reset upstream subtrees to yocto 2.6

Reset the following subtrees on thud HEAD:

  poky: 87e3a9739d
  meta-openembedded: 6094ae18c8
  meta-security: 31dc4e7532
  meta-raspberrypi: a48743dc36
  meta-xilinx: c42016e2e6

Also re-apply backports that didn't make it into thud:
  poky:
    17726d0 systemd-systemctl-native: handle Install wildcards

  meta-openembedded:
    4321a5d libtinyxml2: update to 7.0.1
    042f0a3 libcereal: Add native and nativesdk classes
    e23284f libcereal: Allow empty package
    030e8d4 rsyslog: curl-less build with fmhttp PACKAGECONFIG
    179a1b9 gtest: update to 1.8.1

Squashed OpenBMC subtree compatibility updates:
  meta-aspeed:
    Brad Bishop (1):
          aspeed: add yocto 2.6 compatibility

  meta-ibm:
    Brad Bishop (1):
          ibm: prepare for yocto 2.6

  meta-ingrasys:
    Brad Bishop (1):
          ingrasys: set layer compatibility to yocto 2.6

  meta-openpower:
    Brad Bishop (1):
          openpower: set layer compatibility to yocto 2.6

  meta-phosphor:
    Brad Bishop (3):
          phosphor: set layer compatibility to thud
          phosphor: libgpg-error: drop patches
          phosphor: react to fitimage artifact rename

    Ed Tanous (4):
          Dropbear: upgrade options for latest upgrade
          yocto2.6: update openssl options
          busybox: remove upstream watchdog patch
          systemd: Rebase CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF patch

Change-Id: I7b1fe71cca880d0372a82d94b5fd785323e3a9e7
Signed-off-by: Brad Bishop <bradleyb@fuzziesquirrel.com>
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2017-17087.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2017-17087.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 937b9ba..0000000
--- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2017-17087.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-From 9c11f80339372b7aa2f43153d574f2b5abb79708 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Li Zhou <li.zhou@windriver.com>
-Date: Sun, 17 Dec 2017 23:09:35 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH] vim: patch 8.0.1263: others can read the swap file if a user
- is careless
-
-Problem:    Others can read the swap file if a user is careless with his
-            primary group.
-Solution:   If the group permission allows for reading but the world
-            permissions doesn't, make sure the group is right.
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-CVE: CVE-2017-17087
-Signed-off-by: Li Zhou <li.zhou@windriver.com>
----
- src/fileio.c  | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
- src/version.c |  2 ++
- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/fileio.c b/src/fileio.c
-index f54fb8465..2c7740af9 100644
---- a/src/fileio.c
-+++ b/src/fileio.c
-@@ -716,7 +716,29 @@ readfile(
- 	/* Set swap file protection bits after creating it. */
- 	if (swap_mode > 0 && curbuf->b_ml.ml_mfp != NULL
- 			  && curbuf->b_ml.ml_mfp->mf_fname != NULL)
--	    (void)mch_setperm(curbuf->b_ml.ml_mfp->mf_fname, (long)swap_mode);
-+	{
-+	    char_u *swap_fname = curbuf->b_ml.ml_mfp->mf_fname;
-+
-+	    /*
-+	     * If the group-read bit is set but not the world-read bit, then
-+	     * the group must be equal to the group of the original file.  If
-+	     * we can't make that happen then reset the group-read bit.  This
-+	     * avoids making the swap file readable to more users when the
-+	     * primary group of the user is too permissive.
-+	     */
-+	    if ((swap_mode & 044) == 040)
-+	    {
-+		stat_T	swap_st;
-+
-+		if (mch_stat((char *)swap_fname, &swap_st) >= 0
-+			&& st.st_gid != swap_st.st_gid
-+			&& fchown(curbuf->b_ml.ml_mfp->mf_fd, -1, st.st_gid)
-+									 == -1)
-+		    swap_mode &= 0600;
-+	    }
-+
-+	    (void)mch_setperm(swap_fname, (long)swap_mode);
-+	}
- #endif
-     }
- 
-diff --git a/src/version.c b/src/version.c
-index a5cb078f0..5c0df475f 100644
---- a/src/version.c
-+++ b/src/version.c
-@@ -770,6 +770,8 @@ static char *(features[]) =
- static int included_patches[] =
- {   /* Add new patch number below this line */
- /**/
-+    1263,
-+/**/
-     983,
- /**/
-     982,
--- 
-2.11.0
-
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/vim/files/disable_acl_header_check.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/vim/files/disable_acl_header_check.patch
index 65e5f58..4720003 100644
--- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/vim/files/disable_acl_header_check.patch
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/vim/files/disable_acl_header_check.patch
@@ -1,14 +1,23 @@
-Upstream-Status: pending
+From 5ed25c076a1fb1889a3c50dddf29f21850b59a13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Wenzong Fan <wenzong.fan@windriver.com> 
+Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 17:29:09 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] disable acl header check
 
