Revert "libpam: update 1.3.1 -> 1.5.1"
This reverts commit b0384720a46fb25c4ad180e3f256ffdeb53dc8a6.
OpenBMC is not ready for the removal of pam_cracklib and pam_tally2.
Until code is ready to move to new libs in libpam_1.5, carry a revert
in OpenBMC to stay at libpam_1.3.
openbmc/openbmc#3750 tracks this work
Signed-off-by: Andrew Geissler <geissonator@yahoo.com>
Change-Id: I8da478dd1965f52d3a21e5274a96bd16e95bc7f9
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0001-modules-pam_namespace-Makefile.am-correctly-install-.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0001-modules-pam_namespace-Makefile.am-correctly-install-.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b41d1e5..0000000
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0001-modules-pam_namespace-Makefile.am-correctly-install-.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-From e2db4082f6b988f1d5803028e9e47aee5f3519ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alexander Kanavin <alex.kanavin@gmail.com>
-Date: Sun, 27 Dec 2020 00:30:45 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] modules/pam_namespace/Makefile.am: correctly install systemd
- unit file
-
-Upstream-Status: Pending
-Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin <alex.kanavin@gmail.com>
----
- modules/pam_namespace/Makefile.am | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/Makefile.am b/modules/pam_namespace/Makefile.am
-index 21e1b33..ddd5fc0 100644
---- a/modules/pam_namespace/Makefile.am
-+++ b/modules/pam_namespace/Makefile.am
-@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ TESTS = $(dist_check_SCRIPTS)
- securelibdir = $(SECUREDIR)
- secureconfdir = $(SCONFIGDIR)
- namespaceddir = $(SCONFIGDIR)/namespace.d
--servicedir = $(prefix)/lib/systemd/system
-+servicedir = /lib/systemd/system
-
- AM_CFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/libpam/include -I$(top_srcdir)/libpamc/include \
- -DSECURECONF_DIR=\"$(SCONFIGDIR)/\" $(WARN_CFLAGS)
---
-2.24.0
-
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/crypt_configure.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/crypt_configure.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..917a8af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/crypt_configure.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From b86575ab4a0df07da160283459da270e1c0372a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Maxin B. John" <maxin.john@intel.com>
+Date: Tue, 24 May 2016 14:11:09 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] crypt_configure
+
+This patch fixes a case where it find crypt defined in libc (musl) but
+not in specified libraries then it ends up assigning
+LIBCRYPT="-l" which then goes into makefile cause all sort of problems
+e.g.
+
+ld: cannot find -l-m32
+| collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status
+The reason is that -l appears on commandline with
+out any library and compiler treats the next argument as library name
+whatever it is.
+
+Upstream-Status: Pending
+
+Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maxin B. John <maxin.john@intel.com>
+---
+ configure.ac | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index df39d07..e68d856 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ AS_IF([test "x$ac_cv_header_xcrypt_h" = "xyes"],
+ [crypt_libs="crypt"])
+
+ BACKUP_LIBS=$LIBS
+-AC_SEARCH_LIBS([crypt],[$crypt_libs], LIBCRYPT="${ac_lib:+-l$ac_lib}", LIBCRYPT="")
++AC_SEARCH_LIBS([crypt],[$crypt_libs], [test "$ac_cv_search_crypt" = "none required" || LIBCRYPT="$ac_cv_search_crypt"])
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(crypt_r crypt_gensalt_r)
+ LIBS=$BACKUP_LIBS
+ AC_SUBST(LIBCRYPT)
+--
+2.4.0
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9b8d4c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+Description: extract the securetty logic for use with the "nullok_secure" option
+ introduced in the "055_pam_unix_nullok_secure" patch.
