Squashed 'yocto-poky/' content from commit ea562de
git-subtree-dir: yocto-poky
git-subtree-split: ea562de57590c966cd5a75fda8defecd397e6436
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c477c2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
+
+From e28a58be26184c2a23f80b410e0997ef1bd5d578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:40:44 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 2/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit
+ and Confirm
+
+The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
+checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
+overflow when processing an invalid message.
+
+Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
+processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
+make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
+message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
+
+Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
+reporting this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+index 66bd5d2..3189105 100644
+--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
+ int res = 0;
++ size_t prime_len, order_len;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response");
+
++ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
++ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
++
++ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
++ (unsigned int) payload_len,
++ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
++ goto fin;
++ }
++
+ if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+ ((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+ ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
+ int offset;
+
++ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
++ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
++ goto fin;
++ }
++
+ /* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */
+ grp = htons(data->group_num);
+ ptr = (u8 *) &cs;
+--
+1.9.1
+