diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/avahi-ui_0.6.31.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/avahi-ui_0.6.31.bb
index eea4d70..0d42b90 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/avahi-ui_0.6.31.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/avahi-ui_0.6.31.bb
@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@
 
 require avahi.inc
 
-inherit python-dir pythonnative
+inherit python-dir pythonnative distro_features_check
+ANY_OF_DISTRO_FEATURES = "${GTK2DISTROFEATURES}"
 
 PACKAGECONFIG ??= "python"
 PACKAGECONFIG[python] = "--enable-python,--disable-python,python-native python"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/0001-lib-dns-gen.c-fix-too-long-error.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/0001-lib-dns-gen.c-fix-too-long-error.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1ed858c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/0001-lib-dns-gen.c-fix-too-long-error.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 5bc3167a8b714ec0c4a3f1c7f3b9411296ec0a23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Robert Yang <liezhi.yang@windriver.com>
+Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2015 20:23:47 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] lib/dns/gen.c: fix too long error
+
+The 512 is a little short when build in deep dir, and cause "too long"
+error, use PATH_MAX if defined.
+
+Upstream-Status: Pending
+
+Signed-off-by: Robert Yang <liezhi.yang@windriver.com>
+---
+ lib/dns/gen.c |    4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/dns/gen.c b/lib/dns/gen.c
+index 51a0435..3d7214f 100644
+--- a/lib/dns/gen.c
++++ b/lib/dns/gen.c
+@@ -148,7 +148,11 @@ static const char copyright[] =
+ #define TYPECLASSBUF (TYPECLASSLEN + 1)
+ #define TYPECLASSFMT "%" STR(TYPECLASSLEN) "[-0-9a-z]_%d"
+ #define ATTRIBUTESIZE 256
++#ifdef PATH_MAX
++#define DIRNAMESIZE PATH_MAX
++#else
+ #define DIRNAMESIZE 512
++#endif
+ 
+ static struct cc {
+ 	struct cc *next;
+-- 
+1.7.9.5
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2015-8000.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2015-8000.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e1c8052
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2015-8000.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
+From 8259daad7242ab2af8731681177ef7e948a15ece Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
+Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2015 13:12:20 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] 4260.   [security]      Insufficient testing when parsing a
+ message allowed                         records with an incorrect class to be
+ be accepted,                         triggering a REQUIRE failure when those
+ records                         were subsequently cached. (CVE-2015-8000) [RT
+ #4098]
+
+(cherry picked from commit c8821d124c532e0a65752b378f924d4259499fd3)
+(cherry picked from commit 3a4c24c4a52d4a2d21d2decbde3d4e514e27d51c)
+
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+https://source.isc.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=bind9.git;a=commit;h=8259daad7242ab2af8731681177ef7e948a15ece
+
+CVE: CVE-2015-8000
+
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ CHANGES                       |  5 +++++
+ bin/tests/system/start.pl     |  5 ++++-
+ doc/arm/notes.xml             |  9 +++++++++
+ lib/dns/include/dns/message.h | 13 +++++++++++--
+ lib/dns/message.c             | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ lib/dns/resolver.c            |  9 +++++++++
+ lib/dns/xfrin.c               |  2 ++
+ 7 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+Index: bind-9.10.2-P4/bin/tests/system/start.pl
+===================================================================
+--- bind-9.10.2-P4.orig/bin/tests/system/start.pl
++++ bind-9.10.2-P4/bin/tests/system/start.pl
+@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ my $NAMED = $ENV{'NAMED'};
+ my $LWRESD = $ENV{'LWRESD'};
+ my $DIG = $ENV{'DIG'};
+ my $PERL = $ENV{'PERL'};
++my $PYTHON = $ENV{'PYTHON'};
+ 
+ # Start the server(s)
+ 
+@@ -213,7 +214,9 @@ sub start_server {
+ 		$pid_file = "lwresd.pid";
+ 	} elsif ($server =~ /^ans/) {
+ 		$cleanup_files = "{ans.run}";
+-                if (-e "$testdir/$server/ans.pl") {
++                if (-e "$testdir/$server/ans.py") {
++                        $command = "$PYTHON ans.py 10.53.0.$' 5300";
++                } elsif (-e "$testdir/$server/ans.pl") {
+                         $command = "$PERL ans.pl";
+                 } else {
+                         $command = "$PERL $topdir/ans.pl 10.53.0.$'";
+Index: bind-9.10.2-P4/doc/arm/notes.xml
+===================================================================
+--- bind-9.10.2-P4.orig/doc/arm/notes.xml
++++ bind-9.10.2-P4/doc/arm/notes.xml
+@@ -62,6 +62,15 @@
+     <itemizedlist>
+       <listitem>
+ 	<para>
++	  Insufficient testing when parsing a message allowed
++	  records with an incorrect class to be be accepted,
++	  triggering a REQUIRE failure when those records
++	  were subsequently cached.  This flaw is disclosed
++	  in CVE-2015-8000. [RT #4098]
++	</para>
++      </listitem>
++      <listitem>
++	<para>
+ 	  An incorrect boundary check in the OPENPGPKEY rdatatype
+ 	  could trigger an assertion failure. This flaw is disclosed
+ 	  in CVE-2015-5986. [RT #40286]
+Index: bind-9.10.2-P4/lib/dns/include/dns/message.h
+===================================================================
+--- bind-9.10.2-P4.orig/lib/dns/include/dns/message.h
++++ bind-9.10.2-P4/lib/dns/include/dns/message.h
+@@ -15,8 +15,6 @@
+  * PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+  */
+ 
+-/* $Id$ */
+-
+ #ifndef DNS_MESSAGE_H
+ #define DNS_MESSAGE_H 1
+ 
+@@ -221,6 +219,8 @@ struct dns_message {
+ 	unsigned int			free_saved : 1;
+ 	unsigned int			sitok : 1;
+ 	unsigned int			sitbad : 1;
++	unsigned int			tkey : 1;
++	unsigned int			rdclass_set : 1;
+ 
+ 	unsigned int			opt_reserved;
+ 	unsigned int			sig_reserved;
+@@ -1400,6 +1400,15 @@ dns_message_buildopt(dns_message_t *msg,
+  * \li	 other.
+  */
+ 
++void
++dns_message_setclass(dns_message_t *msg, dns_rdataclass_t rdclass);
++/*%<
++ * Set the expected class of records in the response.
++ *
++ * Requires:
++ * \li   msg be a valid message with parsing intent.
++ */
++
+ ISC_LANG_ENDDECLS
+ 
+ #endif /* DNS_MESSAGE_H */
+Index: bind-9.10.2-P4/lib/dns/message.c
+===================================================================
+--- bind-9.10.2-P4.orig/lib/dns/message.c
++++ bind-9.10.2-P4/lib/dns/message.c
+@@ -439,6 +439,8 @@ msginit(dns_message_t *m) {
+ 	m->free_saved = 0;
+ 	m->sitok = 0;
+ 	m->sitbad = 0;
++	m->tkey = 0;
++	m->rdclass_set = 0;
+ 	m->querytsig = NULL;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1091,13 +1093,19 @@ getquestions(isc_buffer_t *source, dns_m
+ 		 * If this class is different than the one we already read,
+ 		 * this is an error.
+ 		 */
+-		if (msg->state == DNS_SECTION_ANY) {
+-			msg->state = DNS_SECTION_QUESTION;
++		if (msg->rdclass_set == 0) {
+ 			msg->rdclass = rdclass;
++			msg->rdclass_set = 1;
+ 		} else if (msg->rdclass != rdclass)
+ 			DO_FORMERR;
+ 
+ 		/*
++		 * Is this a TKEY query?
++		 */
++		if (rdtype == dns_rdatatype_tkey)
++			msg->tkey = 1;
++
++		/*
+ 		 * Can't ask the same question twice.
+ 		 */
+ 		result = dns_message_find(name, rdclass, rdtype, 0, NULL);
+@@ -1241,12 +1249,12 @@ getsection(isc_buffer_t *source, dns_mes
+ 		 * If there was no question section, we may not yet have
+ 		 * established a class.  Do so now.
+ 		 */
+-		if (msg->state == DNS_SECTION_ANY &&
++		if (msg->rdclass_set == 0 &&
+ 		    rdtype != dns_rdatatype_opt &&	/* class is UDP SIZE */
+ 		    rdtype != dns_rdatatype_tsig &&	/* class is ANY */
+ 		    rdtype != dns_rdatatype_tkey) {	/* class is undefined */
+ 			msg->rdclass = rdclass;
+-			msg->state = DNS_SECTION_QUESTION;
++			msg->rdclass_set = 1;
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		/*
+@@ -1256,7 +1264,7 @@ getsection(isc_buffer_t *source, dns_mes
+ 		if (msg->opcode != dns_opcode_update
+ 		    && rdtype != dns_rdatatype_tsig
+ 		    && rdtype != dns_rdatatype_opt
+-		    && rdtype != dns_rdatatype_dnskey /* in a TKEY query */
++		    && rdtype != dns_rdatatype_key /* in a TKEY query */
+ 		    && rdtype != dns_rdatatype_sig /* SIG(0) */
+ 		    && rdtype != dns_rdatatype_tkey /* Win2000 TKEY */
+ 		    && msg->rdclass != dns_rdataclass_any
+@@ -1264,6 +1272,16 @@ getsection(isc_buffer_t *source, dns_mes
+ 			DO_FORMERR;
+ 
+ 		/*
++		 * If this is not a TKEY query/response then the KEY
++		 * record's class needs to match.
++		 */
++		if (msg->opcode != dns_opcode_update && !msg->tkey &&
++		    rdtype == dns_rdatatype_key &&
++		    msg->rdclass != dns_rdataclass_any &&
++		    msg->rdclass != rdclass)
++			DO_FORMERR;
++
++		/*
+ 		 * Special type handling for TSIG, OPT, and TKEY.
+ 		 */
+ 		if (rdtype == dns_rdatatype_tsig) {
+@@ -1377,6 +1395,10 @@ getsection(isc_buffer_t *source, dns_mes
+ 				skip_name_search = ISC_TRUE;
+ 				skip_type_search = ISC_TRUE;
+ 				issigzero = ISC_TRUE;
++			} else {
++				if (msg->rdclass != dns_rdataclass_any &&
++				    msg->rdclass != rdclass)
++					DO_FORMERR;
+ 			}
+ 		} else
+ 			covers = 0;
+@@ -1625,6 +1647,7 @@ dns_message_parse(dns_message_t *msg, is
+ 	msg->counts[DNS_SECTION_ADDITIONAL] = isc_buffer_getuint16(source);
+ 
+ 	msg->header_ok = 1;
++	msg->state = DNS_SECTION_QUESTION;
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * -1 means no EDNS.
+@@ -3706,3 +3729,15 @@ dns_message_buildopt(dns_message_t *mess
+ 		dns_message_puttemprdatalist(message, &rdatalist);
+ 	return (result);
+ }
++
++void
++dns_message_setclass(dns_message_t *msg, dns_rdataclass_t rdclass) {
++
++	REQUIRE(DNS_MESSAGE_VALID(msg));
++	REQUIRE(msg->from_to_wire == DNS_MESSAGE_INTENTPARSE);
++	REQUIRE(msg->state == DNS_SECTION_ANY);
++	REQUIRE(msg->rdclass_set == 0);
++
++	msg->rdclass = rdclass;
++	msg->rdclass_set = 1;
++}
+Index: bind-9.10.2-P4/lib/dns/resolver.c
+===================================================================
+--- bind-9.10.2-P4.orig/lib/dns/resolver.c
++++ bind-9.10.2-P4/lib/dns/resolver.c
+@@ -7309,6 +7309,8 @@ resquery_response(isc_task_t *task, isc_
+ 			goto done;
+ 	}
+ 
++	dns_message_setclass(message, fctx->res->rdclass);
++
+ 	if ((options & DNS_FETCHOPT_TCP) == 0) {
+ 		if ((options & DNS_FETCHOPT_NOEDNS0) == 0)
+ 			dns_adb_setudpsize(fctx->adb, query->addrinfo,
+@@ -7391,6 +7393,13 @@ resquery_response(isc_task_t *task, isc_
+ 				 &dns_master_style_comment,
+ 				 ISC_LOG_DEBUG(10),
+ 				 fctx->res->mctx);
++
++	if (message->rdclass != fctx->res->rdclass) {
++		resend = ISC_TRUE;
++		FCTXTRACE("bad class");
++		goto done;
++	}
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Process receive opt record.
+ 	 */
+Index: bind-9.10.2-P4/lib/dns/xfrin.c
+===================================================================
+--- bind-9.10.2-P4.orig/lib/dns/xfrin.c
++++ bind-9.10.2-P4/lib/dns/xfrin.c
+@@ -1225,6 +1225,8 @@ xfrin_recv_done(isc_task_t *task, isc_ev
+ 	msg->tsigctx = xfr->tsigctx;
+ 	xfr->tsigctx = NULL;
+ 
++	dns_message_setclass(msg, xfr->rdclass);
++
+ 	if (xfr->nmsg > 0)
+ 		msg->tcp_continuation = 1;
+ 
+Index: bind-9.10.2-P4/CHANGES
+===================================================================
+--- bind-9.10.2-P4.orig/CHANGES
++++ bind-9.10.2-P4/CHANGES
+@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
+-	--- 9.10.2-P4 released ---
++4260.  [security]      Insufficient testing when parsing a message allowed
++                       records with an incorrect class to be be accepted,
++                       triggering a REQUIRE failure when those records
++                       were subsequently cached. (CVE-2015-8000) [RT #4098]
++
++    --- 9.10.2-P4 released ---
+ 
+ 4170.	[security]	An incorrect boundary check in the OPENPGPKEY
+ 			rdatatype could trigger an assertion failure.
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2015-8461.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2015-8461.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..88e9c83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2015-8461.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From adbf81335b67be0cebdcf9f1f4fcb38ef4814f4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
+Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2015 18:36:27 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] 4146.   [bug]           Address reference leak that could
+ prevent a clean                         shutdown. [RT #37125]
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+https://source.isc.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=bind9.git;a=commit;h=adbf81335b67be0cebdcf9f1f4fcb38ef4814f4d
+
+CVE: CVE-2015-8461
+Signed-off-by:  Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+---
+ CHANGES            | 3 +++
+ lib/dns/resolver.c | 5 +++++
+ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+Index: bind-9.10.2-P4/CHANGES
+===================================================================
+--- bind-9.10.2-P4.orig/CHANGES
++++ bind-9.10.2-P4/CHANGES
+@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
++4146.  [bug]           Address reference leak that could prevent a clean
++                       shutdown. [RT #37125]
++
+ 4260.  [security]      Insufficient testing when parsing a message allowed
+                        records with an incorrect class to be be accepted,
+                        triggering a REQUIRE failure when those records
+Index: bind-9.10.2-P4/lib/dns/resolver.c
+===================================================================
+--- bind-9.10.2-P4.orig/lib/dns/resolver.c
++++ bind-9.10.2-P4/lib/dns/resolver.c
+@@ -1649,6 +1649,11 @@ fctx_query(fetchctx_t *fctx, dns_adbaddr
+ 	if (query->dispatch != NULL)
+ 		dns_dispatch_detach(&query->dispatch);
+ 
++	LOCK(&res->buckets[fctx->bucketnum].lock);
++	INSIST(fctx->references > 1);
++	fctx->references--;
++	UNLOCK(&res->buckets[fctx->bucketnum].lock);
++
+  cleanup_query:
+ 	if (query->connects == 0) {
+ 		query->magic = 0;
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2015-8704.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2015-8704.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d5bf740
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2015-8704.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+a buffer size check can cause denial of service under certain circumstances 
+
+[security]
+The following flaw in BIND was reported by ISC:
+
+A buffer size check used to guard against overflow could cause named to exit with an INSIST failure In apl_42.c.
+
+A server could exit due to an INSIST failure in apl_42.c when performing certain string formatting operations.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2015-8704
+
+[The patch is taken from BIND 9.10.3:
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2015-8704]
+
+Signed-off-by: Derek Straka <derek@asterius.io>
+diff --git a/lib/dns/rdata/in_1/apl_42.c b/lib/dns/rdata/in_1/apl_42.c
+index bedd38e..28eb7f2 100644
+--- a/lib/dns/rdata/in_1/apl_42.c
++++ b/lib/dns/rdata/in_1/apl_42.c
+@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ totext_in_apl(ARGS_TOTEXT) {
+	isc_uint8_t len;
+	isc_boolean_t neg;
+	unsigned char buf[16];
+-	char txt[sizeof(" !64000")];
++	char txt[sizeof(" !64000:")];
+	const char *sep = "";
+	int n;
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2015-8705.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2015-8705.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c4a052d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2015-8705.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+a crash or assertion failure can during format processing 
+
+[security]
+The following flaw in BIND was reported by ISC:
+
+In versions of BIND 9.10, errors can occur when OPT pseudo-RR data or ECS options are formatted to text. In 9.10.3 through 9.10.3-P2, the issue may result in a REQUIRE assertion failure in buffer.c.
+
+This issue can affect both authoritative and recursive servers if they are performing debug logging. (It may also crash related tools which use the same code, such as dig or delv.)
+
+A server could exit due to an INSIST failure in apl_42.c when performing certain string formatting operations.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2015-8705
+
+[The patch is taken from BIND 9.10.3:
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2015-8705]
+
+Signed-off-by: Derek Straka <derek@asterius.io>
+diff --git a/lib/dns/message.c b/lib/dns/message.c
+index ea7b93a..810c58e 100644
+--- a/lib/dns/message.c
++++ b/lib/dns/message.c
+@@ -3310,9 +3310,19 @@
+ 			} else if (optcode == DNS_OPT_SIT) {
+ 				ADD_STRING(target, "; SIT");
+ 			} else if (optcode == DNS_OPT_CLIENT_SUBNET) {
++				isc_buffer_t ecsbuf;
+ 				ADD_STRING(target, "; CLIENT-SUBNET: ");
+-				render_ecs(&optbuf, target);
+-				ADD_STRING(target, "\n");
++				isc_buffer_init(&ecsbuf,
++							isc_buffer_current(&optbuf),
++							optlen);
++				isc_buffer_add(&ecsbuf, optlen);
++				result = render_ecs(&ecsbuf, target);
++				if (result == ISC_R_NOSPACE)
++					return (result);
++				if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
++					isc_buffer_forward(&optbuf, optlen);
++                                        ADD_STRING(target, "\n");
++                }
+ 				continue;
+ 			} else if (optcode == DNS_OPT_EXPIRE) {
+ 				if (optlen == 4) {
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.10.2-P4.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.10.2-P4.bb
index efae289..19f87d7 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.10.2-P4.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.10.2-P4.bb
@@ -20,6 +20,11 @@
            file://0001-build-use-pkg-config-to-find-libxml2.patch \
            file://bind-ensure-searching-for-json-headers-searches-sysr.patch \
            file://0001-gen.c-extend-DIRNAMESIZE-from-256-to-512.patch \
+           file://0001-lib-dns-gen.c-fix-too-long-error.patch \
+           file://CVE-2015-8704.patch \
+           file://CVE-2015-8705.patch \
+           file://CVE-2015-8000.patch \
+           file://CVE-2015-8461.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "8b1f5064837756c938eadc1537dec5c7"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc
index 039c443..df42c88 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@
 
