From e5ff72a8005dd1d9c0f63f8a9cc4298df5bb7551 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2018 16:39:46 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] pcnet: fix possible buffer overflow

In pcnet_receive(), we try to assign size_ to size which converts from
size_t to integer. This will cause troubles when size_ is greater
INT_MAX, this will lead a negative value in size and it can then pass
the check of size < MIN_BUF_SIZE which may lead out of bound access
for both buf and buf1.

Fixing by converting the type of size to size_t.

CC: address@hidden
Reported-by: Daniel Shapira <address@hidden>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <address@hidden>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <address@hidden>

Upstream-Status: Backport [https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-09/msg03268.html]

CVE: CVE-2018-17963

Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
---
 hw/net/pcnet.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/hw/net/pcnet.c b/hw/net/pcnet.c
index 0c44554..d9ba04b 100644
--- a/hw/net/pcnet.c
+++ b/hw/net/pcnet.c
@@ -988,14 +988,14 @@ ssize_t pcnet_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_)
     uint8_t buf1[60];
     int remaining;
     int crc_err = 0;
-    int size = size_;
+    size_t size = size_;
 
     if (CSR_DRX(s) || CSR_STOP(s) || CSR_SPND(s) || !size ||
         (CSR_LOOP(s) && !s->looptest)) {
         return -1;
     }
 #ifdef PCNET_DEBUG
-    printf("pcnet_receive size=%d\n", size);
+    printf("pcnet_receive size=%zu\n", size);
 #endif
 
     /* if too small buffer, then expand it */
-- 
2.7.4