 Don't check 'sys/acl.h' if acl support disabled for vim/vim-tiny.
 
+Upstream-Status: pending
+
 Signed-off-by: Wenzong Fan <wenzong.fan@windriver.com>
-================================================
+Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/configure.ac | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
 diff --git a/src/configure.ac b/src/configure.ac
-index fb965e5..d734064 100644
+index 107c170..0ee86ad 100644
 --- a/src/configure.ac
 +++ b/src/configure.ac
-@@ -2511,7 +2511,7 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(stdarg.h stdint.h stdlib.h string.h \
+@@ -3220,7 +3220,7 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(stdint.h stdlib.h string.h \
  	sys/systeminfo.h locale.h sys/stream.h termios.h \
  	libc.h sys/statfs.h poll.h sys/poll.h pwd.h \
  	utime.h sys/param.h libintl.h libgen.h \
@@ -17,11 +26,14 @@
  	sys/access.h sys/sysinfo.h wchar.h wctype.h)
  
  dnl sys/ptem.h depends on sys/stream.h on Solaris
-@@ -3112,6 +3112,7 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(acl,
+@@ -3848,6 +3848,7 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(acl,
  	, [enable_acl="yes"])
  if test "$enable_acl" = "yes"; then
- AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
-+AC_CHECK_HEADERS(sys/acl.h)
- AC_CHECK_LIB(posix1e, acl_get_file, [LIBS="$LIBS -lposix1e"],
+   AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
++  AC_CHECK_HEADERS(sys/acl.h)
+   AC_CHECK_LIB(posix1e, acl_get_file, [LIBS="$LIBS -lposix1e"],
  	AC_CHECK_LIB(acl, acl_get_file, [LIBS="$LIBS -lacl"
  		  AC_CHECK_LIB(attr, fgetxattr, LIBS="$LIBS -lattr",,)],,),)
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/vim/files/vim-add-knob-whether-elf.h-are-checked.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/vim/files/vim-add-knob-whether-elf.h-are-checked.patch
index 6c620f9..37914d4 100644
--- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/vim/files/vim-add-knob-whether-elf.h-are-checked.patch
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/vim/files/vim-add-knob-whether-elf.h-are-checked.patch
@@ -1,20 +1,24 @@
-vim: add knob whether elf.h are checked
+From 38de4bccdb8a861ffdd447f12fdab19d6d852c02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chong Lu <Chong.Lu@windriver.com>
+Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 17:34:15 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] vim: add knob whether elf.h are checked
 
 Previously, it still was checked when there was no elf library in sysroots directory.
 Add knob to decide whether elf.h are checked or not.
 
-Upstream-status: Pending
+Upstream-Status: Pending
 
 Signed-off-by: Chong Lu <Chong.Lu@windriver.com>
+Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
 ---
- src/configure.ac |    7 +++++++
+ src/configure.ac | 7 +++++++
  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
 
 diff --git a/src/configure.ac b/src/configure.ac
-index d734064..f504fa6 100644
+index 0ee86ad..64736f0 100644
 --- a/src/configure.ac
 +++ b/src/configure.ac
-@@ -2483,11 +2483,18 @@ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <stdio.h>], [int x __attribute__((unused));],
+@@ -3192,11 +3192,18 @@ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <stdio.h>], [int x __attribute__((unused));],
  	AC_MSG_RESULT(no))
  
  dnl Checks for header files.
@@ -34,5 +38,5 @@
  AC_HEADER_DIRENT
  
 -- 
-1.7.9.5
+2.7.4