 SRC_URI = "\
     ${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/bluetooth/bluez-${PV}.tar.xz \
-    file://bluetooth.conf \
 "
 S = "${WORKDIR}/bluez-${PV}"
 
@@ -53,8 +52,8 @@
 	if [ -f ${S}/profiles/input/input.conf ]; then
 	    install -m 0644 ${S}/profiles/input/input.conf ${D}/${sysconfdir}/bluetooth/
 	fi
-	# at_console doesn't really work with the current state of OE, so punch some more holes so people can actually use BT
-	install -m 0644 ${WORKDIR}/bluetooth.conf ${D}/${sysconfdir}/dbus-1/system.d/
+
+	install -m 0644 ${S}/src/bluetooth.conf ${D}/${sysconfdir}/dbus-1/system.d/
 
 	# Install desired tools that upstream leaves in build area
         for f in ${NOINST_TOOLS} ; do
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/bluetooth.conf b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/bluetooth.conf
deleted file mode 100644
index 26845bb..0000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/bluetooth.conf
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-<!-- This configuration file specifies the required security policies
-     for Bluetooth core daemon to work. -->
-
-<!DOCTYPE busconfig PUBLIC "-//freedesktop//DTD D-BUS Bus Configuration 1.0//EN"
- "http://www.freedesktop.org/standards/dbus/1.0/busconfig.dtd">
-<busconfig>
-
-  <!-- ../system.conf have denied everything, so we just punch some holes -->
-
-  <policy context="default">
-    <allow own="org.bluez"/>
-    <allow send_destination="org.bluez"/>
-    <allow send_interface="org.bluez.Agent1"/>
-    <allow send_type="method_call"/>
-  </policy>
-
-</busconfig>
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman-conf.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman-conf.bb
index bd4c28d..9254ed7 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman-conf.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman-conf.bb
@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@
 
 PACKAGE_ARCH = "${MACHINE_ARCH}"
 
-FILES_${PN} = "${localstatedir}/* ${libdir}/*"
+FILES_${PN} = "${localstatedir}/* ${datadir}/*"
 
 do_install() {
     #Configure Wired network interface in case of qemu* machines
     if test -e ${WORKDIR}/wired.config && test -e ${WORKDIR}/wired-setup; then
         install -d ${D}${localstatedir}/lib/connman
         install -m 0644 ${WORKDIR}/wired.config ${D}${localstatedir}/lib/connman
-        install -d ${D}${libdir}/connman
-        install -m 0755 ${WORKDIR}/wired-setup ${D}${libdir}/connman
+        install -d ${D}${datadir}/connman
+        install -m 0755 ${WORKDIR}/wired-setup ${D}${datadir}/connman
     fi
 }
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman-gnome_0.7.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman-gnome_0.7.bb
index f5575d2..7b875f0 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman-gnome_0.7.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman-gnome_0.7.bb
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
                     file://properties/main.c;beginline=1;endline=20;md5=50c77c81871308b033ab7a1504626afb \
                     file://common/connman-dbus.c;beginline=1;endline=20;md5=de6b485c0e717a0236402d220187717a"
 
-DEPENDS = "gtk+ dbus-glib intltool-native"
+DEPENDS = "gtk+ dbus-glib intltool-native gettext-native"
 
 # 0.7 tag
 SRCREV = "cf3c325b23dae843c5499a113591cfbc98acb143"
@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@
 
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
 
-inherit autotools-brokensep gtk-icon-cache pkgconfig
+inherit autotools-brokensep gtk-icon-cache pkgconfig distro_features_check
+ANY_OF_DISTRO_FEATURES = "${GTK2DISTROFEATURES}"
 
 RDEPENDS_${PN} = "connman"
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman.inc b/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman.inc
index 17dc4b9..afdb3f2 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman.inc
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
     --disable-polkit \
     --enable-client \
 "
+CFLAGS += "-D_GNU_SOURCE"
 
 PACKAGECONFIG ??= "wispr \
                    ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'systemd','systemd', '', d)} \
@@ -67,15 +68,9 @@
 
 SYSTEMD_SERVICE_${PN} = "connman.service"
 SYSTEMD_SERVICE_${PN}-vpn = "connman-vpn.service"
-SYSTEMD_WIRED_SETUP = "ExecStartPre=-${libdir}/connman/wired-setup"
+SYSTEMD_WIRED_SETUP = "ExecStartPre=-${datadir}/connman/wired-setup"
 
-# This allows *everyone* to access ConnMan over DBus, without any access
-# control.  Really the at_console flag should work, which would mean that
-# both this and the xuser patch can be dropped.
 do_compile_append() {
-	sed -i -e s:deny:allow:g ${S}/src/connman-dbus.conf
-	sed -i -e s:deny:allow:g ${S}/vpn/vpn-dbus.conf
-
 	sed -i "s#ExecStart=#${SYSTEMD_WIRED_SETUP}\nExecStart=#" ${B}/src/connman.service
 }
 
