poky/meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c/CVE-2020-12762.patch

From 099016b7e8d70a6d5dd814e788bba08d33d48426 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 19:41:16 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Protect array_list_del_idx against size_t overflow.

If the assignment of stop overflows due to idx and count being
larger than SIZE_T_MAX in sum, out of boundary access could happen.

It takes invalid usage of this function for this to happen, but
I decided to add this check so array_list_del_idx is as safe against
bad usage as the other arraylist functions.

Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/json-c/json-c/commit/31243e4d1204ef78be34b0fcae73221eee6b83be]
CVE: CVE-2020-12762
Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>

---
 arraylist.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arraylist.c b/arraylist.c
index 12ad8af6d3..e5524aca75 100644
--- a/arraylist.c
+++ b/arraylist.c
@@ -136,6 +136,9 @@ int array_list_del_idx(struct array_list *arr, size_t idx, size_t count)
 {
 	size_t i, stop;
 
+	/* Avoid overflow in calculation with large indices. */
+	if (idx > SIZE_T_MAX - count)
+		return -1;
 	stop = idx + count;
 	if (idx >= arr->length || stop > arr->length)
 		return -1;

From 77d935b7ae7871a1940cd827e850e6063044ec45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 19:46:45 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Prevent division by zero in linkhash.

If a linkhash with a size of zero is created, then modulo operations
are prone to division by zero operations.

Purely protective measure against bad usage.
---
 linkhash.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/linkhash.c b/linkhash.c
index 7ea58c0abf..f05cc38030 100644
--- a/linkhash.c
+++ b/linkhash.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 
 #include "config.h"
 
+#include <assert.h>
 #include <limits.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <stddef.h>
@@ -499,6 +500,8 @@ struct lh_table *lh_table_new(int size, lh_entry_free_fn *free_fn, lh_hash_fn *h
 	int i;
 	struct lh_table *t;
 
+	/* Allocate space for elements to avoid divisions by zero. */
+	assert(size > 0);
 	t = (struct lh_table *)calloc(1, sizeof(struct lh_table));
 	if (!t)
 		return NULL;

From d07b91014986900a3a75f306d302e13e005e9d67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 19:47:25 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Fix integer overflows.

The data structures linkhash and printbuf are limited to 2 GB in size
due to a signed integer being used to track their current size.

If too much data is added, then size variable can overflow, which is
an undefined behaviour in C programming language.

Assuming that a signed int overflow just leads to a negative value,
like it happens on many sytems (Linux i686/amd64 with gcc), then
printbuf is vulnerable to an out of boundary write on 64 bit systems.
---
 linkhash.c |  7 +++++--
 printbuf.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/linkhash.c b/linkhash.c
index f05cc38030..51e90b13a2 100644
--- a/linkhash.c
+++ b/linkhash.c
@@ -580,9 +580,12 @@ int lh_table_insert_w_hash(struct lh_table *t, const void *k, const void *v, con
 {
 	unsigned long n;
 
-	if (t->count >= t->size * LH_LOAD_FACTOR)
-		if (lh_table_resize(t, t->size * 2) != 0)
+	if (t->count >= t->size * LH_LOAD_FACTOR) {
+		/* Avoid signed integer overflow with large tables. */
+		int new_size = INT_MAX / 2 < t->size ? t->size * 2 : INT_MAX;
+		if (t->size == INT_MAX || lh_table_resize(t, new_size) != 0)
 			return -1;
+	}
 
 	n = h % t->size;
 
diff --git a/printbuf.c b/printbuf.c
index 976c12dde5..00822fac4f 100644
--- a/printbuf.c
+++ b/printbuf.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 
 #include "config.h"
 
+#include <limits.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
@@ -65,10 +66,16 @@ static int printbuf_extend(struct printbuf *p, int min_size)
 
 	if (p->size >= min_size)
 		return 0;
-
-	new_size = p->size * 2;
-	if (new_size < min_size + 8)
+	/* Prevent signed integer overflows with large buffers. */
+	if (min_size > INT_MAX - 8)
+		return -1;
+	if (p->size > INT_MAX / 2)
 		new_size = min_size + 8;
+	else {
+		new_size = p->size * 2;
+		if (new_size < min_size + 8)
+			new_size = min_size + 8;
+	}
 #ifdef PRINTBUF_DEBUG
 	MC_DEBUG("printbuf_memappend: realloc "
 	         "bpos=%d min_size=%d old_size=%d new_size=%d\n",
@@ -83,6 +90,9 @@ static int printbuf_extend(struct printbuf *p, int min_size)
 
 int printbuf_memappend(struct printbuf *p, const char *buf, int size)
 {
+	/* Prevent signed integer overflows with large buffers. */
+	if (size > INT_MAX - p->bpos - 1)
+		return -1;
 	if (p->size <= p->bpos + size + 1)
 	{
 		if (printbuf_extend(p, p->bpos + size + 1) < 0)
@@ -100,6 +110,9 @@ int printbuf_memset(struct printbuf *pb, int offset, int charvalue, int len)
 
 	if (offset == -1)
 		offset = pb->bpos;
+	/* Prevent signed integer overflows with large buffers. */
+	if (len > INT_MAX - offset)
+		return -1;
 	size_needed = offset + len;
 	if (pb->size < size_needed)
 	{