diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl.inc b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl.inc
index 53dcfd9..8af423f 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl.inc
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@
         linux-*-mips64)
                target=linux-mips
                 ;;
-	linux-microblaze*)
+	linux-microblaze*|linux-nios2*)
 		target=linux-generic32
 		;;
 	linux-powerpc)
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0001-Add-test-for-CVE-2015-3194.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0001-Add-test-for-CVE-2015-3194.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39a2e5a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0001-Add-test-for-CVE-2015-3194.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+From 00456fded43eadd4bb94bf675ae4ea5d158a764f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org>
+Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2015 13:30:03 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Add test for CVE-2015-3194
+
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+This patch was imported from 
+https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=00456fded43eadd4bb94bf675ae4ea5d158a764f
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ test/certs/pss1.pem | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ test/tx509          |  7 +++++++
+ 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 test/certs/pss1.pem
+
+diff --git a/test/certs/pss1.pem b/test/certs/pss1.pem
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..29da71d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/certs/pss1.pem
+@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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++-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+diff --git a/test/tx509 b/test/tx509
+index 0ce3b52..77f5cac 100644
+--- a/test/tx509
++++ b/test/tx509
+@@ -74,5 +74,12 @@ if [ $? != 0 ]; then exit 1; fi
+ cmp x509-f.p x509-ff.p3
+ if [ $? != 0 ]; then exit 1; fi
+ 
++echo "Parsing test certificates"
++
++$cmd -in certs/pss1.pem -text -noout >/dev/null
++if [ $? != 0 ]; then exit 1; fi
++
++echo OK
++
+ /bin/rm -f x509-f.* x509-ff.* x509-fff.*
+ exit 0
+-- 
+2.3.5
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2015-3193-bn-asm-x86_64-mont5.pl-fix-carry-propagating-bug-CVE.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2015-3193-bn-asm-x86_64-mont5.pl-fix-carry-propagating-bug-CVE.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..125016a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2015-3193-bn-asm-x86_64-mont5.pl-fix-carry-propagating-bug-CVE.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+From d73cc256c8e256c32ed959456101b73ba9842f72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 09:00:32 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl: fix carry propagating bug
+ (CVE-2015-3193).
+
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+(cherry picked from commit e7c078db57908cbf16074c68034977565ffaf107)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+This patch was imported from 
+https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=d73cc256c8e256c32ed959456101b73ba9842f72
+
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl | 22 +++++++++++++++++++---
+ crypto/bn/bntest.c            | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+Index: openssl-1.0.2d/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.2d.orig/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
++++ openssl-1.0.2d/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
+@@ -1779,6 +1779,15 @@ sqr8x_reduction:
+ .align	32
+ .L8x_tail_done:
+ 	add	(%rdx),%r8		# can this overflow?
++	adc	\$0,%r9
++	adc	\$0,%r10
++	adc	\$0,%r11
++	adc	\$0,%r12
++	adc	\$0,%r13
++	adc	\$0,%r14
++	adc	\$0,%r15		# can't overflow, because we
++					# started with "overhung" part
++					# of multiplication
+ 	xor	%rax,%rax
+ 
+ 	neg	$carry
+@@ -3125,6 +3134,15 @@ sqrx8x_reduction:
+ .align	32
+ .Lsqrx8x_tail_done:
+ 	add	24+8(%rsp),%r8		# can this overflow?