@@ -83,7 +78,7 @@
 	if ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES','sysvinit','true','false',d)}; then
 		install -d ${D}${sysconfdir}/init.d
 		install -m 0755 ${WORKDIR}/connman ${D}${sysconfdir}/init.d/connman
-		sed -i s%@LIBDIR@%${libdir}% ${D}${sysconfdir}/init.d/connman
+		sed -i s%@DATADIR@%${datadir}% ${D}${sysconfdir}/init.d/connman
 	fi
 
 	install -d ${D}${bindir}
@@ -112,7 +107,6 @@
 
 RDEPENDS_${PN} = "\
 	dbus \
-	${@base_conditional('ROOTLESS_X', '1', 'xuser-account', '', d)} \
 	"
 
 PACKAGES_DYNAMIC += "^${PN}-plugin-.*"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/0001-Detect-backtrace-API-availability-before-using-it.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/0001-Detect-backtrace-API-availability-before-using-it.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5dc6fd6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/0001-Detect-backtrace-API-availability-before-using-it.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+From 00d4447395725abaa651e12ed40095081e04011e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2015 13:22:01 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Detect backtrace() API availability before using it
+
+C libraries besides glibc do not have backtrace() implemented
+
+Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+---
+Upstream-Status: Pending
+
+ configure.ac | 2 ++
+ src/log.c    | 5 ++---
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 69c0eeb..90099f2 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -171,6 +171,8 @@ fi
+ AM_CONDITIONAL(PPTP, test "${enable_pptp}" != "no")
+ AM_CONDITIONAL(PPTP_BUILTIN, test "${enable_pptp}" = "builtin")
+ 
++AC_CHECK_HEADERS([execinfo.h])
++
+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(resolv.h, dummy=yes,
+ 	AC_MSG_ERROR(resolver header files are required))
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(resolv, ns_initparse, dummy=yes, [
+diff --git a/src/log.c b/src/log.c
+index a693bd0..5b40c1f 100644
+--- a/src/log.c
++++ b/src/log.c
+@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <syslog.h>
+-#include <execinfo.h>
+ #include <dlfcn.h>
+ 
+ #include "connman.h"
+@@ -215,9 +214,9 @@ static void print_backtrace(unsigned int offset)
+ static void signal_handler(int signo)
+ {
+ 	connman_error("Aborting (signal %d) [%s]", signo, program_exec);
+-
++#ifdef HAVE_EXECINFO_H
+ 	print_backtrace(2);
+-
++#endif /* HAVE_EXECINFO_H */
+ 	exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.5.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/0002-resolve-musl-does-not-implement-res_ninit.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/0002-resolve-musl-does-not-implement-res_ninit.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0593427
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/0002-resolve-musl-does-not-implement-res_ninit.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+From 10b0d16d04b811b1ccd1f9b0cfe757bce8d876a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 6 Apr 2015 23:02:21 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] resolve: musl does not implement res_ninit
+
+ported from
+http://git.alpinelinux.org/cgit/aports/plain/testing/connman/libresolv.patch
+
+Upstream-Status: Pending
+
+Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+---
+ gweb/gresolv.c | 33 ++++++++++++---------------------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/gweb/gresolv.c b/gweb/gresolv.c
+index 5cf7a9a..3ad8e70 100644
+--- a/gweb/gresolv.c
++++ b/gweb/gresolv.c
+@@ -875,8 +875,6 @@ GResolv *g_resolv_new(int index)
+ 	resolv->index = index;
+ 	resolv->nameserver_list = NULL;
+ 
+-	res_ninit(&resolv->res);
+-
+ 	return resolv;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -916,8 +914,6 @@ void g_resolv_unref(GResolv *resolv)
+ 
+ 	flush_nameservers(resolv);
+ 
+-	res_nclose(&resolv->res);
+-
+ 	g_free(resolv);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1020,24 +1016,19 @@ guint g_resolv_lookup_hostname(GResolv *resolv, const char *hostname,
+ 	debug(resolv, "hostname %s", hostname);
+ 
+ 	if (!resolv->nameserver_list) {
+-		int i;
+-
+-		for (i = 0; i < resolv->res.nscount; i++) {
+-			char buf[100];
+-			int family = resolv->res.nsaddr_list[i].sin_family;
+-			void *sa_addr = &resolv->res.nsaddr_list[i].sin_addr;
+-
+-			if (family != AF_INET &&
+-					resolv->res._u._ext.nsaddrs[i]) {
+-				family = AF_INET6;
+-				sa_addr = &resolv->res._u._ext.nsaddrs[i]->sin6_addr;
++		FILE *f = fopen("/etc/resolv.conf", "r");
++		if (f) {
++			char line[256], *s;
++			int i;
++			while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
++				if (strncmp(line, "nameserver", 10) || !isspace(line[10]))
++					continue;
++				for (s = &line[11]; isspace(s[0]); s++);
++				for (i = 0; s[i] && !isspace(s[i]); i++);
++				s[i] = 0;
++				g_resolv_add_nameserver(resolv, s, 53, 0);
+ 			}
+-
+-			if (family != AF_INET && family != AF_INET6)
+-				continue;
+-
+-			if (inet_ntop(family, sa_addr, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+-				g_resolv_add_nameserver(resolv, buf, 53, 0);
++			fclose(f);
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		if (!resolv->nameserver_list)
+-- 
+2.5.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/0003-Fix-header-inclusions-for-musl.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/0003-Fix-header-inclusions-for-musl.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6327aa2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/0003-Fix-header-inclusions-for-musl.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+From 67645a01a2f3f52625d8dd77f2811a9e213e1b7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2015 13:28:20 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix header inclusions for musl
+
+Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+---
+Upstream-Status: Pending
+
+ gweb/gresolv.c        | 1 +
+ plugins/wifi.c        | 3 +--
+ src/tethering.c       | 2 --
+ tools/dhcp-test.c     | 1 -
+ tools/dnsproxy-test.c | 1 +
+ 5 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/gweb/gresolv.c b/gweb/gresolv.c
+index 3ad8e70..61d6fe8 100644
+--- a/gweb/gresolv.c
++++ b/gweb/gresolv.c
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
+ #include <resolv.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <sys/socket.h>
+diff --git a/plugins/wifi.c b/plugins/wifi.c
+index dfe849f..99cff3f 100644
+--- a/plugins/wifi.c
++++ b/plugins/wifi.c
+@@ -30,9 +30,8 @@
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <sys/ioctl.h>
+ #include <sys/socket.h>
+-#include <linux/if_arp.h>
+-#include <linux/wireless.h>
+ #include <net/ethernet.h>
++#include <linux/wireless.h>
+ 
+ #ifndef IFF_LOWER_UP
+ #define IFF_LOWER_UP	0x10000
+diff --git a/src/tethering.c b/src/tethering.c
+index ceeec74..c44cb36 100644
+--- a/src/tethering.c
++++ b/src/tethering.c
+@@ -31,10 +31,8 @@
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <sys/ioctl.h>
+ #include <net/if.h>
+-#include <linux/sockios.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <fcntl.h>
+-#include <linux/if_tun.h>
+ #include <netinet/in.h>
+ #include <linux/if_bridge.h>
+ 
+diff --git a/tools/dhcp-test.c b/tools/dhcp-test.c
+index c34e10a..eae66fc 100644
+--- a/tools/dhcp-test.c
++++ b/tools/dhcp-test.c
+@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@
+ #include <arpa/inet.h>
+ #include <net/route.h>
+ #include <net/ethernet.h>
+-#include <linux/if_arp.h>
+ 
+ #include <gdhcp/gdhcp.h>
+ 
+diff --git a/tools/dnsproxy-test.c b/tools/dnsproxy-test.c
+index 551cae9..226ba86 100644
+--- a/tools/dnsproxy-test.c
++++ b/tools/dnsproxy-test.c
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
+ #include <arpa/inet.h>
+ #include <netinet/in.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+-- 
+2.5.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/add_xuser_dbus_permission.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/add_xuser_dbus_permission.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 707b3ca..0000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/add_xuser_dbus_permission.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-Because Poky doesn't support at_console we need to special-case the session
-user.
-
-Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [configuration]
-
-Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
-
-diff --git a/src/connman-dbus.conf b/src/connman-dbus.conf
-index 98a773e..466809c 100644
---- a/src/connman-dbus.conf
-+++ b/src/connman-dbus.conf
-@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@
-         <allow send_interface="net.connman.Counter"/>
-         <allow send_interface="net.connman.Notification"/>
-     </policy>
-+    <policy user="xuser">
-+        <allow send_destination="net.connman"/>
-+    </policy>
-     <policy at_console="true">
-         <allow send_destination="net.connman"/>
-     </policy>
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/connman b/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/connman
index bf7a94a..c64fa0d 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/connman
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/connman
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@
 		fi
 	    fi
 	fi
-	if [ -f @LIBDIR@/connman/wired-setup ] ; then
-		. @LIBDIR@/connman/wired-setup
+	if [ -f @DATADIR@/connman/wired-setup ] ; then
+		. @DATADIR@/connman/wired-setup
 	fi
 	$DAEMON $EXTRA_PARAM
 }
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman_1.30.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman_1.30.bb
index 8c47353..7d65ac9 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman_1.30.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman_1.30.bb
@@ -2,7 +2,9 @@
 
 SRC_URI  = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/network/${BPN}/${BP}.tar.xz \
             file://0001-plugin.h-Change-visibility-to-default-for-debug-symb.patch \
-            file://add_xuser_dbus_permission.patch \
+            file://0001-Detect-backtrace-API-availability-before-using-it.patch \
+            file://0002-resolve-musl-does-not-implement-res_ninit.patch \
+            file://0003-Fix-header-inclusions-for-musl.patch \
             file://connman \
             "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "4a3efdbd6796922db9c6f66da57887fa"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/iproute2/iproute2.inc b/meta/recipes-connectivity/iproute2/iproute2.inc
index a53a4e6..29f9062 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/iproute2/iproute2.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/iproute2/iproute2.inc
@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@
 
 EXTRA_OEMAKE = "CC='${CC}' KERNEL_INCLUDE=${STAGING_INCDIR} DOCDIR=${docdir}/iproute2 SUBDIRS='lib tc ip' SBINDIR='${base_sbindir}' LIBDIR='${libdir}'"
 
