reset upstream subtrees to yocto 2.6
Reset the following subtrees on thud HEAD:
poky: 87e3a9739d
meta-openembedded: 6094ae18c8
meta-security: 31dc4e7532
meta-raspberrypi: a48743dc36
meta-xilinx: c42016e2e6
Also re-apply backports that didn't make it into thud:
poky:
17726d0 systemd-systemctl-native: handle Install wildcards
meta-openembedded:
4321a5d libtinyxml2: update to 7.0.1
042f0a3 libcereal: Add native and nativesdk classes
e23284f libcereal: Allow empty package
030e8d4 rsyslog: curl-less build with fmhttp PACKAGECONFIG
179a1b9 gtest: update to 1.8.1
Squashed OpenBMC subtree compatibility updates:
meta-aspeed:
Brad Bishop (1):
aspeed: add yocto 2.6 compatibility
meta-ibm:
Brad Bishop (1):
ibm: prepare for yocto 2.6
meta-ingrasys:
Brad Bishop (1):
ingrasys: set layer compatibility to yocto 2.6
meta-openpower:
Brad Bishop (1):
openpower: set layer compatibility to yocto 2.6
meta-phosphor:
Brad Bishop (3):
phosphor: set layer compatibility to thud
phosphor: libgpg-error: drop patches
phosphor: react to fitimage artifact rename
Ed Tanous (4):
Dropbear: upgrade options for latest upgrade
yocto2.6: update openssl options
busybox: remove upstream watchdog patch
systemd: Rebase CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF patch
Change-Id: I7b1fe71cca880d0372a82d94b5fd785323e3a9e7
Signed-off-by: Brad Bishop <bradleyb@fuzziesquirrel.com>
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..522fc39
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+hostapd-2.6: Fix CVE-2018-14526
+
+[No upstream tracking] -- https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/unauthenticated-eapol-key-decryption.txt
+
+wpa: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data
+
+Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant
+processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted
+flag set, but not the MIC flag.
+
+When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but
+not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying
+the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when
+negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that
+unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary
+could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information
+in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key).
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c?id=3e34cfdff6b192fe337c6fb3f487f73e96582961]
+CVE: CVE-2018-14526
+Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com>
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 3c47879..6bdf923 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -2016,6 +2016,17 @@ int wpa_sm_rx_eapol(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
+
+ if ((sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) &&
+ (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA)) {
++ /*
++ * Only decrypt the Key Data field if the frame's authenticity
++ * was verified. When using AES-SIV (FILS), the MIC flag is not
++ * set, so this check should only be performed if mic_len != 0
++ * which is the case in this code branch.
++ */
++ if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) {
++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++ "WPA: Ignore EAPOL-Key with encrypted but unauthenticated data");
++ goto out;
++ }
+ if (wpa_supplicant_decrypt_key_data(sm, key, ver, key_data,
+ &key_data_len))
+ goto out;
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb
index 250add8..42aae42 100644
--- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
file://0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch \
file://0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch \
file://0007-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch \
+ file://hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "eaa56dce9bd8f1d195eb62596eab34c7"