++	adc	\$0,%r9
++	adc	\$0,%r10
++	adc	\$0,%r11
++	adc	\$0,%r12
++	adc	\$0,%r13
++	adc	\$0,%r14
++	adc	\$0,%r15		# can't overflow, because we
++					# started with "overhung" part
++					# of multiplication
+ 	mov	$carry,%rax		# xor	%rax,%rax
+ 
+ 	sub	16+8(%rsp),$carry	# mov 16(%rsp),%cf
+@@ -3168,13 +3186,11 @@ my ($rptr,$nptr)=("%rdx","%rbp");
+ my @ri=map("%r$_",(10..13));
+ my @ni=map("%r$_",(14..15));
+ $code.=<<___;
+-	xor	%rbx,%rbx
++	xor	%ebx,%ebx
+ 	sub	%r15,%rsi		# compare top-most words
+ 	adc	%rbx,%rbx
+ 	mov	%rcx,%r10		# -$num
+-	.byte	0x67
+ 	or	%rbx,%rax
+-	.byte	0x67
+ 	mov	%rcx,%r9		# -$num
+ 	xor	\$1,%rax
+ 	sar	\$3+2,%rcx		# cf=0
+Index: openssl-1.0.2d/crypto/bn/bntest.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.2d.orig/crypto/bn/bntest.c
++++ openssl-1.0.2d/crypto/bn/bntest.c
+@@ -1027,6 +1027,24 @@ int test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIO *bp,
+             return 0;
+         }
+     }
++
++    /* Regression test for carry propagation bug in sqr8x_reduction */
++    BN_hex2bn(&a, "050505050505");
++    BN_hex2bn(&b, "02");
++    BN_hex2bn(&c,
++        "4141414141414141414141274141414141414141414141414141414141414141"
++        "4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141"
++        "4141414141414141414141800000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
++        "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
++        "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
++        "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001");
++    BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx);
++    BN_mul(e, a, a, ctx);
++    if (BN_cmp(d, e)) {
++        fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp and BN_mul produce different results!\n");
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     BN_free(a);
+     BN_free(b);
+     BN_free(c);
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2015-3194-1-Add-PSS-parameter-check.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2015-3194-1-Add-PSS-parameter-check.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..13d4891
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2015-3194-1-Add-PSS-parameter-check.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From c394a488942387246653833359a5c94b5832674e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2015 12:35:19 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Add PSS parameter check.
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Avoid seg fault by checking mgf1 parameter is not NULL. This can be
+triggered during certificate verification so could be a DoS attack
+against a client or a server enabling client authentication.
+
+Thanks to Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG) for discovering this bug.
+
+CVE-2015-3194
+
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+This patch was imported from 
+https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=c394a488942387246653833359a5c94b5832674e
+
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+index ca3922e..4e06218 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ static X509_ALGOR *rsa_mgf1_decode(X509_ALGOR *alg)
+ {
+     const unsigned char *p;
+     int plen;
+-    if (alg == NULL)
++    if (alg == NULL || alg->parameter == NULL)
+         return NULL;
+     if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_mgf1)
+         return NULL;
+-- 
+2.3.5
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2015-3195-Fix-leak-with-ASN.1-combine.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2015-3195-Fix-leak-with-ASN.1-combine.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6fc4d0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2015-3195-Fix-leak-with-ASN.1-combine.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+From cc598f321fbac9c04da5766243ed55d55948637d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2015 19:03:07 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix leak with ASN.1 combine.
+
+When parsing a combined structure pass a flag to the decode routine
+so on error a pointer to the parent structure is not zeroed as
+this will leak any additional components in the parent.
+
+This can leak memory in any application parsing PKCS#7 or CMS structures.
+
+CVE-2015-3195.
+
+Thanks to Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) for discovering this bug using
+libFuzzer.