+do_configure_append () {
+    sh configure ${STAGING_INCDIR}
+    # Explicitly disable ATM support
+    sed -i -e '/TC_CONFIG_ATM/d' Config
+}
+
 do_install () {
     oe_runmake DESTDIR=${D} install
     mv ${D}${base_sbindir}/ip ${D}${base_sbindir}/ip.iproute2
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/irda-utils/irda-utils_0.9.18.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/irda-utils/irda-utils_0.9.18.bb
index 8ac3b18..bd2f815 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/irda-utils/irda-utils_0.9.18.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/irda-utils/irda-utils_0.9.18.bb
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 IrDA allows communication over Infrared with other devices \
 such as phones and laptops."
 HOMEPAGE = "http://irda.sourceforge.net/"
-BUGTRACKER = "irda-users@lists.sourceforge.net"
+BUGTRACKER = "http://sourceforge.net/p/irda/bugs/"
 SECTION = "base"
 LICENSE = "GPLv2+"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://irdadump/COPYING;md5=94d55d512a9ba36caa9b7df079bae19f \
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2016-1907_2.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2016-1907_2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9fac69c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2016-1907_2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+From f98a09cacff7baad8748c9aa217afd155a4d493f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "mmcc@openbsd.org" <mmcc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2015 03:36:35 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream commit
+
+Replace a function-local allocation with stack memory.
+
+ok djm@
+
+Upstream-ID: c09fbbab637053a2ab9f33ca142b4e20a4c5a17e
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2016-1907
+
+[YOCTO #8935]
+
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ clientloop.c | 9 ++-------
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
+index 87ceb3d..1e05cba 100644
+--- a/clientloop.c
++++ b/clientloop.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.275 2015/07/10 06:21:53 markus Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.276 2015/10/20 03:36:35 mmcc Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+@@ -311,11 +311,10 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+ 	static char proto[512], data[512];
+ 	FILE *f;
+ 	int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i;
+-	char *xauthdir, *xauthfile;
++	char xauthdir[PATH_MAX] = "", xauthfile[PATH_MAX] = "";
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 	u_int now, x11_timeout_real;
+ 
+-	xauthdir = xauthfile = NULL;
+ 	*_proto = proto;
+ 	*_data = data;
+ 	proto[0] = data[0] = '\0';
+@@ -343,8 +342,6 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+ 			display = xdisplay;
+ 		}
+ 		if (trusted == 0) {
+-			xauthdir = xmalloc(PATH_MAX);
+-			xauthfile = xmalloc(PATH_MAX);
+ 			mktemp_proto(xauthdir, PATH_MAX);
+ 			/*
+ 			 * The authentication cookie should briefly outlive
+@@ -407,8 +404,6 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+ 		unlink(xauthfile);
+ 		rmdir(xauthdir);
+ 	}
+-	free(xauthdir);
+-	free(xauthfile);
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2016-1907_3.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2016-1907_3.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3dfc51a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2016-1907_3.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
+From ed4ce82dbfa8a3a3c8ea6fa0db113c71e234416c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 23:04:47 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream commit
+
+eliminate fallback from untrusted X11 forwarding to trusted
+ forwarding when the X server disables the SECURITY extension; Reported by
+ Thomas Hoger; ok deraadt@
+
+Upstream-ID: f76195bd2064615a63ef9674a0e4096b0713f938
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2016-1907
+
+[YOCTO #8935]
+
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ clientloop.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
+ clientloop.h |   4 +--
+ mux.c        |  22 ++++++------
+ ssh.c        |  23 +++++-------
+ 4 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
+
+Index: openssh-7.1p2/clientloop.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.1p2.orig/clientloop.c
++++ openssh-7.1p2/clientloop.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.276 2015/10/20 03:36:35 mmcc Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.279 2016/01/13 23:04:47 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+@@ -288,6 +288,9 @@ client_x11_display_valid(const char *dis
+ {
+ 	size_t i, dlen;
+ 
++	if (display == NULL)
++		return 0;
++
+ 	dlen = strlen(display);
+ 	for (i = 0; i < dlen; i++) {
+ 		if (!isalnum((u_char)display[i]) &&
+@@ -301,34 +304,33 @@ client_x11_display_valid(const char *dis
+ 
+ #define SSH_X11_PROTO		"MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1"
+ #define X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK	60
+-void
++int
+ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+     u_int trusted, u_int timeout, char **_proto, char **_data)
+ {
+-	char cmd[1024];
+-	char line[512];
+-	char xdisplay[512];
++	char cmd[1024], line[512], xdisplay[512];
++	char xauthfile[PATH_MAX], xauthdir[PATH_MAX];
+ 	static char proto[512], data[512];
+ 	FILE *f;
+-	int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i;
+-	char xauthdir[PATH_MAX] = "", xauthfile[PATH_MAX] = "";
++	int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i, r;
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 	u_int now, x11_timeout_real;
+ 
+ 	*_proto = proto;
+ 	*_data = data;
+-	proto[0] = data[0] = '\0';
++	proto[0] = data[0] = xauthfile[0] = xauthdir[0] = '\0';
+ 
+-	if (xauth_path == NULL ||(stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1)) {
+-		debug("No xauth program.");
+-	} else if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) {
+-		logit("DISPLAY '%s' invalid, falling back to fake xauth data",
++	if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) {
++		logit("DISPLAY \"%s\" invalid; disabling X11 forwarding",
+ 		    display);
+-	} else {
+-		if (display == NULL) {
+-			debug("x11_get_proto: DISPLAY not set");
+-			return;
+-		}
++		return -1;
++	}
++	if (xauth_path != NULL && stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1) {
++		debug("No xauth program.");
++		xauth_path = NULL;
++	}
++
++	if (xauth_path != NULL) {
+ 		/*
+ 		 * Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does
+ 		 * not match an authorization entry.  For this we
+@@ -337,43 +339,60 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display
+ 		 *      is not perfect.
+ 		 */
+ 		if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) {
+-			snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s",
+-			    display + 10);
++			if ((r = snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s",
++			    display + 10)) < 0 ||
++			    (size_t)r >= sizeof(xdisplay)) {
++				error("%s: display name too long", __func__);
++				return -1;
++			}
+ 			display = xdisplay;
+ 		}
+ 		if (trusted == 0) {
+-			mktemp_proto(xauthdir, PATH_MAX);
+ 			/*
++			 * Generate an untrusted X11 auth cookie.
++			 *
+ 			 * The authentication cookie should briefly outlive
+ 			 * ssh's willingness to forward X11 connections to
+ 			 * avoid nasty fail-open behaviour in the X server.
+ 			 */
++			mktemp_proto(xauthdir, sizeof(xauthdir));
++			if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) == NULL) {
++				error("%s: mkdtemp: %s",
++				    __func__, strerror(errno));
++				return -1;
++			}
++			do_unlink = 1;
++			if ((r = snprintf(xauthfile, sizeof(xauthfile),
++			    "%s/xauthfile", xauthdir)) < 0 ||
++			    (size_t)r >= sizeof(xauthfile)) {
++				error("%s: xauthfile path too long", __func__);
++				unlink(xauthfile);
++				rmdir(xauthdir);
++				return -1;
++			}
++
+ 			if (timeout >= UINT_MAX - X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK)
+ 				x11_timeout_real = UINT_MAX;
+ 			else
+ 				x11_timeout_real = timeout + X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK;
+-			if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) != NULL) {
+-				do_unlink = 1;
+-				snprintf(xauthfile, PATH_MAX, "%s/xauthfile",
+-				    xauthdir);
+-				snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+-				    "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO
+-				    " untrusted timeout %u 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
+-				    xauth_path, xauthfile, display,
+-				    x11_timeout_real);
+-				debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
+-				if (x11_refuse_time == 0) {
+-					now = monotime() + 1;
+-					if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now)
+-						x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX;
+-					else
+-						x11_refuse_time = now + timeout;
+-					channel_set_x11_refuse_time(
+-					    x11_refuse_time);
+-				}
+-				if (system(cmd) == 0)
+-					generated = 1;
++			if ((r = snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
++			    "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO
++			    " untrusted timeout %u 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
++			    xauth_path, xauthfile, display,
++			    x11_timeout_real)) < 0 ||
++			    (size_t)r >= sizeof(cmd))
++				fatal("%s: cmd too long", __func__);
++			debug2("%s: %s", __func__, cmd);
++			if (x11_refuse_time == 0) {
++				now = monotime() + 1;
++				if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now)
++					x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX;
++				else
++					x11_refuse_time = now + timeout;
++				channel_set_x11_refuse_time(x11_refuse_time);
+ 			}
++			if (system(cmd) == 0)
++				generated = 1;
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		/*
+@@ -395,9 +414,7 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display
+ 				got_data = 1;
+ 			if (f)
+ 				pclose(f);
+-		} else
+-			error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: "
+-			    "xauth key data not generated");
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (do_unlink) {
+@@ -405,6 +422,13 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display
+ 		rmdir(xauthdir);
+ 	}
+ 
++	/* Don't fall back to fake X11 data for untrusted forwarding */
++	if (!trusted && !got_data) {
++		error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: "
++		    "xauth key data not generated");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some
+ 	 * data.  The forwarding code will check the validity of the
+@@ -427,6 +451,8 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display
+ 			rnd >>= 8;
+ 		}
+ 	}
++
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+Index: openssh-7.1p2/clientloop.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.1p2.orig/clientloop.h
++++ openssh-7.1p2/clientloop.h
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.31 2013/06/02 23:36:29 dtucker Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.32 2016/01/13 23:04:47 djm Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
+ 
+ /* Client side main loop for the interactive session. */
+ int	 client_loop(int, int, int);
+-void	 client_x11_get_proto(const char *, const char *, u_int, u_int,
++int	 client_x11_get_proto(const char *, const char *, u_int, u_int,
+ 	    char **, char **);
+ void	 client_global_request_reply_fwd(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+ void	 client_session2_setup(int, int, int, const char *, struct termios *,
+Index: openssh-7.1p2/mux.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.1p2.orig/mux.c
++++ openssh-7.1p2/mux.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.54 2015/08/19 23:18:26 djm Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.58 2016/01/13 23:04:47 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+  *
+@@ -1354,16 +1354,18 @@ mux_session_confirm(int id, int success,
+ 		char *proto, *data;
+ 
+ 		/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
+-		client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
++		if (client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
+ 		    options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout,
+-		    &proto, &data);
+-		/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
+-		debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
+-		    "spoofing.");
+-		x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto,
+-		    data, 1);
+-		client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN);
+-		/* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */
++		    &proto, &data) == 0) {
++			/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
++			debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
++			    "spoofing.");
++			x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto,
++			    data, 1);
++			/* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */
++			client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding",
++			    CONFIRM_WARN);
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (cctx->want_agent_fwd && options.forward_agent) {
+Index: openssh-7.1p2/ssh.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.1p2.orig/ssh.c
++++ openssh-7.1p2/ssh.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.420 2015/07/30 00:01:34 djm Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.433 2016/01/13 23:04:47 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+@@ -1604,6 +1604,7 @@ ssh_session(void)
+ 	struct winsize ws;
+ 	char *cp;
+ 	const char *display;
++	char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL;
+ 
+ 	/* Enable compression if requested. */
+ 	if (options.compression) {
+@@ -1674,13 +1675,9 @@ ssh_session(void)
+ 	display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+ 	if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11)
+ 		debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set");
+-	if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
+-		char *proto, *data;
+-		/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
+-		client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
+-		    options.forward_x11_trusted,
+-		    options.forward_x11_timeout,
+-		    &proto, &data);
++	if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(display,
++	    options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted,
++	    options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) {
+ 		/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
+ 		debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
+ 		    "spoofing.");
+@@ -1770,6 +1767,7 @@ ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success,
+ 	extern char **environ;
+ 	const char *display;
+ 	int interactive = tty_flag;
++	char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (!success)
+ 		return; /* No need for error message, channels code sens one */
+@@ -1777,12 +1775,9 @@ ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success,
+ 	display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+ 	if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11)
+ 		debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set");
+-	if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
+-		char *proto, *data;
+-		/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
+-		client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
+-		    options.forward_x11_trusted,
+-		    options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data);
++	if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(display,
++	    options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted,
++	    options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) {
+ 		/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
+ 		debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
+ 		    "spoofing.");
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2016-1907_upstream_commit.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2016-1907_upstream_commit.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3d132e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2016-1907_upstream_commit.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From d77148e3a3ef6c29b26ec74331455394581aa257 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun, 8 Nov 2015 21:59:11 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream commit
+
+fix OOB read in packet code caused by missing return
+ statement found by Ben Hawkes; ok markus@ deraadt@
+
+Upstream-ID: a3e3a85434ebfa0690d4879091959591f30efc62
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2016-1907
+
+[YOCTO #8935]
+
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ packet.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+Index: openssh-7.1p2/packet.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.1p2.orig/packet.c
++++ openssh-7.1p2/packet.c
+@@ -1855,6 +1855,7 @@ ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh *
+ 		if (len >= state->packet_discard) {
+ 			if ((r = ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh)) != 0)
+ 				return r;
++			return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
+ 		}
+ 		state->packet_discard -= len;
+ 		return 0;
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/sshd@.service b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/sshd@.service
index bb2d68e..9d83dfb 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/sshd@.service
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/sshd@.service
@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@
 After=sshdgenkeys.service
 
 [Service]
-ExecStart=-@SBINDIR@/sshd -i
+Environment="SSHD_OPTS="
+EnvironmentFile=-/etc/default/ssh
+ExecStart=-@SBINDIR@/sshd -i $SSHD_OPTS
 ExecReload=@BASE_BINDIR@/kill -HUP $MAINPID
 StandardInput=socket
 StandardError=syslog
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/sshdgenkeys.service b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/sshdgenkeys.service
index d65086f..148e6ad 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/sshdgenkeys.service
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/sshdgenkeys.service
@@ -1,11 +1,22 @@
 [Unit]
 Description=OpenSSH Key Generation
-ConditionPathExists=|!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
-ConditionPathExists=|!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
-ConditionPathExists=|!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
-ConditionPathExists=|!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+RequiresMountsFor=/var /run
+ConditionPathExists=!/var/run/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+ConditionPathExists=!/var/run/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+ConditionPathExists=!/var/run/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+ConditionPathExists=!/var/run/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+ConditionPathExists=!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+ConditionPathExists=!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+ConditionPathExists=!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+ConditionPathExists=!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
 
