| /** |
| * @license AngularJS v1.6.4 |
| * (c) 2010-2017 Google, Inc. http://angularjs.org |
| * License: MIT |
| */ |
| (function(window, angular) {'use strict'; |
| |
| /* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * |
| * Any commits to this file should be reviewed with security in mind. * |
| * Changes to this file can potentially create security vulnerabilities. * |
| * An approval from 2 Core members with history of modifying * |
| * this file is required. * |
| * * |
| * Does the change somehow allow for arbitrary javascript to be executed? * |
| * Or allows for someone to change the prototype of built-in objects? * |
| * Or gives undesired access to variables likes document or window? * |
| * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */ |
| |
| var $sanitizeMinErr = angular.$$minErr('$sanitize'); |
| var bind; |
| var extend; |
| var forEach; |
| var isDefined; |
| var lowercase; |
| var noop; |
| var nodeContains; |
| var htmlParser; |
| var htmlSanitizeWriter; |
| |
| /** |
| * @ngdoc module |
| * @name ngSanitize |
| * @description |
| * |
| * # ngSanitize |
| * |
| * The `ngSanitize` module provides functionality to sanitize HTML. |
| * |
| * |
| * <div doc-module-components="ngSanitize"></div> |
| * |
| * See {@link ngSanitize.$sanitize `$sanitize`} for usage. |
| */ |
| |
| /** |
| * @ngdoc service |
| * @name $sanitize |
| * @kind function |
| * |
| * @description |
| * Sanitizes an html string by stripping all potentially dangerous tokens. |
| * |
| * The input is sanitized by parsing the HTML into tokens. All safe tokens (from a whitelist) are |
| * then serialized back to properly escaped html string. This means that no unsafe input can make |
| * it into the returned string. |
| * |
| * The whitelist for URL sanitization of attribute values is configured using the functions |
| * `aHrefSanitizationWhitelist` and `imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist` of {@link ng.$compileProvider |
| * `$compileProvider`}. |
| * |
| * The input may also contain SVG markup if this is enabled via {@link $sanitizeProvider}. |
| * |
| * @param {string} html HTML input. |
| * @returns {string} Sanitized HTML. |
| * |
| * @example |
| <example module="sanitizeExample" deps="angular-sanitize.js" name="sanitize-service"> |
| <file name="index.html"> |
| <script> |
| angular.module('sanitizeExample', ['ngSanitize']) |
| .controller('ExampleController', ['$scope', '$sce', function($scope, $sce) { |
| $scope.snippet = |
| '<p style="color:blue">an html\n' + |
| '<em onmouseover="this.textContent=\'PWN3D!\'">click here</em>\n' + |
| 'snippet</p>'; |
| $scope.deliberatelyTrustDangerousSnippet = function() { |
| return $sce.trustAsHtml($scope.snippet); |
| }; |
| }]); |
| </script> |
| <div ng-controller="ExampleController"> |
| Snippet: <textarea ng-model="snippet" cols="60" rows="3"></textarea> |
| <table> |
| <tr> |
| <td>Directive</td> |
| <td>How</td> |
| <td>Source</td> |
| <td>Rendered</td> |
| </tr> |
| <tr id="bind-html-with-sanitize"> |
| <td>ng-bind-html</td> |
| <td>Automatically uses $sanitize</td> |
| <td><pre><div ng-bind-html="snippet"><br/></div></pre></td> |
| <td><div ng-bind-html="snippet"></div></td> |
| </tr> |
| <tr id="bind-html-with-trust"> |
| <td>ng-bind-html</td> |
| <td>Bypass $sanitize by explicitly trusting the dangerous value</td> |
| <td> |
| <pre><div ng-bind-html="deliberatelyTrustDangerousSnippet()"> |
| </div></pre> |
| </td> |
| <td><div ng-bind-html="deliberatelyTrustDangerousSnippet()"></div></td> |
| </tr> |
| <tr id="bind-default"> |
| <td>ng-bind</td> |
| <td>Automatically escapes</td> |
| <td><pre><div ng-bind="snippet"><br/></div></pre></td> |
| <td><div ng-bind="snippet"></div></td> |
| </tr> |
| </table> |
| </div> |
| </file> |
| <file name="protractor.js" type="protractor"> |