+
+PR#4131
+
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+This patch was imported from
+https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=cc598f321fbac9c04da5766243ed55d55948637d
+
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c | 7 +++++--
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c b/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
+index febf605..9256049 100644
+--- a/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
++++ b/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
+@@ -180,6 +180,8 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
+     int otag;
+     int ret = 0;
+     ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval;
++    int combine = aclass & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
++    aclass &= ~ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
+     if (!pval)
+         return 0;
+     if (aux && aux->asn1_cb)
+@@ -500,7 +502,8 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
+  auxerr:
+     ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR);
+  err:
+-    ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
++    if (combine == 0)
++        ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
+     if (errtt)
+         ERR_add_error_data(4, "Field=", errtt->field_name,
+                            ", Type=", it->sname);
+@@ -689,7 +692,7 @@ static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
+     } else {
+         /* Nothing special */
+         ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
+-                               -1, 0, opt, ctx);
++                               -1, tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE, opt, ctx);
+         if (!ret) {
+             ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+             goto err;
+-- 
+2.3.5
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2015-3197.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2015-3197.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dd288c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2015-3197.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+From d81a1600588b726c2bdccda7efad3cc7a87d6245 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
+Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2015 22:44:51 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] Better SSLv2 cipher-suite enforcement
+
+Based on patch by: Nimrod Aviram <nimrod.aviram@gmail.com>
+
+CVE-2015-3197
+
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/d81a1600588b726c2bdccda7efad3cc7a87d6245
+
+CVE: CVE-2015-3197
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ ssl/s2_srvr.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+Index: openssl-1.0.2d/ssl/s2_srvr.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.2d.orig/ssl/s2_srvr.c
++++ openssl-1.0.2d/ssl/s2_srvr.c
+@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
+         }
+ 
+         cp = ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(p);
+-        if (cp == NULL) {
++        if (cp == NULL || sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(s->session->ciphers, cp) < 0) {
+             ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
+             SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+             return (-1);
+@@ -687,8 +687,12 @@ static int get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+             prio = cs;
+             allow = cl;
+         }
++
++        /* Generate list of SSLv2 ciphers shared between client and server */
+         for (z = 0; z < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); z++) {
+-            if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, z)) < 0) {
++            const SSL_CIPHER *cp = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, z);
++            if ((cp->algorithm_ssl & SSL_SSLV2) == 0 ||
++                sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, cp) < 0) {
+                 (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(prio, z);
+                 z--;
+             }
+@@ -697,6 +701,13 @@ static int get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+             sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
+             s->session->ciphers = prio;
+         }
++
++        /* Make sure we have at least one cipher in common */
++        if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(s->session->ciphers) == 0) {
++            ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
++            SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
++            return -1;
++        }
+         /*
+          * s->session->ciphers should now have a list of ciphers that are on
+          * both the client and server. This list is ordered by the order the
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-0701_1.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-0701_1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf2d9a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-0701_1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+From 878e2c5b13010329c203f309ed0c8f2113f85648 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 11:31:58 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Prevent small subgroup attacks on DH/DHE
+
+Historically OpenSSL only ever generated DH parameters based on "safe"
+primes. More recently (in version 1.0.2) support was provided for
+generating X9.42 style parameter files such as those required for RFC
+5114 support. The primes used in such files may not be "safe". Where an
+application is using DH configured with parameters based on primes that
+are not "safe" then an attacker could use this fact to find a peer's
+private DH exponent. This attack requires that the attacker complete
+multiple handshakes in which the peer uses the same DH exponent.
+
+A simple mitigation is to ensure that y^q (mod p) == 1
+
+CVE-2016-0701 (fix part 1 of 2)
+
+Issue reported by Antonio Sanso.