 [Service]
-ExecStart=@BINDIR@/ssh-keygen -A
+Environment="SYSCONFDIR=/etc/ssh"
+EnvironmentFile=-/etc/default/ssh
+ExecStart=@BASE_BINDIR@/mkdir -p $SYSCONFDIR
+ExecStart=@BINDIR@/ssh-keygen -q -f ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_rsa_key -N '' -t rsa
+ExecStart=@BINDIR@/ssh-keygen -q -f ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_dsa_key -N '' -t dsa
+ExecStart=@BINDIR@/ssh-keygen -q -f ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -N '' -t ecdsa
+ExecStart=@BINDIR@/ssh-keygen -q -f ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_ed25519_key -N '' -t ed25519
 Type=oneshot
 RemainAfterExit=yes
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_7.1p1.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_7.1p2.bb
similarity index 93%
rename from meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_7.1p1.bb
rename to meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_7.1p2.bb
index eeeb4b4..714c391 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_7.1p1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_7.1p2.bb
@@ -20,12 +20,15 @@
            file://sshdgenkeys.service \
            file://volatiles.99_sshd \
            file://add-test-support-for-busybox.patch \
-           file://run-ptest"
+           file://run-ptest \
+           file://CVE-2016-1907_upstream_commit.patch \
+           file://CVE-2016-1907_2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2016-1907_3.patch "
 
 PAM_SRC_URI = "file://sshd"
 
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "8709736bc8a8c253bc4eeb4829888ca5"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "fc0a6d2d1d063d5c66dffd952493d0cda256cad204f681de0f84ef85b2ad8428"
+SRC_URI[md5sum] = "4d8547670e2a220d5ef805ad9e47acf2"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "dd75f024dcf21e06a0d6421d582690bf987a1f6323e32ad6619392f3bfde6bbd"
 