| it('should sanitize the html snippet by default', function() { |
| expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-sanitize div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')). |
| toBe('<p>an html\n<em>click here</em>\nsnippet</p>'); |
| }); |
| |
| it('should inline raw snippet if bound to a trusted value', function() { |
| expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-trust div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')). |
| toBe("<p style=\"color:blue\">an html\n" + |
| "<em onmouseover=\"this.textContent='PWN3D!'\">click here</em>\n" + |
| "snippet</p>"); |
| }); |
| |
| it('should escape snippet without any filter', function() { |
| expect(element(by.css('#bind-default div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')). |
| toBe("<p style=\"color:blue\">an html\n" + |
| "<em onmouseover=\"this.textContent='PWN3D!'\">click here</em>\n" + |
| "snippet</p>"); |
| }); |
| |
| it('should update', function() { |
| element(by.model('snippet')).clear(); |
| element(by.model('snippet')).sendKeys('new <b onclick="alert(1)">text</b>'); |
| expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-sanitize div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')). |
| toBe('new <b>text</b>'); |
| expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-trust div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).toBe( |
| 'new <b onclick="alert(1)">text</b>'); |
| expect(element(by.css('#bind-default div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).toBe( |
| "new <b onclick=\"alert(1)\">text</b>"); |
| }); |
| </file> |
| </example> |
| */ |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * @ngdoc provider |
| * @name $sanitizeProvider |
| * @this |
| * |
| * @description |
| * Creates and configures {@link $sanitize} instance. |
| */ |
| function $SanitizeProvider() { |
| var svgEnabled = false; |
| |
| this.$get = ['$$sanitizeUri', function($$sanitizeUri) { |
| if (svgEnabled) { |
| extend(validElements, svgElements); |
| } |
| return function(html) { |
| var buf = []; |
| htmlParser(html, htmlSanitizeWriter(buf, function(uri, isImage) { |
| return !/^unsafe:/.test($$sanitizeUri(uri, isImage)); |
| })); |
| return buf.join(''); |
| }; |
| }]; |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * @ngdoc method |
| * @name $sanitizeProvider#enableSvg |
| * @kind function |
| * |
| * @description |
| * Enables a subset of svg to be supported by the sanitizer. |
| * |
| * <div class="alert alert-warning"> |
| * <p>By enabling this setting without taking other precautions, you might expose your |
| * application to click-hijacking attacks. In these attacks, sanitized svg elements could be positioned |
| * outside of the containing element and be rendered over other elements on the page (e.g. a login |
| * link). Such behavior can then result in phishing incidents.</p> |
| * |
| * <p>To protect against these, explicitly setup `overflow: hidden` css rule for all potential svg |
| * tags within the sanitized content:</p> |
| * |
| * <br> |
| * |
| * <pre><code> |
| * .rootOfTheIncludedContent svg { |
| * overflow: hidden !important; |
| * } |
| * </code></pre> |
| * </div> |
| * |
| * @param {boolean=} flag Enable or disable SVG support in the sanitizer. |
| * @returns {boolean|ng.$sanitizeProvider} Returns the currently configured value if called |
| * without an argument or self for chaining otherwise. |
| */ |
| this.enableSvg = function(enableSvg) { |
| if (isDefined(enableSvg)) { |
| svgEnabled = enableSvg; |
| return this; |
| } else { |
| return svgEnabled; |
| } |
| }; |
| |
| ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// |
| // Private stuff |
| ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// |
| |
| bind = angular.bind; |
| extend = angular.extend; |
| forEach = angular.forEach; |
| isDefined = angular.isDefined; |