+
+Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/878e2c5b13010329c203f309ed0c8f2113f85648
+
+CVE: CVE-2016-0701
+Signed-of-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvisa.com>
+
+---
+ crypto/dh/dh.h       |  1 +
+ crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
+ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh.h b/crypto/dh/dh.h
+index b177673..5498a9d 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh.h
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh.h
+@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ struct dh_st {
+ /* DH_check_pub_key error codes */
+ # define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL       0x01
+ # define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE       0x02
++# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID         0x03
+ 
+ /*
+  * primes p where (p-1)/2 is prime too are called "safe"; we define this for
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+index 347467c..5adedc0 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+@@ -151,23 +151,38 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+ int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
+ {
+     int ok = 0;
+-    BIGNUM *q = NULL;
++    BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
++    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ 
+     *ret = 0;
+-    q = BN_new();
+-    if (q == NULL)
++    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
++    if (ctx == NULL)
+         goto err;
+-    BN_set_word(q, 1);
+-    if (BN_cmp(pub_key, q) <= 0)
++    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
++    tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
++    if (tmp == NULL)
++        goto err;
++    BN_set_word(tmp, 1);
++    if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) <= 0)
+         *ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL;
+-    BN_copy(q, dh->p);
+-    BN_sub_word(q, 1);
+-    if (BN_cmp(pub_key, q) >= 0)
++    BN_copy(tmp, dh->p);
++    BN_sub_word(tmp, 1);
++    if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) >= 0)
+         *ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE;
+ 
++    if (dh->q != NULL) {
++        /* Check pub_key^q == 1 mod p */
++        if (!BN_mod_exp(tmp, pub_key, dh->q, dh->p, ctx))
++            goto err;
++        if (!BN_is_one(tmp))
++            *ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
++    }
++
+     ok = 1;
+  err:
+-    if (q != NULL)
+-        BN_free(q);
++    if (ctx != NULL) {
++        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
++        BN_CTX_free(ctx);
++    }
+     return (ok);
+ }
+-- 
+2.3.5
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-0701_2.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-0701_2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..05caf0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-0701_2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+From c5b831f21d0d29d1e517d139d9d101763f60c9a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 02:57:20 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Always generate DH keys for ephemeral DH cipher suites
+
+Modified version of the commit ffaef3f15 in the master branch by Stephen
+Henson. This makes the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option a no-op and always
+generates a new DH key for every handshake regardless.
+
+CVE-2016-0701 (fix part 2 or 2)
+
+Issue reported by Antonio Sanso
+
+Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/c5b831f21d0d29d1e517d139d9d101763f60c9a2
+
+CVE: CVE-2016-0701 #2
+Signed-of-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvisa.com>
+
+---
+ doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod | 29 +++++------------------------
+ ssl/s3_lib.c                            | 14 --------------
+ ssl/s3_srvr.c                           | 17 +++--------------
+ ssl/ssl.h                               |  2 +-
+ 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
+
+Index: openssl-1.0.2d/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.2d.orig/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
++++ openssl-1.0.2d/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
+@@ -48,25 +48,8 @@ even if he gets hold of the normal (cert
+ only used for signing.
+ 
+ In order to perform a DH key exchange the server must use a DH group
+-(DH parameters) and generate a DH key.
+-The server will always generate a new DH key during the negotiation
+-if either the DH parameters are supplied via callback or the
+-SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option of SSL_CTX_set_options(3) is set (or both).
+-It will  immediately create a DH key if DH parameters are supplied via
+-SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() and SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is not set.
+-In this case,
+-it may happen that a key is generated on initialization without later
+-being needed, while on the other hand the computer time during the
+-negotiation is being saved.
+-
+-If "strong" primes were used to generate the DH parameters, it is not strictly
+-necessary to generate a new key for each handshake but it does improve forward
+-secrecy. If it is not assured that "strong" primes were used,
+-SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used in order to prevent small subgroup
+-attacks. Always using SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE has an impact on the
+-computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not very large, so
+-application authors/users should consider always enabling this option.
+-The option is required to implement perfect forward secrecy (PFS).
++(DH parameters) and generate a DH key. The server will always generate
++a new DH key during the negotiation.
+ 
+ As generating DH parameters is extremely time consuming, an application
+ should not generate the parameters on the fly but supply the parameters.
+@@ -93,10 +76,9 @@ can supply the DH parameters via a callb
+ Previous versions of the callback used B<is_export> and B<keylength>
+ parameters to control parameter generation for export and non-export
+ cipher suites. Modern servers that do not support export ciphersuites
+-are advised to either use SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() in combination with
+-SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE, or alternatively, use the callback but ignore
+-B<keylength> and B<is_export> and simply supply at least 2048-bit
+-parameters in the callback.
++are advised to either use SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() or alternatively, use
++the callback but ignore B<keylength> and B<is_export> and simply
++supply at least 2048-bit parameters in the callback.
+ 
+ =head1 EXAMPLES
+ 
+@@ -128,7 +110,6 @@ partly left out.)
+  if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh_2048) != 1) {
+    /* Error. */
+  }
+- SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
+  ...