 inherit useradd update-rc.d update-alternatives systemd
 
@@ -87,7 +90,7 @@
 
 do_install_append () {
 	if [ "${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'pam', 'pam', '', d)}" = "pam" ]; then
-		install -D -m 0755 ${WORKDIR}/sshd ${D}${sysconfdir}/pam.d/sshd
+		install -D -m 0644 ${WORKDIR}/sshd ${D}${sysconfdir}/pam.d/sshd
 		sed -i -e 's:#UsePAM no:UsePAM yes:' ${WORKDIR}/sshd_config ${D}${sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config
 	fi
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl.inc b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl.inc
index 53dcfd9..8af423f 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl.inc
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@
         linux-*-mips64)
                target=linux-mips
                 ;;
-	linux-microblaze*)
+	linux-microblaze*|linux-nios2*)
 		target=linux-generic32
 		;;
 	linux-powerpc)
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0001-Add-test-for-CVE-2015-3194.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0001-Add-test-for-CVE-2015-3194.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39a2e5a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0001-Add-test-for-CVE-2015-3194.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+From 00456fded43eadd4bb94bf675ae4ea5d158a764f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org>
+Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2015 13:30:03 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Add test for CVE-2015-3194
+
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+This patch was imported from 
+https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=00456fded43eadd4bb94bf675ae4ea5d158a764f
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ test/certs/pss1.pem | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ test/tx509          |  7 +++++++
+ 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 test/certs/pss1.pem
+
+diff --git a/test/certs/pss1.pem b/test/certs/pss1.pem
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..29da71d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/certs/pss1.pem
+@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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++-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+diff --git a/test/tx509 b/test/tx509
+index 0ce3b52..77f5cac 100644
+--- a/test/tx509
++++ b/test/tx509
+@@ -74,5 +74,12 @@ if [ $? != 0 ]; then exit 1; fi
+ cmp x509-f.p x509-ff.p3
+ if [ $? != 0 ]; then exit 1; fi
+ 
++echo "Parsing test certificates"
++
++$cmd -in certs/pss1.pem -text -noout >/dev/null
++if [ $? != 0 ]; then exit 1; fi
++
++echo OK
++
+ /bin/rm -f x509-f.* x509-ff.* x509-fff.*
+ exit 0
+-- 
+2.3.5
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2015-3193-bn-asm-x86_64-mont5.pl-fix-carry-propagating-bug-CVE.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2015-3193-bn-asm-x86_64-mont5.pl-fix-carry-propagating-bug-CVE.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..125016a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2015-3193-bn-asm-x86_64-mont5.pl-fix-carry-propagating-bug-CVE.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+From d73cc256c8e256c32ed959456101b73ba9842f72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 09:00:32 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl: fix carry propagating bug
+ (CVE-2015-3193).
+
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+(cherry picked from commit e7c078db57908cbf16074c68034977565ffaf107)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+This patch was imported from 
+https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=d73cc256c8e256c32ed959456101b73ba9842f72
+
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl | 22 +++++++++++++++++++---
+ crypto/bn/bntest.c            | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+Index: openssl-1.0.2d/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.2d.orig/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
++++ openssl-1.0.2d/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
+@@ -1779,6 +1779,15 @@ sqr8x_reduction:
+ .align	32
+ .L8x_tail_done:
+ 	add	(%rdx),%r8		# can this overflow?
++	adc	\$0,%r9
++	adc	\$0,%r10
++	adc	\$0,%r11
++	adc	\$0,%r12
++	adc	\$0,%r13
++	adc	\$0,%r14
++	adc	\$0,%r15		# can't overflow, because we
++					# started with "overhung" part
++					# of multiplication
+ 	xor	%rax,%rax
+ 
+ 	neg	$carry
+@@ -3125,6 +3134,15 @@ sqrx8x_reduction:
+ .align	32
+ .Lsqrx8x_tail_done:
+ 	add	24+8(%rsp),%r8		# can this overflow?
++	adc	\$0,%r9
++	adc	\$0,%r10
++	adc	\$0,%r11
++	adc	\$0,%r12
++	adc	\$0,%r13
++	adc	\$0,%r14
++	adc	\$0,%r15		# can't overflow, because we
++					# started with "overhung" part
++					# of multiplication
+ 	mov	$carry,%rax		# xor	%rax,%rax
+ 
+ 	sub	16+8(%rsp),$carry	# mov 16(%rsp),%cf
+@@ -3168,13 +3186,11 @@ my ($rptr,$nptr)=("%rdx","%rbp");
+ my @ri=map("%r$_",(10..13));
+ my @ni=map("%r$_",(14..15));
+ $code.=<<___;
+-	xor	%rbx,%rbx
++	xor	%ebx,%ebx
+ 	sub	%r15,%rsi		# compare top-most words
+ 	adc	%rbx,%rbx
+ 	mov	%rcx,%r10		# -$num
+-	.byte	0x67
+ 	or	%rbx,%rax
+-	.byte	0x67
+ 	mov	%rcx,%r9		# -$num
+ 	xor	\$1,%rax
+ 	sar	\$3+2,%rcx		# cf=0
+Index: openssl-1.0.2d/crypto/bn/bntest.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.2d.orig/crypto/bn/bntest.c
++++ openssl-1.0.2d/crypto/bn/bntest.c
+@@ -1027,6 +1027,24 @@ int test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIO *bp,
+             return 0;
+         }
+     }
++
++    /* Regression test for carry propagation bug in sqr8x_reduction */
++    BN_hex2bn(&a, "050505050505");
++    BN_hex2bn(&b, "02");
++    BN_hex2bn(&c,
++        "4141414141414141414141274141414141414141414141414141414141414141"
++        "4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141"
++        "4141414141414141414141800000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
++        "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
++        "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
++        "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001");
++    BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx);
++    BN_mul(e, a, a, ctx);
++    if (BN_cmp(d, e)) {
++        fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp and BN_mul produce different results!\n");
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     BN_free(a);
+     BN_free(b);
+     BN_free(c);
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2015-3194-1-Add-PSS-parameter-check.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2015-3194-1-Add-PSS-parameter-check.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..13d4891
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2015-3194-1-Add-PSS-parameter-check.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From c394a488942387246653833359a5c94b5832674e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2015 12:35:19 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Add PSS parameter check.
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Avoid seg fault by checking mgf1 parameter is not NULL. This can be
+triggered during certificate verification so could be a DoS attack
+against a client or a server enabling client authentication.
+
+Thanks to Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG) for discovering this bug.
+
+CVE-2015-3194
+
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+This patch was imported from 
+https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=c394a488942387246653833359a5c94b5832674e
+
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+index ca3922e..4e06218 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ static X509_ALGOR *rsa_mgf1_decode(X509_ALGOR *alg)
+ {
+     const unsigned char *p;
+     int plen;
+-    if (alg == NULL)
++    if (alg == NULL || alg->parameter == NULL)
+         return NULL;
+     if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_mgf1)
+         return NULL;
+-- 
+2.3.5
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2015-3195-Fix-leak-with-ASN.1-combine.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2015-3195-Fix-leak-with-ASN.1-combine.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6fc4d0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2015-3195-Fix-leak-with-ASN.1-combine.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+From cc598f321fbac9c04da5766243ed55d55948637d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2015 19:03:07 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix leak with ASN.1 combine.
+
+When parsing a combined structure pass a flag to the decode routine
+so on error a pointer to the parent structure is not zeroed as
+this will leak any additional components in the parent.
+
+This can leak memory in any application parsing PKCS#7 or CMS structures.
+
+CVE-2015-3195.
+
+Thanks to Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) for discovering this bug using
+libFuzzer.
+
+PR#4131
+
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+This patch was imported from
+https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=cc598f321fbac9c04da5766243ed55d55948637d
+
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c | 7 +++++--
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c b/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
+index febf605..9256049 100644
+--- a/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
++++ b/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
+@@ -180,6 +180,8 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
+     int otag;
+     int ret = 0;
+     ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval;
++    int combine = aclass & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
++    aclass &= ~ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
+     if (!pval)
+         return 0;
+     if (aux && aux->asn1_cb)
+@@ -500,7 +502,8 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
+  auxerr:
+     ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR);
+  err:
+-    ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
++    if (combine == 0)
++        ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
+     if (errtt)
+         ERR_add_error_data(4, "Field=", errtt->field_name,
+                            ", Type=", it->sname);
+@@ -689,7 +692,7 @@ static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
+     } else {
+         /* Nothing special */
+         ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
+-                               -1, 0, opt, ctx);
++                               -1, tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE, opt, ctx);
+         if (!ret) {
+             ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+             goto err;
+-- 
+2.3.5
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2015-3197.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2015-3197.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dd288c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2015-3197.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+From d81a1600588b726c2bdccda7efad3cc7a87d6245 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
+Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2015 22:44:51 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] Better SSLv2 cipher-suite enforcement
+
+Based on patch by: Nimrod Aviram <nimrod.aviram@gmail.com>
+
+CVE-2015-3197
+
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/d81a1600588b726c2bdccda7efad3cc7a87d6245
+
+CVE: CVE-2015-3197
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ ssl/s2_srvr.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+Index: openssl-1.0.2d/ssl/s2_srvr.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.2d.orig/ssl/s2_srvr.c
++++ openssl-1.0.2d/ssl/s2_srvr.c
+@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
+         }
+ 
+         cp = ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(p);
+-        if (cp == NULL) {
++        if (cp == NULL || sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(s->session->ciphers, cp) < 0) {
+             ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
+             SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+             return (-1);
+@@ -687,8 +687,12 @@ static int get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+             prio = cs;
+             allow = cl;
+         }
++
++        /* Generate list of SSLv2 ciphers shared between client and server */
+         for (z = 0; z < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); z++) {
+-            if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, z)) < 0) {
++            const SSL_CIPHER *cp = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, z);
++            if ((cp->algorithm_ssl & SSL_SSLV2) == 0 ||
++                sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, cp) < 0) {
+                 (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(prio, z);
+                 z--;
+             }
+@@ -697,6 +701,13 @@ static int get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+             sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
+             s->session->ciphers = prio;
+         }
++
++        /* Make sure we have at least one cipher in common */
++        if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(s->session->ciphers) == 0) {
++            ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
++            SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
++            return -1;
++        }
+         /*
+          * s->session->ciphers should now have a list of ciphers that are on
+          * both the client and server. This list is ordered by the order the
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-0701_1.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-0701_1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf2d9a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-0701_1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+From 878e2c5b13010329c203f309ed0c8f2113f85648 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 11:31:58 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Prevent small subgroup attacks on DH/DHE
+
+Historically OpenSSL only ever generated DH parameters based on "safe"
+primes. More recently (in version 1.0.2) support was provided for
+generating X9.42 style parameter files such as those required for RFC
+5114 support. The primes used in such files may not be "safe". Where an
+application is using DH configured with parameters based on primes that
+are not "safe" then an attacker could use this fact to find a peer's
+private DH exponent. This attack requires that the attacker complete
+multiple handshakes in which the peer uses the same DH exponent.
+
+A simple mitigation is to ensure that y^q (mod p) == 1
+
+CVE-2016-0701 (fix part 1 of 2)
+
+Issue reported by Antonio Sanso.
+
+Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/878e2c5b13010329c203f309ed0c8f2113f85648
+
+CVE: CVE-2016-0701
+Signed-of-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvisa.com>
+
+---
+ crypto/dh/dh.h       |  1 +
+ crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
+ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh.h b/crypto/dh/dh.h
+index b177673..5498a9d 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh.h
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh.h
+@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ struct dh_st {
+ /* DH_check_pub_key error codes */
+ # define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL       0x01
+ # define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE       0x02
++# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID         0x03
+ 
+ /*
+  * primes p where (p-1)/2 is prime too are called "safe"; we define this for
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+index 347467c..5adedc0 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+@@ -151,23 +151,38 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+ int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
+ {
+     int ok = 0;
+-    BIGNUM *q = NULL;
++    BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
++    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ 
+     *ret = 0;
+-    q = BN_new();
+-    if (q == NULL)
++    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
++    if (ctx == NULL)
+         goto err;
+-    BN_set_word(q, 1);
+-    if (BN_cmp(pub_key, q) <= 0)
++    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
++    tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
++    if (tmp == NULL)
++        goto err;
++    BN_set_word(tmp, 1);
++    if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) <= 0)
+         *ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL;
+-    BN_copy(q, dh->p);
+-    BN_sub_word(q, 1);
+-    if (BN_cmp(pub_key, q) >= 0)
++    BN_copy(tmp, dh->p);
++    BN_sub_word(tmp, 1);
++    if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) >= 0)
+         *ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE;
+ 
++    if (dh->q != NULL) {
++        /* Check pub_key^q == 1 mod p */
++        if (!BN_mod_exp(tmp, pub_key, dh->q, dh->p, ctx))
++            goto err;
++        if (!BN_is_one(tmp))
++            *ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
++    }
++
+     ok = 1;
+  err:
+-    if (q != NULL)