| lowercase = angular.lowercase; |
| noop = angular.noop; |
| |
| htmlParser = htmlParserImpl; |
| htmlSanitizeWriter = htmlSanitizeWriterImpl; |
| |
| nodeContains = window.Node.prototype.contains || /** @this */ function(arg) { |
| // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise |
| return !!(this.compareDocumentPosition(arg) & 16); |
| }; |
| |
| // Regular Expressions for parsing tags and attributes |
| var SURROGATE_PAIR_REGEXP = /[\uD800-\uDBFF][\uDC00-\uDFFF]/g, |
| // Match everything outside of normal chars and " (quote character) |
| NON_ALPHANUMERIC_REGEXP = /([^#-~ |!])/g; |
| |
| |
| // Good source of info about elements and attributes |
| // http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#semantics |
| // http://simon.html5.org/html-elements |
| |
| // Safe Void Elements - HTML5 |
| // http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#void-elements |
| var voidElements = toMap('area,br,col,hr,img,wbr'); |
| |
| // Elements that you can, intentionally, leave open (and which close themselves) |
| // http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#optional-tags |
| var optionalEndTagBlockElements = toMap('colgroup,dd,dt,li,p,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,tr'), |
| optionalEndTagInlineElements = toMap('rp,rt'), |
| optionalEndTagElements = extend({}, |
| optionalEndTagInlineElements, |
| optionalEndTagBlockElements); |
| |
| // Safe Block Elements - HTML5 |
| var blockElements = extend({}, optionalEndTagBlockElements, toMap('address,article,' + |
| 'aside,blockquote,caption,center,del,dir,div,dl,figure,figcaption,footer,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,' + |
| 'h6,header,hgroup,hr,ins,map,menu,nav,ol,pre,section,table,ul')); |
| |
| // Inline Elements - HTML5 |
| var inlineElements = extend({}, optionalEndTagInlineElements, toMap('a,abbr,acronym,b,' + |
| 'bdi,bdo,big,br,cite,code,del,dfn,em,font,i,img,ins,kbd,label,map,mark,q,ruby,rp,rt,s,' + |
| 'samp,small,span,strike,strong,sub,sup,time,tt,u,var')); |
| |
| // SVG Elements |
| // https://wiki.whatwg.org/wiki/Sanitization_rules#svg_Elements |
| // Note: the elements animate,animateColor,animateMotion,animateTransform,set are intentionally omitted. |
| // They can potentially allow for arbitrary javascript to be executed. See #11290 |
| var svgElements = toMap('circle,defs,desc,ellipse,font-face,font-face-name,font-face-src,g,glyph,' + |
| 'hkern,image,linearGradient,line,marker,metadata,missing-glyph,mpath,path,polygon,polyline,' + |
| 'radialGradient,rect,stop,svg,switch,text,title,tspan'); |
| |
| // Blocked Elements (will be stripped) |
| var blockedElements = toMap('script,style'); |
| |
| var validElements = extend({}, |
| voidElements, |
| blockElements, |
| inlineElements, |
| optionalEndTagElements); |
| |
| //Attributes that have href and hence need to be sanitized |
| var uriAttrs = toMap('background,cite,href,longdesc,src,xlink:href'); |
| |
| var htmlAttrs = toMap('abbr,align,alt,axis,bgcolor,border,cellpadding,cellspacing,class,clear,' + |
| 'color,cols,colspan,compact,coords,dir,face,headers,height,hreflang,hspace,' + |
| 'ismap,lang,language,nohref,nowrap,rel,rev,rows,rowspan,rules,' + |
| 'scope,scrolling,shape,size,span,start,summary,tabindex,target,title,type,' + |
| 'valign,value,vspace,width'); |
| |
| // SVG attributes (without "id" and "name" attributes) |
| // https://wiki.whatwg.org/wiki/Sanitization_rules#svg_Attributes |
| var svgAttrs = toMap('accent-height,accumulate,additive,alphabetic,arabic-form,ascent,' + |
| 'baseProfile,bbox,begin,by,calcMode,cap-height,class,color,color-rendering,content,' + |
| 'cx,cy,d,dx,dy,descent,display,dur,end,fill,fill-rule,font-family,font-size,font-stretch,' + |
| 'font-style,font-variant,font-weight,from,fx,fy,g1,g2,glyph-name,gradientUnits,hanging,' + |