+
+Upstream-Status: Pending
+
+Signed-off-by: Ming Liu <ming.liu@windriver.com>
+===================================================================
+Index: Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am
+===================================================================
+--- Linux-PAM-1.3.0.orig/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am
++++ Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am
+@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ endif
+ securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_securetty.la
+ pam_securetty_la_LIBADD = $(top_builddir)/libpam/libpam.la
+
++pam_securetty_la_SOURCES = \
++ pam_securetty.c \
++ tty_secure.c
++
+ if ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN
+ noinst_DATA = README
+ README: pam_securetty.8.xml
+Index: Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c
+===================================================================
+--- Linux-PAM-1.3.0.orig/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c
++++ Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
+ /* pam_securetty module */
+
+-#define SECURETTY_FILE "/etc/securetty"
+-#define TTY_PREFIX "/dev/"
+ #define CMDLINE_FILE "/proc/cmdline"
+ #define CONSOLEACTIVE_FILE "/sys/class/tty/console/active"
+
+@@ -40,6 +38,9 @@
+ #include <security/pam_modutil.h>
+ #include <security/pam_ext.h>
+
++extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh,
++ const char *uttyname);
++
+ #define PAM_DEBUG_ARG 0x0001
+ #define PAM_NOCONSOLE_ARG 0x0002
+
+@@ -73,11 +74,7 @@ securetty_perform_check (pam_handle_t *p
+ const char *username;
+ const char *uttyname;
+ const void *void_uttyname;
+- char ttyfileline[256];
+- char ptname[256];
+- struct stat ttyfileinfo;
+ struct passwd *user_pwd;
+- FILE *ttyfile;
+
+ /* log a trail for debugging */
+ if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG) {
+@@ -105,50 +102,7 @@ securetty_perform_check (pam_handle_t *p
+ return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+ }
+
+- /* The PAM_TTY item may be prefixed with "/dev/" - skip that */
+- if (strncmp(TTY_PREFIX, uttyname, sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1) == 0) {
+- uttyname += sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1;
+- }
+-
+- if (stat(SECURETTY_FILE, &ttyfileinfo)) {
+- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Couldn't open %s: %m", SECURETTY_FILE);
+- return PAM_SUCCESS; /* for compatibility with old securetty handling,
+- this needs to succeed. But we still log the
+- error. */
+- }
+-
+- if ((ttyfileinfo.st_mode & S_IWOTH) || !S_ISREG(ttyfileinfo.st_mode)) {
+- /* If the file is world writable or is not a
+- normal file, return error */
+- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+- "%s is either world writable or not a normal file",
+- SECURETTY_FILE);
+- return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+- }
+-
+- ttyfile = fopen(SECURETTY_FILE,"r");
+- if (ttyfile == NULL) { /* Check that we opened it successfully */
+- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error opening %s: %m", SECURETTY_FILE);
+- return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+- }
+-
+- if (isdigit(uttyname[0])) {
+- snprintf(ptname, sizeof(ptname), "pts/%s", uttyname);
+- } else {
+- ptname[0] = '\0';
+- }
+-
+- retval = 1;
+-
+- while ((fgets(ttyfileline, sizeof(ttyfileline)-1, ttyfile) != NULL)
+- && retval) {
+- if (ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] == '\n')
+- ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] = '\0';
+-
+- retval = ( strcmp(ttyfileline, uttyname)
+- && (!ptname[0] || strcmp(ptname, uttyname)) );
+- }
+- fclose(ttyfile);
++ retval = _pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, uttyname);
+
+ if (retval && !(ctrl & PAM_NOCONSOLE_ARG)) {
+ FILE *cmdlinefile;
+Index: Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
++++ Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
++/*
++ * A function to determine if a particular line is in /etc/securetty
++ */
++
++
++#define SECURETTY_FILE "/etc/securetty"
++#define TTY_PREFIX "/dev/"
++
++/* This function taken out of pam_securetty by Sam Hartman
++ * <hartmans@debian.org>*/
++/*
++ * by Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>, Red Hat Software.
++ * July 25, 1996.