+-        BN_free(q);
++    if (ctx != NULL) {
++        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
++        BN_CTX_free(ctx);
++    }
+     return (ok);
+ }
+-- 
+2.3.5
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-0701_2.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-0701_2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..05caf0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-0701_2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+From c5b831f21d0d29d1e517d139d9d101763f60c9a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 02:57:20 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Always generate DH keys for ephemeral DH cipher suites
+
+Modified version of the commit ffaef3f15 in the master branch by Stephen
+Henson. This makes the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option a no-op and always
+generates a new DH key for every handshake regardless.
+
+CVE-2016-0701 (fix part 2 or 2)
+
+Issue reported by Antonio Sanso
+
+Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/c5b831f21d0d29d1e517d139d9d101763f60c9a2
+
+CVE: CVE-2016-0701 #2
+Signed-of-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvisa.com>
+
+---
+ doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod | 29 +++++------------------------
+ ssl/s3_lib.c                            | 14 --------------
+ ssl/s3_srvr.c                           | 17 +++--------------
+ ssl/ssl.h                               |  2 +-
+ 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
+
+Index: openssl-1.0.2d/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.2d.orig/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
++++ openssl-1.0.2d/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
+@@ -48,25 +48,8 @@ even if he gets hold of the normal (cert
+ only used for signing.
+ 
+ In order to perform a DH key exchange the server must use a DH group
+-(DH parameters) and generate a DH key.
+-The server will always generate a new DH key during the negotiation
+-if either the DH parameters are supplied via callback or the
+-SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option of SSL_CTX_set_options(3) is set (or both).
+-It will  immediately create a DH key if DH parameters are supplied via
+-SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() and SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is not set.
+-In this case,
+-it may happen that a key is generated on initialization without later
+-being needed, while on the other hand the computer time during the
+-negotiation is being saved.
+-
+-If "strong" primes were used to generate the DH parameters, it is not strictly
+-necessary to generate a new key for each handshake but it does improve forward
+-secrecy. If it is not assured that "strong" primes were used,
+-SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used in order to prevent small subgroup
+-attacks. Always using SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE has an impact on the
+-computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not very large, so
+-application authors/users should consider always enabling this option.
+-The option is required to implement perfect forward secrecy (PFS).
++(DH parameters) and generate a DH key. The server will always generate
++a new DH key during the negotiation.
+ 
+ As generating DH parameters is extremely time consuming, an application
+ should not generate the parameters on the fly but supply the parameters.
+@@ -93,10 +76,9 @@ can supply the DH parameters via a callb
+ Previous versions of the callback used B<is_export> and B<keylength>
+ parameters to control parameter generation for export and non-export
+ cipher suites. Modern servers that do not support export ciphersuites
+-are advised to either use SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() in combination with
+-SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE, or alternatively, use the callback but ignore
+-B<keylength> and B<is_export> and simply supply at least 2048-bit
+-parameters in the callback.
++are advised to either use SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() or alternatively, use
++the callback but ignore B<keylength> and B<is_export> and simply
++supply at least 2048-bit parameters in the callback.
+ 
+ =head1 EXAMPLES
+ 
+@@ -128,7 +110,6 @@ partly left out.)
+  if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh_2048) != 1) {
+    /* Error. */
+  }
+- SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
+  ...
+ 
+ =head1 RETURN VALUES
+Index: openssl-1.0.2d/ssl/s3_lib.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.2d.orig/ssl/s3_lib.c
++++ openssl-1.0.2d/ssl/s3_lib.c
+@@ -3206,13 +3206,6 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long lar
+                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+                 return (ret);
+             }
+-            if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)) {
+-                if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
+-                    DH_free(dh);
+-                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+-                    return (ret);
+-                }
+-            }
+             if (s->cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
+                 DH_free(s->cert->dh_tmp);
+             s->cert->dh_tmp = dh;
+@@ -3710,13 +3703,6 @@ long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd
+                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+                 return 0;
+             }
+-            if (!(ctx->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)) {
+-                if (!DH_generate_key(new)) {
+-                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+-                    DH_free(new);
+-                    return 0;
+-                }
+-            }
+             if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
+                 DH_free(cert->dh_tmp);
+             cert->dh_tmp = new;
+Index: openssl-1.0.2d/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.2d.orig/ssl/s3_srvr.c
++++ openssl-1.0.2d/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+@@ -1684,20 +1684,9 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s
+             }
+ 
+             s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
+-            if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
+-                 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
+-                 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
+-                if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
+-                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+-                    goto err;
+-                }
+-            } else {
+-                dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
+-                dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
+-                if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
+-                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+-                    goto err;
+-                }
++            if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
++                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
++                goto err;
+             }
+             r[0] = dh->p;
+             r[1] = dh->g;
+Index: openssl-1.0.2d/ssl/ssl.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.2d.orig/ssl/ssl.h
++++ openssl-1.0.2d/ssl/ssl.h
+@@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ struct ssl_session_st {
+ # define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION        0x00040000L
+ /* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_ecdh parameters */
+ # define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE                          0x00080000L
+-/* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_dh parameters */
++/* Does nothing: retained for compatibility */
+ # define SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE                            0x00100000L
+ /* Does nothing: retained for compatibiity */
+ # define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA                            0x0
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/ptest_makefile_deps.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/ptest_makefile_deps.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4202e61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/ptest_makefile_deps.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+Additional Makefile dependencies removal for test targets
+
+Removing the dependency check for test targets as these tests are
+causing a number of failures and "noise" during ptest execution.
+
+Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [config]
+
+Signed-off-by: Maxin B. John <maxin.john@intel.com>
+
+diff -Naur openssl-1.0.2d-orig/test/Makefile openssl-1.0.2d/test/Makefile
+--- openssl-1.0.2d-orig/test/Makefile	2015-09-28 12:50:41.530022979 +0300
++++ openssl-1.0.2d/test/Makefile	2015-09-28 12:57:45.930717240 +0300
+@@ -155,67 +155,67 @@
+ 	( $(MAKE) $$i && echo "PASS: $$i" ) || echo "FAIL: $$i"; \
+ 	done)
+ 
+-test_evp: $(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) evptests.txt
++test_evp:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(EVPTEST) evptests.txt
+ 
+-test_evp_extra: $(EVPEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_evp_extra:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(EVPEXTRATEST)
+ 
+-test_des: $(DESTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_des:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(DESTEST)
+ 
+-test_idea: $(IDEATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_idea:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(IDEATEST)
+ 
+-test_sha: $(SHATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SHA1TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SHA256TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SHA512TEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_sha:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(SHATEST)
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(SHA1TEST)
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(SHA256TEST)
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(SHA512TEST)
+ 
+-test_mdc2: $(MDC2TEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_mdc2:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(MDC2TEST)
+ 
+-test_md5: $(MD5TEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_md5:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(MD5TEST)
+ 
+-test_md4: $(MD4TEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_md4:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(MD4TEST)
+ 
+-test_hmac: $(HMACTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_hmac:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(HMACTEST)
+ 
+-test_wp: $(WPTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_wp:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(WPTEST)
+ 
+-test_md2: $(MD2TEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_md2:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(MD2TEST)
+ 
+-test_rmd: $(RMDTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_rmd:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(RMDTEST)
+ 
+-test_bf: $(BFTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_bf:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(BFTEST)
+ 
+-test_cast: $(CASTTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_cast:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(CASTTEST)
+ 
+-test_rc2: $(RC2TEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_rc2:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(RC2TEST)
+ 
+-test_rc4: $(RC4TEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_rc4:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(RC4TEST)
+ 
+-test_rc5: $(RC5TEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_rc5:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(RC5TEST)
+ 
+-test_rand: $(RANDTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_rand:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(RANDTEST)
+ 
+-test_enc: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT) testenc
++test_enc:
+ 	@sh ./testenc
+ 
+-test_x509: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT) tx509 testx509.pem v3-cert1.pem v3-cert2.pem
++test_x509:
+ 	echo test normal x509v1 certificate
+ 	sh ./tx509 2>/dev/null
+ 	echo test first x509v3 certificate
+@@ -223,25 +223,25 @@
+ 	echo test second x509v3 certificate
+ 	sh ./tx509 v3-cert2.pem 2>/dev/null
+ 
+-test_rsa: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT) trsa testrsa.pem
++test_rsa:
+ 	@sh ./trsa 2>/dev/null
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(RSATEST)
+ 
+-test_crl: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT) tcrl testcrl.pem
++test_crl:
+ 	@sh ./tcrl 2>/dev/null
+ 
+-test_sid: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT) tsid testsid.pem
++test_sid:
+ 	@sh ./tsid 2>/dev/null
+ 
+-test_req: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT) treq testreq.pem testreq2.pem
++test_req:
+ 	@sh ./treq 2>/dev/null
+ 	@sh ./treq testreq2.pem 2>/dev/null
+ 
+-test_pkcs7: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT) tpkcs7 tpkcs7d testp7.pem pkcs7-1.pem
++test_pkcs7:
+ 	@sh ./tpkcs7 2>/dev/null
+ 	@sh ./tpkcs7d 2>/dev/null
+ 
+-test_bn: $(BNTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(EXPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) bctest
++test_bn:
+ 	@echo starting big number library test, could take a while...
+ 	@../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(BNTEST) >tmp.bntest
+ 	@echo quit >>tmp.bntest
+@@ -250,33 +250,33 @@
+ 	@echo 'test a^b%c implementations'
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(EXPTEST)
+ 
+-test_ec: $(ECTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_ec:
+ 	@echo 'test elliptic curves'
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(ECTEST)
+ 
+-test_ecdsa: $(ECDSATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_ecdsa:
+ 	@echo 'test ecdsa'
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(ECDSATEST)
+ 
+-test_ecdh: $(ECDHTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_ecdh:
+ 	@echo 'test ecdh'
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(ECDHTEST)
+ 
+-test_verify: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT)
++test_verify:
+ 	@echo "The following command should have some OK's and some failures"
+ 	@echo "There are definitly a few expired certificates"
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl verify -CApath ../certs/demo ../certs/demo/*.pem
+ 
+-test_dh: $(DHTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_dh:
+ 	@echo "Generate a set of DH parameters"
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(DHTEST)
+ 
+-test_dsa: $(DSATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_dsa:
+ 	@echo "Generate a set of DSA parameters"
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(DSATEST)
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(DSATEST) -app2_1
+ 
+-test_gen testreq.pem: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT) testgen test.cnf
++test_gen testreq.pem:
+ 	@echo "Generate and verify a certificate request"
+ 	@sh ./testgen
+ 
+@@ -288,13 +288,11 @@
+ 	@cat certCA.ss certU.ss > intP1.ss
+ 	@cat certCA.ss certU.ss certP1.ss > intP2.ss
+ 
+-test_engine:  $(ENGINETEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_engine:
+ 	@echo "Manipulate the ENGINE structures"
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(ENGINETEST)
+ 
+-test_ssl: keyU.ss certU.ss certCA.ss certP1.ss keyP1.ss certP2.ss keyP2.ss \
+-		intP1.ss intP2.ss $(SSLTEST)$(EXE_EXT) testssl testsslproxy \
+-		../apps/server2.pem serverinfo.pem
++test_ssl:
+ 	@echo "test SSL protocol"
+ 	@if [ -n "$(FIPSCANLIB)" ]; then \
+ 	  sh ./testfipsssl keyU.ss certU.ss certCA.ss; \
+@@ -304,7 +302,7 @@
+ 	@sh ./testsslproxy keyP1.ss certP1.ss intP1.ss
+ 	@sh ./testsslproxy keyP2.ss certP2.ss intP2.ss
+ 
+-test_ca: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT) testca CAss.cnf Uss.cnf
++test_ca:
+ 	@if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-rsa; then \
+ 	  echo "skipping CA.sh test -- requires RSA"; \
+ 	else \
+@@ -312,11 +310,11 @@
+ 	  sh ./testca; \
+ 	fi
+ 
+-test_aes: #$(AESTEST)
++test_aes:
+ #	@echo "test Rijndael"
+ #	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(AESTEST)
+ 
+-test_tsa: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT) testtsa CAtsa.cnf ../util/shlib_wrap.sh
++test_tsa:
+ 	@if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-rsa; then \
+ 	  echo "skipping testtsa test -- requires RSA"; \
+ 	else \
+@@ -331,7 +329,7 @@
+ 	@echo "Test JPAKE"
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(JPAKETEST)
+ 
+-test_cms: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT) cms-test.pl smcont.txt
++test_cms:
+ 	@echo "CMS consistency test"
+ 	$(PERL) cms-test.pl
+ 
+@@ -339,22 +337,22 @@
+ 	@echo "Test SRP"
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./srptest
+ 
+-test_ocsp: ../apps/openssl$(EXE_EXT) tocsp
++test_ocsp:
+ 	@echo "Test OCSP"
+ 	@sh ./tocsp
+ 
+-test_v3name: $(V3NAMETEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_v3name:
+ 	@echo "Test X509v3_check_*"
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(V3NAMETEST)
+ 
+ test_heartbeat:
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(HEARTBEATTEST)
+ 
+-test_constant_time: $(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_constant_time:
+ 	@echo "Test constant time utilites"
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(CONSTTIMETEST)
+ 
+-test_verify_extra: $(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
++test_verify_extra:
+ 	@echo $(START) $@
+ 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(VERIFYEXTRATEST)
+ 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2d.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2d.bb
index 32d8dce..8defa5b 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2d.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2d.bb
@@ -36,6 +36,14 @@
             file://run-ptest \
             file://crypto_use_bigint_in_x86-64_perl.patch \
             file://openssl-1.0.2a-x32-asm.patch \
+            file://ptest_makefile_deps.patch  \
+            file://CVE-2015-3193-bn-asm-x86_64-mont5.pl-fix-carry-propagating-bug-CVE.patch \
+            file://CVE-2015-3194-1-Add-PSS-parameter-check.patch \
+            file://0001-Add-test-for-CVE-2015-3194.patch \
+            file://CVE-2015-3195-Fix-leak-with-ASN.1-combine.patch \
+            file://CVE-2015-3197.patch \
+            file://CVE-2016-0701_1.patch \
+            file://CVE-2016-0701_2.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "38dd619b2e77cbac69b99f52a053d25a"
@@ -55,3 +63,13 @@
 do_configure_prepend() {
   cp ${WORKDIR}/find.pl ${S}/util/find.pl
 }
+
+# The crypto_use_bigint patch means that perl's bignum module needs to be
+# installed, but some distributions (for example Fedora 23) don't ship it by
+# default.  As the resulting error is very misleading check for bignum before
+# building.
+do_configure_prepend() {
+	if ! perl -Mbigint -e true; then
+		bbfatal "The perl module 'bignum' was not found but this is required to build openssl.  Please install this module (often packaged as perl-bignum) and re-run bitbake."
+	fi
+}
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/socat/socat/CVE-2016-2217.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/socat/socat/CVE-2016-2217.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0cd4179
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/socat/socat/CVE-2016-2217.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,372 @@
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+http://www.dest-unreach.org/socat/download/socat-1.7.3.1.patch 
+
+CVE: CVE-2016-2217
+[Yocto # 9024]
+Singed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+Index: socat-1.7.3.0/CHANGES
+===================================================================
+--- socat-1.7.3.0.orig/CHANGES
++++ socat-1.7.3.0/CHANGES
+@@ -1,8 +1,39 @@
+ 
++####################### V 1.7.3.1:
++
++security:
++	Socat security advisory 8
++	A stack overflow in vulnerability was found that can be triggered when
++	command line arguments (complete address specifications, host names,
++	file names) are longer than 512 bytes.
++	Successful exploitation might allow an attacker to execute arbitrary
++	code with the privileges of the socat process.
++	This vulnerability can only be exploited when an attacker is able to
++	inject data into socat's command line.
++	A vulnerable scenario would be a CGI script that reads data from clients
++	and uses (parts of) this data as hostname for a Socat invocation.
++	Test: NESTEDOVFL
++	Credits to Takumi Akiyama for finding and reporting this issue.
++
++	Socat security advisory 7
++	MSVR-1499
++	In the OpenSSL address implementation the hard coded 1024 bit DH p
++	parameter was not prime. The effective cryptographic strength of a key
++	exchange using these parameters was weaker than the one one could get by
++	using a prime p. Moreover, since there is no indication of how these
++	parameters were chosen, the existence of a trapdoor that makes possible
++	for an eavesdropper to recover the shared secret from a key exchange
++	that uses them cannot be ruled out.
++	Futhermore, 1024bit is not considered sufficiently secure.
++	Fix: generated a new 2048bit prime.
++	Thanks to Santiago Zanella-Beguelin and Microsoft Vulnerability
++	Research (MSVR) for finding and reporting this issue.
++
+ ####################### V 1.7.3.0:
+ 
+ security:
+-	(CVE Id pending)
++	Socat security advisory 6
++	CVE-2015-1379: Possible DoS with fork
+ 	Fixed problems with signal handling caused by use of not async signal
+ 	safe functions in signal handlers that could freeze socat, allowing
+ 	denial of service attacks.
+@@ -240,6 +271,7 @@ docu:
+ ####################### V 1.7.2.3:
+ 
+ security:
++	Socat security advisory 5
+ 	CVE-2014-0019: socats PROXY-CONNECT address was vulnerable to a buffer
+ 	overflow with data from command line (see socat-secadv5.txt)
+ 	Credits to Florian Weimer of the Red Hat Product Security Team
+@@ -247,6 +279,7 @@ security:
+ ####################### V 1.7.2.2:
+ 
+ security:
++	Socat security advisory 4
+ 	CVE-2013-3571:
+ 	after refusing a client connection due to bad source address or source
+ 	port socat shutdown() the socket but did not close() it, resulting in
+@@ -258,6 +291,7 @@ security:
+ ####################### V 1.7.2.1:
+ 
+ security:
++	Socat security advisory 3
+ 	CVE-2012-0219:
+ 	fixed a possible heap buffer overflow in the readline address. This bug
+ 	could be exploited when all of the following conditions were met:
+@@ -391,6 +425,7 @@ docu:
+ ####################### V 1.7.1.3:
+ 
+ security:
++	Socat security advisory 2
+ 	CVE-2010-2799:
+ 	fixed a stack overflow vulnerability that occurred when command
+ 	line arguments (whole addresses, host names, file names) were longer
+@@ -892,6 +927,7 @@ further corrections:
+ ####################### V 1.4.0.3:
+ 
+ security:
++	Socat security advisory 1
+ 	CVE-2004-1484:
+ 	fix to a syslog() based format string vulnerability that can lead to
+ 	remote code execution. See advisory socat-adv-1.txt
+Index: socat-1.7.3.0/VERSION
+===================================================================
+--- socat-1.7.3.0.orig/VERSION
++++ socat-1.7.3.0/VERSION
+@@ -1 +1 @@
+-"1.7.3.0"
++"1.7.3.1"
+Index: socat-1.7.3.0/nestlex.c
+===================================================================
+--- socat-1.7.3.0.orig/nestlex.c
++++ socat-1.7.3.0/nestlex.c
+@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
+ /* source: nestlex.c */
+-/* Copyright Gerhard Rieger 2006-2010 */
++/* Copyright Gerhard Rieger */
+ /* Published under the GNU General Public License V.2, see file COPYING */
+ 
+ /* a function for lexical scanning of nested character patterns */
+@@ -9,6 +9,17 @@
+ 
+ #include "sysincludes.h"
+ 
++static int _nestlex(const char **addr,
++		    char **token,
++		    ptrdiff_t *len,
++		    const char *ends[],
++		    const char *hquotes[],
++		    const char *squotes[],
++		    const char *nests[],
++		    bool dropquotes,
++		    bool c_esc,
++		    bool html_esc
++		    );
+ 
+ /* sub: scan a string and copy its value to output string
+    end scanning when an unescaped, unnested string from ends array is found
+@@ -33,6 +44,22 @@ int nestlex(const char **addr,	/* input
+ 	    bool c_esc,		/* solve C char escapes: \n \t \0 etc */
+ 	    bool html_esc	/* solve HTML char escapes: %0d %08 etc */
+ 	    ) {
++   return
++      _nestlex(addr, token, (ptrdiff_t *)len, ends, hquotes, squotes, nests,
++	       dropquotes, c_esc, html_esc);
++}
++
++static int _nestlex(const char **addr,
++		    char **token,
++		    ptrdiff_t *len,
++		    const char *ends[],
++		    const char *hquotes[],
++		    const char *squotes[],
++		    const char *nests[],
++		    bool dropquotes,
++		    bool c_esc,
++		    bool html_esc
++		    ) {
+    const char *in = *addr;	/* pointer into input string */
+    const char **endx;	/* loops over end patterns */
+    const char **quotx;	/* loops over quote patterns */
+@@ -77,16 +104,18 @@ int nestlex(const char **addr,	/* input
+ 		  if (--*len <= 0) { *addr = in; *token = out; return -1; }
+ 	       }
+ 	    }
+-	    /* we call nestlex recursively */
++	    /* we call _nestlex recursively */
+ 	    endnest[0] = *quotx;
+ 	    endnest[1] = NULL;
+ 	    result =
+-	       nestlex(&in, &out, len, endnest, NULL/*hquotes*/,
++	       _nestlex(&in, &out, len, endnest, NULL/*hquotes*/,
+ 		       NULL/*squotes*/, NULL/*nests*/,
+ 		       false, c_esc, html_esc);
+ 	    if (result == 0 && dropquotes) {
+ 	       /* we strip this quote */
+ 	       in += strlen(*quotx);
++	    } else if (result < 0) {
++	       *addr = in; *token = out; return result;
+ 	    } else {
+ 	       /* we copy the trailing quote */
+ 	       for (i = strlen(*quotx); i > 0; --i) {
+@@ -110,7 +139,7 @@ int nestlex(const char **addr,	/* input
+ 	 if (!strncmp(in, *quotx, strlen(*quotx))) {
+ 	    /* this quote pattern matches */
+ 	    /* we strip this quote */
+-	    /* we call nestlex recursively */
++	    /* we call _nestlex recursively */
+ 	    const char *endnest[2];
+ 	    if (dropquotes) {
+ 	       /* we strip this quote */
+@@ -124,13 +153,15 @@ int nestlex(const char **addr,	/* input
+ 	    endnest[0] = *quotx;
+ 	    endnest[1] = NULL;
+ 	    result =
+-	       nestlex(&in, &out, len, endnest, hquotes,
++	       _nestlex(&in, &out, len, endnest, hquotes,
+ 		       squotes, nests,
+ 		       false, c_esc, html_esc);
+ 
+ 	    if (result == 0 && dropquotes) {
+ 	       /* we strip the trailing quote */
+ 	       in += strlen(*quotx);
++	    } else if (result < 0) {
++	       *addr = in; *token = out; return result;
+ 	    } else {
+ 	       /* we copy the trailing quote */
+ 	       for (i = strlen(*quotx); i > 0; --i) {
+@@ -162,7 +193,7 @@ int nestlex(const char **addr,	/* input
+ 	    }
+ 
+ 	    result =
+-	       nestlex(&in, &out, len, endnest, hquotes, squotes, nests,
++	       _nestlex(&in, &out, len, endnest, hquotes, squotes, nests,
+ 		       false, c_esc, html_esc);
+ 	    if (result == 0) {
+ 	       /* copy endnest */
+@@ -175,6 +206,8 @@ int nestlex(const char **addr,	/* input
+ 		  }
+ 		  --i;
+ 	       }
++	    } else if (result < 0) {
++	       *addr = in; *token = out; return result;
+ 	    }
+ 	    break;
+ 	 }
+@@ -211,7 +244,7 @@ int nestlex(const char **addr,	/* input
+ 	 }
+ 	 *out++ = c;
+ 	 --*len;
+-	 if (*len == 0) {
++	 if (*len <= 0) {
+ 	    *addr = in;
+ 	    *token = out;
+ 	    return -1;	/* output overflow */
+@@ -222,7 +255,7 @@ int nestlex(const char **addr,	/* input
+       /* just a simple char */
+       *out++ = c;
+       --*len;
+-      if (*len == 0) {
++      if (*len <= 0) {
+ 	 *addr = in;
+ 	 *token = out;
+ 	 return -1;	/* output overflow */
+Index: socat-1.7.3.0/nestlex.h
+===================================================================
+--- socat-1.7.3.0.orig/nestlex.h
++++ socat-1.7.3.0/nestlex.h
+@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
+ /* source: nestlex.h */
+-/* Copyright Gerhard Rieger 2006 */
++/* Copyright Gerhard Rieger */
+ /* Published under the GNU General Public License V.2, see file COPYING */
+ 
+ #ifndef __nestlex_h_included
+Index: socat-1.7.3.0/socat.spec
+===================================================================
+--- socat-1.7.3.0.orig/socat.spec
++++ socat-1.7.3.0/socat.spec
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ 
+ %define majorver 1.7
+-%define minorver 3.0
++%define minorver 3.1
+ 
+ Summary: socat - multipurpose relay
+ Name: socat
+Index: socat-1.7.3.0/test.sh
+===================================================================
+--- socat-1.7.3.0.orig/test.sh
++++ socat-1.7.3.0/test.sh
+@@ -2266,8 +2266,8 @@ gentestcert () {
+ gentestdsacert () {
+     local name="$1"
+     if [ -s $name.key -a -s $name.crt -a -s $name.pem ]; then return; fi
+-    openssl dsaparam -out $name-dsa.pem 512 >/dev/null 2>&1
+-    openssl dhparam -dsaparam -out $name-dh.pem 512 >/dev/null 2>&1
++    openssl dsaparam -out $name-dsa.pem 1024 >/dev/null 2>&1
++    openssl dhparam -dsaparam -out $name-dh.pem 1024 >/dev/null 2>&1
+     openssl req -newkey dsa:$name-dsa.pem -keyout $name.key -nodes -x509 -config $TESTCERT_CONF -out $name.crt -days 3653 >/dev/null 2>&1
+     cat $name-dsa.pem $name-dh.pem $name.key $name.crt >$name.pem
+ }
+@@ -10973,6 +10973,42 @@ CMD0="$TRACE $SOCAT $opts OPENSSL:localh
+ printf "test $F_n $TEST... " $N
+ $CMD0 </dev/null 1>&0 2>"${te}0"
+ rc0=$?
++if [ $rc0 -lt 128 ] || [ $rc0 -eq 255 ]; then
++    $PRINTF "$OK\n"
++    numOK=$((numOK+1))
++else
++    $PRINTF "$FAILED\n"
++    echo "$CMD0"
++    cat "${te}0"
++    numFAIL=$((numFAIL+1))
++    listFAIL="$listFAIL $N"
++fi
++fi # NUMCOND
++ ;;
++esac
++PORT=$((PORT+1))
++N=$((N+1))
++
++# socat up to 1.7.3.0 had a stack overflow vulnerability that occurred when
++# command line arguments (whole addresses, host names, file names) were longer
++# than 512 bytes and specially crafted.
++NAME=NESTEDOVFL
++case "$TESTS" in
++*%$N%*|*%functions%*|*%bugs%*|*%security%*|*%exec%*|*%$NAME%*)
++TEST="$NAME: stack overflow on overly long nested arg"
++# provide a long host name to TCP-CONNECT and check socats exit code
++if ! eval $NUMCOND; then :; else
++tf="$td/test$N.stdout"
++te="$td/test$N.stderr"
++tdiff="$td/test$N.diff"
++da="test$N $(date) $RANDOM"
++# prepare long data - perl might not be installed
++rm -f "$td/test$N.dat"
++i=0; while [ $i -lt 64 ]; do  echo -n "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" >>"$td/test$N.dat"; i=$((i+1)); done
++CMD0="$TRACE $SOCAT $opts EXEC:[$(cat "$td/test$N.dat")] STDIO"
++printf "test $F_n $TEST... " $N
++$CMD0 </dev/null 1>&0 2>"${te}0"
++rc0=$?
+ if [ $rc0 -lt 128 ] || [ $rc0 -eq 255 ]; then
+     $PRINTF "$OK\n"
+     numOK=$((numOK+1))
+Index: socat-1.7.3.0/xio-openssl.c
+===================================================================
+--- socat-1.7.3.0.orig/xio-openssl.c
++++ socat-1.7.3.0/xio-openssl.c
+@@ -912,20 +912,27 @@ int
+    }
+ 
+    {
+-      static unsigned char dh1024_p[] = {
+-	 0xCC,0x17,0xF2,0xDC,0x96,0xDF,0x59,0xA4,0x46,0xC5,0x3E,0x0E,
+-	 0xB8,0x26,0x55,0x0C,0xE3,0x88,0xC1,0xCE,0xA7,0xBC,0xB3,0xBF,
+-	 0x16,0x94,0xD8,0xA9,0x45,0xA2,0xCE,0xA9,0x5B,0x22,0x25,0x5F,
+-	 0x92,0x59,0x94,0x1C,0x22,0xBF,0xCB,0xC8,0xC8,0x57,0xCB,0xBF,
+-	 0xBC,0x0E,0xE8,0x40,0xF9,0x87,0x03,0xBF,0x60,0x9B,0x08,0xC6,
+-	 0x8E,0x99,0xC6,0x05,0xFC,0x00,0xD6,0x6D,0x90,0xA8,0xF5,0xF8,
+-	 0xD3,0x8D,0x43,0xC8,0x8F,0x7A,0xBD,0xBB,0x28,0xAC,0x04,0x69,
+-	 0x4A,0x0B,0x86,0x73,0x37,0xF0,0x6D,0x4F,0x04,0xF6,0xF5,0xAF,
+-	 0xBF,0xAB,0x8E,0xCE,0x75,0x53,0x4D,0x7F,0x7D,0x17,0x78,0x0E,
+-	 0x12,0x46,0x4A,0xAF,0x95,0x99,0xEF,0xBC,0xA6,0xC5,0x41,0x77,
+-	 0x43,0x7A,0xB9,0xEC,0x8E,0x07,0x3C,0x6D,
++      static unsigned char dh2048_p[] = {
++	 0x00,0xdc,0x21,0x64,0x56,0xbd,0x9c,0xb2,0xac,0xbe,0xc9,0x98,0xef,0x95,0x3e,
++	 0x26,0xfa,0xb5,0x57,0xbc,0xd9,0xe6,0x75,0xc0,0x43,0xa2,0x1c,0x7a,0x85,0xdf,
++	 0x34,0xab,0x57,0xa8,0xf6,0xbc,0xf6,0x84,0x7d,0x05,0x69,0x04,0x83,0x4c,0xd5,
++	 0x56,0xd3,0x85,0x09,0x0a,0x08,0xff,0xb5,0x37,0xa1,0xa3,0x8a,0x37,0x04,0x46,
++	 0xd2,0x93,0x31,0x96,0xf4,0xe4,0x0d,0x9f,0xbd,0x3e,0x7f,0x9e,0x4d,0xaf,0x08,
++	 0xe2,0xe8,0x03,0x94,0x73,0xc4,0xdc,0x06,0x87,0xbb,0x6d,0xae,0x66,0x2d,0x18,
++	 0x1f,0xd8,0x47,0x06,0x5c,0xcf,0x8a,0xb5,0x00,0x51,0x57,0x9b,0xea,0x1e,0xd8,
++	 0xdb,0x8e,0x3c,0x1f,0xd3,0x2f,0xba,0x1f,0x5f,0x3d,0x15,0xc1,0x3b,0x2c,0x82,
++	 0x42,0xc8,0x8c,0x87,0x79,0x5b,0x38,0x86,0x3a,0xeb,0xfd,0x81,0xa9,0xba,0xf7,
++	 0x26,0x5b,0x93,0xc5,0x3e,0x03,0x30,0x4b,0x00,0x5c,0xb6,0x23,0x3e,0xea,0x94,
++	 0xc3,0xb4,0x71,0xc7,0x6e,0x64,0x3b,0xf8,0x92,0x65,0xad,0x60,0x6c,0xd4,0x7b,
++	 0xa9,0x67,0x26,0x04,0xa8,0x0a,0xb2,0x06,0xeb,0xe0,0x7d,0x90,0xdd,0xdd,0xf5,
++	 0xcf,0xb4,0x11,0x7c,0xab,0xc1,0xa3,0x84,0xbe,0x27,0x77,0xc7,0xde,0x20,0x57,
++	 0x66,0x47,0xa7,0x35,0xfe,0x0d,0x6a,0x1c,0x52,0xb8,0x58,0xbf,0x26,0x33,0x81,
++	 0x5e,0xb7,0xa9,0xc0,0xee,0x58,0x11,0x74,0x86,0x19,0x08,0x89,0x1c,0x37,0x0d,
++	 0x52,0x47,0x70,0x75,0x8b,0xa8,0x8b,0x30,0x11,0x71,0x36,0x62,0xf0,0x73,0x41,
++	 0xee,0x34,0x9d,0x0a,0x2b,0x67,0x4e,0x6a,0xa3,0xe2,0x99,0x92,0x1b,0xf5,0x32,
++	 0x73,0x63
+       };
+-      static unsigned char dh1024_g[] = {
++      static unsigned char dh2048_g[] = {
+ 	 0x02,
+       };
+       DH *dh;
+@@ -938,8 +945,8 @@ int
+ 	 }
+ 	 Error("DH_new() failed");
+       } else {
+-	 dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_p, sizeof(dh1024_p), NULL);
+-	 dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_g, sizeof(dh1024_g), NULL);
++	 dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh2048_p, sizeof(dh2048_p), NULL);
++	 dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh2048_g, sizeof(dh2048_g), NULL);
+ 	 if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL)) {
+ 	    while (err = ERR_get_error()) {
+ 	       Warn1("BN_bin2bn(): %s",
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/socat/socat_1.7.3.0.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/socat/socat_1.7.3.0.bb
index b58e0a7..6d76d0f 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/socat/socat_1.7.3.0.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/socat/socat_1.7.3.0.bb
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 
 SRC_URI = "http://www.dest-unreach.org/socat/download/socat-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://Makefile.in-fix-for-parallel-build.patch \
+           file://CVE-2016-2217.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "b607edb65bc6c57f4a43f06247504274"