
+recursion. Check mm_index value to avoid such recursion. Log an
+error message for wrong values.
+
+Reported-by: Ren Ding <rding@gatech.edu>
+Reported-by: Hanqing Zhao <hanqing@gatech.edu>
+Reported-by: Yi Ren <c4tren@gmail.com>
+Message-id: 20200604090830.33885-1-ppandit@redhat.com
+Suggested-by: BALATON Zoltan <balaton@eik.bme.hu>
+Suggested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [a98610c429d52db0937c1e48659428929835c455]
+CVE: CVE-2020-13800
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/display/ati.c | 10 ++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/ati.c b/hw/display/ati.c
+index 065f197678..67604e68de 100644
+--- a/hw/display/ati.c
++++ b/hw/display/ati.c
+@@ -285,8 +285,11 @@ static uint64_t ati_mm_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, unsigned int size)
+             if (idx <= s->vga.vram_size - size) {
+                 val = ldn_le_p(s->vga.vram_ptr + idx, size);
+             }
+-        } else {
++        } else if (s->regs.mm_index > MM_DATA + 3) {
+             val = ati_mm_read(s, s->regs.mm_index + addr - MM_DATA, size);
++        } else {
++            qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
++                "ati_mm_read: mm_index too small: %u\n", s->regs.mm_index);
+         }
+         break;
+     case BIOS_0_SCRATCH ... BUS_CNTL - 1:
+@@ -520,8 +523,11 @@ static void ati_mm_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
+             if (idx <= s->vga.vram_size - size) {
+                 stn_le_p(s->vga.vram_ptr + idx, size, data);
+             }
+-        } else {
++        } else if (s->regs.mm_index > MM_DATA + 3) {
+             ati_mm_write(s, s->regs.mm_index + addr - MM_DATA, data, size);
++        } else {
++            qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
++                "ati_mm_write: mm_index too small: %u\n", s->regs.mm_index);
+         }
+         break;
+     case BIOS_0_SCRATCH ... BUS_CNTL - 1:
+-- 
+2.20.1
+