| 'height,horiz-adv-x,horiz-origin-x,ideographic,k,keyPoints,keySplines,keyTimes,lang,' + |
| 'marker-end,marker-mid,marker-start,markerHeight,markerUnits,markerWidth,mathematical,' + |
| 'max,min,offset,opacity,orient,origin,overline-position,overline-thickness,panose-1,' + |
| 'path,pathLength,points,preserveAspectRatio,r,refX,refY,repeatCount,repeatDur,' + |
| 'requiredExtensions,requiredFeatures,restart,rotate,rx,ry,slope,stemh,stemv,stop-color,' + |
| 'stop-opacity,strikethrough-position,strikethrough-thickness,stroke,stroke-dasharray,' + |
| 'stroke-dashoffset,stroke-linecap,stroke-linejoin,stroke-miterlimit,stroke-opacity,' + |
| 'stroke-width,systemLanguage,target,text-anchor,to,transform,type,u1,u2,underline-position,' + |
| 'underline-thickness,unicode,unicode-range,units-per-em,values,version,viewBox,visibility,' + |
| 'width,widths,x,x-height,x1,x2,xlink:actuate,xlink:arcrole,xlink:role,xlink:show,xlink:title,' + |
| 'xlink:type,xml:base,xml:lang,xml:space,xmlns,xmlns:xlink,y,y1,y2,zoomAndPan', true); |
| |
| var validAttrs = extend({}, |
| uriAttrs, |
| svgAttrs, |
| htmlAttrs); |
| |
| function toMap(str, lowercaseKeys) { |
| var obj = {}, items = str.split(','), i; |
| for (i = 0; i < items.length; i++) { |
| obj[lowercaseKeys ? lowercase(items[i]) : items[i]] = true; |
| } |
| return obj; |
| } |
| |
| var inertBodyElement; |
| (function(window) { |
| var doc; |
| if (window.document && window.document.implementation) { |
| doc = window.document.implementation.createHTMLDocument('inert'); |
| } else { |
| throw $sanitizeMinErr('noinert', 'Can\'t create an inert html document'); |
| } |
| var docElement = doc.documentElement || doc.getDocumentElement(); |
| var bodyElements = docElement.getElementsByTagName('body'); |
| |
| // usually there should be only one body element in the document, but IE doesn't have any, so we need to create one |
| if (bodyElements.length === 1) { |
| inertBodyElement = bodyElements[0]; |
| } else { |
| var html = doc.createElement('html'); |
| inertBodyElement = doc.createElement('body'); |
| html.appendChild(inertBodyElement); |
| doc.appendChild(html); |
| } |
| })(window); |
| |
| /** |
| * @example |
| * htmlParser(htmlString, { |
| * start: function(tag, attrs) {}, |
| * end: function(tag) {}, |
| * chars: function(text) {}, |
| * comment: function(text) {} |
| * }); |
| * |
| * @param {string} html string |
| * @param {object} handler |
| */ |
| function htmlParserImpl(html, handler) { |
| if (html === null || html === undefined) { |
| html = ''; |
| } else if (typeof html !== 'string') { |
| html = '' + html; |
| } |
| inertBodyElement.innerHTML = html; |
| |
| //mXSS protection |
| var mXSSAttempts = 5; |
| do { |
| if (mXSSAttempts === 0) { |
| throw $sanitizeMinErr('uinput', 'Failed to sanitize html because the input is unstable'); |
| } |
| mXSSAttempts--; |
| |
| // strip custom-namespaced attributes on IE<=11 |
| if (window.document.documentMode) { |
| stripCustomNsAttrs(inertBodyElement); |
| } |
| html = inertBodyElement.innerHTML; //trigger mXSS |
| inertBodyElement.innerHTML = html; |
| } while (html !== inertBodyElement.innerHTML); |
| |
| var node = inertBodyElement.firstChild; |
| while (node) { |
| switch (node.nodeType) { |
| case 1: // ELEMENT_NODE |
| handler.start(node.nodeName.toLowerCase(), attrToMap(node.attributes)); |
| break; |
| case 3: // TEXT NODE |
| handler.chars(node.textContent); |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| var nextNode; |
| if (!(nextNode = node.firstChild)) { |
| if (node.nodeType === 1) { |
| handler.end(node.nodeName.toLowerCase()); |
| } |
| nextNode = getNonDescendant('nextSibling', node); |
| if (!nextNode) { |
| while (nextNode == null) { |
| node = getNonDescendant('parentNode', node); |
| if (node === inertBodyElement) break; |
| nextNode = getNonDescendant('nextSibling', node); |