++ * Slight modifications AGM. 1996/12/3
++ */
++
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <security/pam_modules.h>
++#include <stdarg.h>
++#include <syslog.h>
++#include <sys/syslog.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <ctype.h>
++#include <security/pam_modutil.h>
++#include <security/pam_ext.h>
++
++extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh,
++ const char *uttyname);
++
++int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *uttyname)
++{
++ int retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
++ char ttyfileline[256];
++ char ptname[256];
++ struct stat ttyfileinfo;
++ FILE *ttyfile;
++ /* The PAM_TTY item may be prefixed with "/dev/" - skip that */
++ if (strncmp(TTY_PREFIX, uttyname, sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1) == 0)
++ uttyname += sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1;
++
++ if (stat(SECURETTY_FILE, &ttyfileinfo)) {
++ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Couldn't open %s: %m",
++ SECURETTY_FILE);
++ return PAM_SUCCESS; /* for compatibility with old securetty handling,
++ this needs to succeed. But we still log the
++ error. */
++ }
++
++ if ((ttyfileinfo.st_mode & S_IWOTH) || !S_ISREG(ttyfileinfo.st_mode)) {
++ /* If the file is world writable or is not a
++ normal file, return error */
++ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
++ "%s is either world writable or not a normal file",
++ SECURETTY_FILE);
++ return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
++ }
++
++ ttyfile = fopen(SECURETTY_FILE,"r");
++ if(ttyfile == NULL) { /* Check that we opened it successfully */
++ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error opening %s: %m", SECURETTY_FILE);
++ return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
++ }
++
++ if (isdigit(uttyname[0])) {
++ snprintf(ptname, sizeof(ptname), "pts/%s", uttyname);
++ } else {
++ ptname[0] = '\0';
++ }
++
++ retval = 1;
++
++ while ((fgets(ttyfileline,sizeof(ttyfileline)-1, ttyfile) != NULL)
++ && retval) {
++ if(ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] == '\n')
++ ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] = '\0';
++ retval = ( strcmp(ttyfileline,uttyname)
++ && (!ptname[0] || strcmp(ptname, uttyname)) );
++ }
++ fclose(ttyfile);
++
++ if(retval) {
++ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
++ }
++
++ return retval;
++}
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d2cc668
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+From b6545b83f94c5fb7aec1478b8d458a1393f479c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Maxin B. John" <maxin.john@intel.com>
+Date: Wed, 25 May 2016 14:12:25 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] pam_unix: support 'nullok_secure' option
+
+Debian patch to add a new 'nullok_secure' option to pam_unix,
+which accepts users with null passwords only when the applicant is
+connected from a tty listed in /etc/securetty.
+
+Authors: Sam Hartman <hartmans@debian.org>,
+ Steve Langasek <vorlon@debian.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Pending
+
+Signed-off-by: Ming Liu <ming.liu@windriver.com>
+Signed-off-by: Amarnath Valluri <amarnath.valluri@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maxin B. John <maxin.john@intel.com>
+---
+ modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am | 3 ++-
+ modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
+ modules/pam_unix/support.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ modules/pam_unix/support.h | 8 ++++++--
+ 4 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am
+index 56df178..2bba460 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am
++++ b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am
+@@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ if HAVE_VERSIONING
+ pam_unix_la_LDFLAGS += -Wl,--version-script=$(srcdir)/../modules.map
+ endif
+ pam_unix_la_LIBADD = $(top_builddir)/libpam/libpam.la \
+- @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@ @TIRPC_LIBS@ @NSL_LIBS@
++ @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@ @TIRPC_LIBS@ @NSL_LIBS@ \
++ ../pam_securetty/tty_secure.lo
+
+ securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_unix.la
+
+diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
+index 1b318f1..be0330e 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
++++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
+@@ -159,7 +159,24 @@
+ <para>
+ The default action of this module is to not permit the
+ user access to a service if their official password is blank.
+- The <option>nullok</option> argument overrides this default.
++ The <option>nullok</option> argument overrides this default
++ and allows any user with a blank password to access the
++ service.
++ </para>
++ </listitem>
++ </varlistentry>
++ <varlistentry>
++ <term>
++ <option>nullok_secure</option>
++ </term>
++ <listitem>
++ <para>
++ The default action of this module is to not permit the
++ user access to a service if their official password is blank.