+ 
+ =head1 RETURN VALUES
+Index: openssl-1.0.2d/ssl/s3_lib.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.2d.orig/ssl/s3_lib.c
++++ openssl-1.0.2d/ssl/s3_lib.c
+@@ -3206,13 +3206,6 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long lar
+                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+                 return (ret);
+             }
+-            if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)) {
+-                if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
+-                    DH_free(dh);
+-                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+-                    return (ret);
+-                }
+-            }
+             if (s->cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
+                 DH_free(s->cert->dh_tmp);
+             s->cert->dh_tmp = dh;
+@@ -3710,13 +3703,6 @@ long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd
+                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+                 return 0;
+             }
+-            if (!(ctx->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)) {
+-                if (!DH_generate_key(new)) {
+-                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+-                    DH_free(new);
+-                    return 0;
+-                }
+-            }
+             if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
+                 DH_free(cert->dh_tmp);
+             cert->dh_tmp = new;
+Index: openssl-1.0.2d/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.2d.orig/ssl/s3_srvr.c
++++ openssl-1.0.2d/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+@@ -1684,20 +1684,9 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s
+             }
+ 
+             s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
+-            if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
+-                 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
+-                 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
+-                if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
+-                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+-                    goto err;
+-                }
+-            } else {
+-                dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
+-                dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
+-                if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
+-                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+-                    goto err;
+-                }
++            if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
++                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
++                goto err;
+             }
+             r[0] = dh->p;
+             r[1] = dh->g;
+Index: openssl-1.0.2d/ssl/ssl.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.2d.orig/ssl/ssl.h
++++ openssl-1.0.2d/ssl/ssl.h
+@@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ struct ssl_session_st {
+ # define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION        0x00040000L
+ /* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_ecdh parameters */
+ # define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE                          0x00080000L
+-/* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_dh parameters */
++/* Does nothing: retained for compatibility */
+ # define SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE                            0x00100000L
+ /* Does nothing: retained for compatibiity */
+ # define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA                            0x0
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/ptest_makefile_deps.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/ptest_makefile_deps.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4202e61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/ptest_makefile_deps.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+Additional Makefile dependencies removal for test targets
+
+Removing the dependency check for test targets as these tests are
+causing a number of failures and "noise" during ptest execution.
+
+Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [config]
+
+Signed-off-by: Maxin B. John <maxin.john@intel.com>
+
+diff -Naur openssl-1.0.2d-orig/test/Makefile openssl-1.0.2d/test/Makefile
+--- openssl-1.0.2d-orig/test/Makefile	2015-09-28 12:50:41.530022979 +0300
++++ openssl-1.0.2d/test/Makefile	2015-09-28 12:57:45.930717240 +0300
+@@ -155,67 +155,67 @@
+ 	( $(MAKE) $$i && echo "PASS: $$i" ) || echo "FAIL: $$i"; \
+ 	done)
+ 
+-test_evp: $(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) evptests.txt
++test_evp:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(EVPTEST) evptests.txt
+ 
+-test_evp_extra: $(EVPEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_evp_extra:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(EVPEXTRATEST)