| if (node.nodeType === 1) { |
| handler.end(node.nodeName.toLowerCase()); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| node = nextNode; |
| } |
| |
| while ((node = inertBodyElement.firstChild)) { |
| inertBodyElement.removeChild(node); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| function attrToMap(attrs) { |
| var map = {}; |
| for (var i = 0, ii = attrs.length; i < ii; i++) { |
| var attr = attrs[i]; |
| map[attr.name] = attr.value; |
| } |
| return map; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * Escapes all potentially dangerous characters, so that the |
| * resulting string can be safely inserted into attribute or |
| * element text. |
| * @param value |
| * @returns {string} escaped text |
| */ |
| function encodeEntities(value) { |
| return value. |
| replace(/&/g, '&'). |
| replace(SURROGATE_PAIR_REGEXP, function(value) { |
| var hi = value.charCodeAt(0); |
| var low = value.charCodeAt(1); |
| return '&#' + (((hi - 0xD800) * 0x400) + (low - 0xDC00) + 0x10000) + ';'; |
| }). |
| replace(NON_ALPHANUMERIC_REGEXP, function(value) { |
| return '&#' + value.charCodeAt(0) + ';'; |
| }). |
| replace(/</g, '<'). |
| replace(/>/g, '>'); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * create an HTML/XML writer which writes to buffer |
| * @param {Array} buf use buf.join('') to get out sanitized html string |
| * @returns {object} in the form of { |
| * start: function(tag, attrs) {}, |
| * end: function(tag) {}, |
| * chars: function(text) {}, |
| * comment: function(text) {} |
| * } |
| */ |
| function htmlSanitizeWriterImpl(buf, uriValidator) { |
| var ignoreCurrentElement = false; |
| var out = bind(buf, buf.push); |
| return { |
| start: function(tag, attrs) { |
| tag = lowercase(tag); |
| if (!ignoreCurrentElement && blockedElements[tag]) { |
| ignoreCurrentElement = tag; |
| } |
| if (!ignoreCurrentElement && validElements[tag] === true) { |
| out('<'); |
| out(tag); |
| forEach(attrs, function(value, key) { |
| var lkey = lowercase(key); |
| var isImage = (tag === 'img' && lkey === 'src') || (lkey === 'background'); |
| if (validAttrs[lkey] === true && |
| (uriAttrs[lkey] !== true || uriValidator(value, isImage))) { |
| out(' '); |
| out(key); |
| out('="'); |
| out(encodeEntities(value)); |
| out('"'); |
| } |
| }); |
| out('>'); |
| } |
| }, |
| end: function(tag) { |
| tag = lowercase(tag); |
| if (!ignoreCurrentElement && validElements[tag] === true && voidElements[tag] !== true) { |
| out('</'); |
| out(tag); |
| out('>'); |
| } |
| // eslint-disable-next-line eqeqeq |
| if (tag == ignoreCurrentElement) { |
| ignoreCurrentElement = false; |
| } |
| }, |
| chars: function(chars) { |
| if (!ignoreCurrentElement) { |
| out(encodeEntities(chars)); |
| } |
| } |
| }; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * When IE9-11 comes across an unknown namespaced attribute e.g. 'xlink:foo' it adds 'xmlns:ns1' attribute to declare |
| * ns1 namespace and prefixes the attribute with 'ns1' (e.g. 'ns1:xlink:foo'). This is undesirable since we don't want |
| * to allow any of these custom attributes. This method strips them all. |
| * |
| * @param node Root element to process |
| */ |
| function stripCustomNsAttrs(node) { |
| while (node) { |
| if (node.nodeType === window.Node.ELEMENT_NODE) { |
| var attrs = node.attributes; |
| for (var i = 0, l = attrs.length; i < l; i++) { |
| var attrNode = attrs[i]; |
| var attrName = attrNode.name.toLowerCase(); |
| if (attrName === 'xmlns:ns1' || attrName.lastIndexOf('ns1:', 0) === 0) { |
| node.removeAttributeNode(attrNode); |
| i--; |
| l--; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| var nextNode = node.firstChild; |
| if (nextNode) { |
| stripCustomNsAttrs(nextNode); |
| } |
| |
| node = getNonDescendant('nextSibling', node); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| function getNonDescendant(propName, node) { |
