blob: c5b3baece9933219b6bd0db9c2eb33b1709abaff [file] [log] [blame]
From 6010c0303a422a9c5fa8860c061bf7105eb7f8b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2018 03:03:10 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] upstream: disallow empty incoming filename or ones that refer
to the
current directory; based on report/patch from Harry Sintonen
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f27651b30eaee2df49540ab68d030865c04f6de9
CVE: CVE-2018-20685
Upstream-Status: Backport
Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
---
scp.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
index 60682c6..4f3fdcd 100644
--- a/scp.c
+++ b/scp.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.197 2018/06/01 04:31:48 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.198 2018/11/16 03:03:10 djm Exp $ */
/*
* scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which
* uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).
@@ -1106,7 +1106,8 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
SCREWUP("size out of range");
size = (off_t)ull;
- if ((strchr(cp, '/') != NULL) || (strcmp(cp, "..") == 0)) {
+ if (*cp == '\0' || strchr(cp, '/') != NULL ||
+ strcmp(cp, ".") == 0 || strcmp(cp, "..") == 0) {
run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp);
exit(1);
}
--
2.7.4