diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/git-2.5.0/0009-CVE-2015-7545-2.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/git-2.5.0/0009-CVE-2015-7545-2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8000e26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/git-2.5.0/0009-CVE-2015-7545-2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+From 33cfccbbf35a56e190b79bdec5c85457c952a021 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
+Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2015 13:13:12 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] submodule: allow only certain protocols for submodule fetches
+
+Some protocols (like git-remote-ext) can execute arbitrary
+code found in the URL. The URLs that submodules use may come
+from arbitrary sources (e.g., .gitmodules files in a remote
+repository). Let's restrict submodules to fetching from a
+known-good subset of protocols.
+
+Note that we apply this restriction to all submodule
+commands, whether the URL comes from .gitmodules or not.
+This is more restrictive than we need to be; for example, in
+the tests we run:
+
+  git submodule add ext::...
+
+which should be trusted, as the URL comes directly from the
+command line provided by the user. But doing it this way is
+simpler, and makes it much less likely that we would miss a
+case. And since such protocols should be an exception
+(especially because nobody who clones from them will be able
+to update the submodules!), it's not likely to inconvenience
+anyone in practice.
+
+Reported-by: Blake Burkhart <bburky@bburky.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
+Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/g/git/git_2.5.0-1ubuntu0.1.debian.tar.xz
+
+CVE: CVE-2015-7545 #2
+Singed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ git-submodule.sh            |  9 +++++++++
+ t/t5815-submodule-protos.sh | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100755 t/t5815-submodule-protos.sh
+
+diff --git a/git-submodule.sh b/git-submodule.sh
+index 36797c3..78c2740 100755
+--- a/git-submodule.sh
++++ b/git-submodule.sh
+@@ -22,6 +22,15 @@ require_work_tree
+ wt_prefix=$(git rev-parse --show-prefix)
+ cd_to_toplevel
+ 
++# Restrict ourselves to a vanilla subset of protocols; the URLs
++# we get are under control of a remote repository, and we do not
++# want them kicking off arbitrary git-remote-* programs.
++#
++# If the user has already specified a set of allowed protocols,
++# we assume they know what they're doing and use that instead.
++: ${GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=file:git:http:https:ssh}
++export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL
++
+ command=
+ branch=
+ force=
+diff --git a/t/t5815-submodule-protos.sh b/t/t5815-submodule-protos.sh
+new file mode 100755
+index 0000000..06f55a1
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/t/t5815-submodule-protos.sh
+@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
++#!/bin/sh
++
++test_description='test protocol whitelisting with submodules'
++. ./test-lib.sh
++. "$TEST_DIRECTORY"/lib-proto-disable.sh
++
++setup_ext_wrapper
++setup_ssh_wrapper
++
++test_expect_success 'setup repository with submodules' '
++	mkdir remote &&
++	git init remote/repo.git &&
++	(cd remote/repo.git && test_commit one) &&
++	# submodule-add should probably trust what we feed it on the cmdline,
++	# but its implementation is overly conservative.
++	GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=ssh git submodule add remote:repo.git ssh-module &&
++	GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=ext git submodule add "ext::fake-remote %S repo.git" ext-module &&
++	git commit -m "add submodules"
++'
++
++test_expect_success 'clone with recurse-submodules fails' '
++	test_must_fail git clone --recurse-submodules . dst
++'
++
++test_expect_success 'setup individual updates' '
++	rm -rf dst &&
++	git clone . dst &&
++	git -C dst submodule init
++'
++
++test_expect_success 'update of ssh allowed' '
++	git -C dst submodule update ssh-module
++'
++
++test_expect_success 'update of ext not allowed' '
++	test_must_fail git -C dst submodule update ext-module
++'
++
++test_expect_success 'user can override whitelist' '
++	GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=ext git -C dst submodule update ext-module
++'
++
++test_done