| // An element is clobbered if its `propName` property points to one of its descendants |
| var nextNode = node[propName]; |
| if (nextNode && nodeContains.call(node, nextNode)) { |
| throw $sanitizeMinErr('elclob', 'Failed to sanitize html because the element is clobbered: {0}', node.outerHTML || node.outerText); |
| } |
| return nextNode; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| function sanitizeText(chars) { |
| var buf = []; |
| var writer = htmlSanitizeWriter(buf, noop); |
| writer.chars(chars); |
| return buf.join(''); |
| } |
| |
| |
| // define ngSanitize module and register $sanitize service |
| angular.module('ngSanitize', []) |
| .provider('$sanitize', $SanitizeProvider) |
| .info({ angularVersion: '1.6.4' }); |
| |
| /** |
| * @ngdoc filter |
| * @name linky |
| * @kind function |
| * |
| * @description |
| * Finds links in text input and turns them into html links. Supports `http/https/ftp/mailto` and |
| * plain email address links. |
| * |
| * Requires the {@link ngSanitize `ngSanitize`} module to be installed. |
| * |
| * @param {string} text Input text. |
| * @param {string} target Window (`_blank|_self|_parent|_top`) or named frame to open links in. |
| * @param {object|function(url)} [attributes] Add custom attributes to the link element. |
| * |
| * Can be one of: |
| * |
| * - `object`: A map of attributes |
| * - `function`: Takes the url as a parameter and returns a map of attributes |
| * |
| * If the map of attributes contains a value for `target`, it overrides the value of |
| * the target parameter. |
| * |
| * |
| * @returns {string} Html-linkified and {@link $sanitize sanitized} text. |
| * |
| * @usage |
| <span ng-bind-html="linky_expression | linky"></span> |
| * |
| * @example |
| <example module="linkyExample" deps="angular-sanitize.js" name="linky-filter"> |
| <file name="index.html"> |
| <div ng-controller="ExampleController"> |
| Snippet: <textarea ng-model="snippet" cols="60" rows="3"></textarea> |
| <table> |
| <tr> |
| <th>Filter</th> |
| <th>Source</th> |
| <th>Rendered</th> |
| </tr> |
| <tr id="linky-filter"> |
| <td>linky filter</td> |
| <td> |
| <pre><div ng-bind-html="snippet | linky"><br></div></pre> |
| </td> |
| <td> |
| <div ng-bind-html="snippet | linky"></div> |
| </td> |
| </tr> |
| <tr id="linky-target"> |
| <td>linky target</td> |
| <td> |
| <pre><div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_blank'"><br></div></pre> |
| </td> |
| <td> |
| <div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_blank'"></div> |
| </td> |
| </tr> |
| <tr id="linky-custom-attributes"> |
| <td>linky custom attributes</td> |
| <td> |
| <pre><div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_self':{rel: 'nofollow'}"><br></div></pre> |
| </td> |
| <td> |
| <div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_self':{rel: 'nofollow'}"></div> |
| </td> |
| </tr> |
| <tr id="escaped-html"> |
| <td>no filter</td> |
| <td><pre><div ng-bind="snippet"><br></div></pre></td> |
| <td><div ng-bind="snippet"></div></td> |
| </tr> |
| </table> |
| </file> |
| <file name="script.js"> |
| angular.module('linkyExample', ['ngSanitize']) |
| .controller('ExampleController', ['$scope', function($scope) { |
| $scope.snippet = |
| 'Pretty text with some links:\n' + |
| 'http://angularjs.org/,\n' + |
| 'mailto:us@somewhere.org,\n' + |
| 'another@somewhere.org,\n' + |
| 'and one more: ftp://127.0.0.1/.'; |
| $scope.snippetWithSingleURL = 'http://angularjs.org/'; |
| }]); |
| </file> |
| <file name="protractor.js" type="protractor"> |
| it('should linkify the snippet with urls', function() { |
| expect(element(by.id('linky-filter')).element(by.binding('snippet | linky')).getText()). |
| toBe('Pretty text with some links: http://angularjs.org/, us@somewhere.org, ' + |
