diff --git a/openpower/linux/0016-powerpc-ima-Fix-secure-boot-rules-in-ima-arch-policy.patch b/openpower/linux/0016-powerpc-ima-Fix-secure-boot-rules-in-ima-arch-policy.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6875b14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openpower/linux/0016-powerpc-ima-Fix-secure-boot-rules-in-ima-arch-policy.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
+Date: Fri, 1 May 2020 10:16:52 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 16/18] powerpc/ima: Fix secure boot rules in ima arch policy
+
+To prevent verifying the kernel module appended signature
+twice (finit_module), once by the module_sig_check() and again by IMA,
+powerpc secure boot rules define an IMA architecture specific policy
+rule only if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE is not enabled. This,
+unfortunately, does not take into account the ability of enabling
+"sig_enforce" on the boot command line (module.sig_enforce=1).
+
+Including the IMA module appraise rule results in failing the
+finit_module syscall, unless the module signing public key is loaded
+onto the IMA keyring.
+
+This patch fixes secure boot policy rules to be based on
+CONFIG_MODULE_SIG instead.
+
+Fixes: 4238fad366a6 ("powerpc/ima: Add support to initialize ima policy rules")
+Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
+Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1588342612-14532-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
+(cherry picked from commit fa4f3f56ccd28ac031ab275e673ed4098855fed4)
+Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
+---
+ arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
+index e34116255ced..957abd592075 100644
+--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
++++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
+@@ -19,12 +19,12 @@ bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
+  * to be stored as an xattr or as an appended signature.
+  *
+  * To avoid duplicate signature verification as much as possible, the IMA
+- * policy rule for module appraisal is added only if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
++ * policy rule for module appraisal is added only if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
+  * is not enabled.
+  */
+ static const char *const secure_rules[] = {
+ 	"appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
+-#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
++#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
+ 	"appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
+ #endif
+ 	NULL
+@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static const char *const secure_and_trusted_rules[] = {
+ 	"measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK template=ima-modsig",
+ 	"measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig",
+ 	"appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
+-#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
++#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
+ 	"appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
+ #endif
+ 	NULL