+ 
+-test_des: $(DESTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_des:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(DESTEST)
+ 
+-test_idea: $(IDEATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_idea:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(IDEATEST)
+ 
+-test_sha: $(SHATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SHA1TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SHA256TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SHA512TEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_sha:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(SHATEST)
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(SHA1TEST)
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(SHA256TEST)
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(SHA512TEST)
+ 
+-test_mdc2: $(MDC2TEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_mdc2:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(MDC2TEST)
+ 
+-test_md5: $(MD5TEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_md5:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(MD5TEST)
+ 
+-test_md4: $(MD4TEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_md4:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(MD4TEST)
+ 
+-test_hmac: $(HMACTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_hmac:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(HMACTEST)
+ 
+-test_wp: $(WPTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_wp:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(WPTEST)
+ 
+-test_md2: $(MD2TEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_md2:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(MD2TEST)
+ 
+-test_rmd: $(RMDTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_rmd:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(RMDTEST)
+ 
+-test_bf: $(BFTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_bf:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(BFTEST)
+ 
+-test_cast: $(CASTTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_cast:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(CASTTEST)
+ 
+-test_rc2: $(RC2TEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_rc2:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(RC2TEST)
+ 
+-test_rc4: $(RC4TEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_rc4:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(RC4TEST)
+ 
+-test_rc5: $(RC5TEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_rc5:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(RC5TEST)
+ 
+-test_rand: $(RANDTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_rand:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(RANDTEST)
+ 
+-test_enc: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT) testenc
++test_enc:
+ 	@sh ./testenc
+ 
+-test_x509: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT) tx509 testx509.pem v3-cert1.pem v3-cert2.pem
++test_x509:
+ 	echo test normal x509v1 certificate
+ 	sh ./tx509 2>/dev/null
+ 	echo test first x509v3 certificate
+@@ -223,25 +223,25 @@
+ 	echo test second x509v3 certificate
+ 	sh ./tx509 v3-cert2.pem 2>/dev/null
+ 
+-test_rsa: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT) trsa testrsa.pem
++test_rsa:
+ 	@sh ./trsa 2>/dev/null
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(RSATEST)
+ 
+-test_crl: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT) tcrl testcrl.pem
++test_crl:
+ 	@sh ./tcrl 2>/dev/null
+ 
+-test_sid: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT) tsid testsid.pem
++test_sid:
+ 	@sh ./tsid 2>/dev/null
+ 
+-test_req: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT) treq testreq.pem testreq2.pem
++test_req:
+ 	@sh ./treq 2>/dev/null
+ 	@sh ./treq testreq2.pem 2>/dev/null
+ 
+-test_pkcs7: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT) tpkcs7 tpkcs7d testp7.pem pkcs7-1.pem
++test_pkcs7:
+ 	@sh ./tpkcs7 2>/dev/null
+ 	@sh ./tpkcs7d 2>/dev/null
+ 
+-test_bn: $(BNTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(EXPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) bctest
++test_bn:
+ 	@echo starting big number library test, could take a while...
+ 	@../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(BNTEST) >tmp.bntest
+ 	@echo quit >>tmp.bntest
+@@ -250,33 +250,33 @@
+ 	@echo 'test a^b%c implementations'
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(EXPTEST)
+ 
+-test_ec: $(ECTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_ec:
+ 	@echo 'test elliptic curves'
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(ECTEST)
+ 
+-test_ecdsa: $(ECDSATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_ecdsa:
+ 	@echo 'test ecdsa'
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(ECDSATEST)
+ 
+-test_ecdh: $(ECDHTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_ecdh:
+ 	@echo 'test ecdh'
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(ECDHTEST)
+ 
+-test_verify: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT)
++test_verify:
+ 	@echo "The following command should have some OK's and some failures"
+ 	@echo "There are definitly a few expired certificates"
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl verify -CApath ../certs/demo ../certs/demo/*.pem
+ 
+-test_dh: $(DHTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_dh:
+ 	@echo "Generate a set of DH parameters"
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(DHTEST)
+ 
+-test_dsa: $(DSATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_dsa:
+ 	@echo "Generate a set of DSA parameters"
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(DSATEST)
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(DSATEST) -app2_1
+ 
+-test_gen testreq.pem: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT) testgen test.cnf
++test_gen testreq.pem:
+ 	@echo "Generate and verify a certificate request"
+ 	@sh ./testgen
+ 
+@@ -288,13 +288,11 @@
+ 	@cat certCA.ss certU.ss > intP1.ss
+ 	@cat certCA.ss certU.ss certP1.ss > intP2.ss
+ 
+-test_engine:  $(ENGINETEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_engine:
+ 	@echo "Manipulate the ENGINE structures"
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(ENGINETEST)
+ 
+-test_ssl: keyU.ss certU.ss certCA.ss certP1.ss keyP1.ss certP2.ss keyP2.ss \
+-		intP1.ss intP2.ss $(SSLTEST)$(EXE_EXT) testssl testsslproxy \
+-		../apps/server2.pem serverinfo.pem
++test_ssl:
+ 	@echo "test SSL protocol"
+ 	@if [ -n "$(FIPSCANLIB)" ]; then \
+ 	  sh ./testfipsssl keyU.ss certU.ss certCA.ss; \
+@@ -304,7 +302,7 @@
+ 	@sh ./testsslproxy keyP1.ss certP1.ss intP1.ss
+ 	@sh ./testsslproxy keyP2.ss certP2.ss intP2.ss
+ 
+-test_ca: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT) testca CAss.cnf Uss.cnf
++test_ca:
+ 	@if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-rsa; then \
+ 	  echo "skipping CA.sh test -- requires RSA"; \
+ 	else \
+@@ -312,11 +310,11 @@
+ 	  sh ./testca; \
+ 	fi
+ 
+-test_aes: #$(AESTEST)
++test_aes:
+ #	@echo "test Rijndael"
+ #	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(AESTEST)
+ 
+-test_tsa: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT) testtsa CAtsa.cnf ../util/shlib_wrap.sh
++test_tsa:
+ 	@if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-rsa; then \
+ 	  echo "skipping testtsa test -- requires RSA"; \
+ 	else \
+@@ -331,7 +329,7 @@
+ 	@echo "Test JPAKE"
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(JPAKETEST)
+ 
+-test_cms: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT) cms-test.pl smcont.txt
++test_cms:
+ 	@echo "CMS consistency test"
+ 	$(PERL) cms-test.pl
+ 
+@@ -339,22 +337,22 @@
+ 	@echo "Test SRP"
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./srptest
+ 
+-test_ocsp: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT) tocsp
++test_ocsp:
+ 	@echo "Test OCSP"
+ 	@sh ./tocsp
+ 
+-test_v3name: $(V3NAMETEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_v3name:
+ 	@echo "Test X509v3_check_*"
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(V3NAMETEST)
+ 
+ test_heartbeat:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(HEARTBEATTEST)
+ 
+-test_constant_time: $(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_constant_time:
+ 	@echo "Test constant time utilites"
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(CONSTTIMETEST)
+ 
+-test_verify_extra: $(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_verify_extra:
+ 	@echo $(START) $@
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(VERIFYEXTRATEST)
+ 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2d.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2d.bb
index 32d8dce..8defa5b 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2d.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2d.bb
@@ -36,6 +36,14 @@
             file://run-ptest \
             file://crypto_use_bigint_in_x86-64_perl.patch \
             file://openssl-1.0.2a-x32-asm.patch \
+            file://ptest_makefile_deps.patch  \
+            file://CVE-2015-3193-bn-asm-x86_64-mont5.pl-fix-carry-propagating-bug-CVE.patch \
+            file://CVE-2015-3194-1-Add-PSS-parameter-check.patch \
+            file://0001-Add-test-for-CVE-2015-3194.patch \
+            file://CVE-2015-3195-Fix-leak-with-ASN.1-combine.patch \
+            file://CVE-2015-3197.patch \
+            file://CVE-2016-0701_1.patch \
+            file://CVE-2016-0701_2.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "38dd619b2e77cbac69b99f52a053d25a"
@@ -55,3 +63,13 @@
 do_configure_prepend() {
   cp ${WORKDIR}/find.pl ${S}/util/find.pl
 }
+
+# The crypto_use_bigint patch means that perl's bignum module needs to be
+# installed, but some distributions (for example Fedora 23) don't ship it by
+# default.  As the resulting error is very misleading check for bignum before
+# building.
+do_configure_prepend() {
+	if ! perl -Mbigint -e true; then
+		bbfatal "The perl module 'bignum' was not found but this is required to build openssl.  Please install this module (often packaged as perl-bignum) and re-run bitbake."
+	fi
+}