| 'another@somewhere.org, and one more: ftp://127.0.0.1/.'); |
| expect(element.all(by.css('#linky-filter a')).count()).toEqual(4); |
| }); |
| |
| it('should not linkify snippet without the linky filter', function() { |
| expect(element(by.id('escaped-html')).element(by.binding('snippet')).getText()). |
| toBe('Pretty text with some links: http://angularjs.org/, mailto:us@somewhere.org, ' + |
| 'another@somewhere.org, and one more: ftp://127.0.0.1/.'); |
| expect(element.all(by.css('#escaped-html a')).count()).toEqual(0); |
| }); |
| |
| it('should update', function() { |
| element(by.model('snippet')).clear(); |
| element(by.model('snippet')).sendKeys('new http://link.'); |
| expect(element(by.id('linky-filter')).element(by.binding('snippet | linky')).getText()). |
| toBe('new http://link.'); |
| expect(element.all(by.css('#linky-filter a')).count()).toEqual(1); |
| expect(element(by.id('escaped-html')).element(by.binding('snippet')).getText()) |
| .toBe('new http://link.'); |
| }); |
| |
| it('should work with the target property', function() { |
| expect(element(by.id('linky-target')). |
| element(by.binding("snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_blank'")).getText()). |
| toBe('http://angularjs.org/'); |
| expect(element(by.css('#linky-target a')).getAttribute('target')).toEqual('_blank'); |
| }); |
| |
| it('should optionally add custom attributes', function() { |
| expect(element(by.id('linky-custom-attributes')). |
| element(by.binding("snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_self':{rel: 'nofollow'}")).getText()). |
| toBe('http://angularjs.org/'); |
| expect(element(by.css('#linky-custom-attributes a')).getAttribute('rel')).toEqual('nofollow'); |
| }); |
| </file> |
| </example> |
| */ |
| angular.module('ngSanitize').filter('linky', ['$sanitize', function($sanitize) { |
| var LINKY_URL_REGEXP = |
| /((ftp|https?):\/\/|(www\.)|(mailto:)?[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@)\S*[^\s.;,(){}<>"\u201d\u2019]/i, |
| MAILTO_REGEXP = /^mailto:/i; |
| |
| var linkyMinErr = angular.$$minErr('linky'); |
| var isDefined = angular.isDefined; |
| var isFunction = angular.isFunction; |
| var isObject = angular.isObject; |
| var isString = angular.isString; |
| |
| return function(text, target, attributes) { |
| if (text == null || text === '') return text; |
| if (!isString(text)) throw linkyMinErr('notstring', 'Expected string but received: {0}', text); |
| |
| var attributesFn = |
| isFunction(attributes) ? attributes : |
| isObject(attributes) ? function getAttributesObject() {return attributes;} : |
| function getEmptyAttributesObject() {return {};}; |
| |
| var match; |
| var raw = text; |
| var html = []; |
| var url; |
| var i; |
| while ((match = raw.match(LINKY_URL_REGEXP))) { |
| // We can not end in these as they are sometimes found at the end of the sentence |
| url = match[0]; |
| // if we did not match ftp/http/www/mailto then assume mailto |
| if (!match[2] && !match[4]) { |
| url = (match[3] ? 'http://' : 'mailto:') + url; |
| } |
| i = match.index; |
| addText(raw.substr(0, i)); |
| addLink(url, match[0].replace(MAILTO_REGEXP, '')); |
| raw = raw.substring(i + match[0].length); |
| } |
| addText(raw); |
| return $sanitize(html.join('')); |
| |
| function addText(text) { |
| if (!text) { |
| return; |
| } |
| html.push(sanitizeText(text)); |
| } |
| |
| function addLink(url, text) { |
| var key, linkAttributes = attributesFn(url); |
| html.push('<a '); |
| |
| for (key in linkAttributes) { |
| html.push(key + '="' + linkAttributes[key] + '" '); |
| } |
| |
| if (isDefined(target) && !('target' in linkAttributes)) { |
| html.push('target="', |
| target, |
| '" '); |
| } |
| html.push('href="', |
| url.replace(/"/g, '"'), |
| '">'); |
| addText(text); |
| html.push('</a>'); |
| } |
| }; |
| }]); |
| |
| |
| })(window, window.angular); |