++ The <option>nullok_secure</option> argument overrides this
++ default and allows any user with a blank password to access
++ the service as long as the value of PAM_TTY is set to one of
++ the values found in /etc/securetty.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/support.c b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
+index fc8595e..29e3341 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.c
++++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
+@@ -183,13 +183,22 @@ int _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int *remember, int *rounds,
+ /* now parse the arguments to this module */
+
+ for (; argc-- > 0; ++argv) {
++ int sl;
+
+ D(("pam_unix arg: %s", *argv));
+
+ for (j = 0; j < UNIX_CTRLS_; ++j) {
+- if (unix_args[j].token
+- && !strncmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token, strlen(unix_args[j].token))) {
+- break;
++ if (unix_args[j].token) {
++ sl = strlen(unix_args[j].token);
++ if (unix_args[j].token[sl-1] == '=') {
++ /* exclude argument from comparison */
++ if (!strncmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token, sl))
++ break;
++ } else {
++ /* compare full strings */
++ if (!strcmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token))
++ break;
++ }
+ }
+ }
+
+@@ -560,6 +569,7 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *passwd,
+ if (child == 0) {
+ static char *envp[] = { NULL };
+ const char *args[] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL };
++ int nullok = off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl);
+
+ /* XXX - should really tidy up PAM here too */
+
+@@ -587,7 +597,16 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *passwd,
+ /* exec binary helper */
+ args[0] = CHKPWD_HELPER;
+ args[1] = user;
+- if (off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl)) { /* this means we've succeeded */
++ if (on(UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE, ctrl)) {
++ const void *uttyname;
++ retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, &uttyname);
++ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS || uttyname == NULL
++ || _pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, (const char *)uttyname) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
++ nullok = 0;
++ }
++ }
++
++ if (nullok) {
+ args[2]="nullok";
+ } else {
+ args[2]="nonull";
+@@ -672,6 +691,17 @@ _unix_blankpasswd (pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const char *name)
+ if (on(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl))
+ return 0; /* will fail but don't let on yet */
+
++ if (on(UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE, ctrl)) {
++ int retval2;
++ const void *uttyname;
++ retval2 = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, &uttyname);
++ if (retval2 != PAM_SUCCESS || uttyname == NULL)
++ return 0;
++
++ if (_pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, (const char *)uttyname) != PAM_SUCCESS)
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ /* UNIX passwords area */
+
+ retval = get_pwd_hash(pamh, name, &pwd, &salt);
+@@ -758,7 +788,7 @@ int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t * pamh, const char *name
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+- retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt, off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl));
++ retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt, _unix_blankpasswd(pamh, ctrl, name));
+ }
+
+ if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/support.h b/modules/pam_unix/support.h
+index b4c279c..8da4a8e 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.h
++++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.h
+@@ -98,8 +98,9 @@ typedef struct {
+ #define UNIX_QUIET 28 /* Don't print informational messages */
+ #define UNIX_NO_PASS_EXPIRY 29 /* Don't check for password expiration if not used for authentication */
+ #define UNIX_DES 30 /* DES, default */
++#define UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE 31 /* NULL passwords allowed only on secure ttys */
+ /* -------------- */
+-#define UNIX_CTRLS_ 31 /* number of ctrl arguments defined */
++#define UNIX_CTRLS_ 32 /* number of ctrl arguments defined */
+
+ #define UNIX_DES_CRYPT(ctrl) (off(UNIX_MD5_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BIGCRYPT,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA256_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA512_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS,ctrl))
+
+@@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_CTRLS_] =
+ /* UNIX_AUTHTOK_TYPE */ {"authtok_type=", _ALL_ON_, 0100, 0},
+ /* UNIX__PRELIM */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0600), 0200, 0},
+ /* UNIX__UPDATE */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0600), 0400, 0},
+-/* UNIX__NONULL */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 01000, 0},
++/* UNIX__NONULL */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(02000000000), 01000, 0},
+ /* UNIX__QUIET */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 02000, 0},
+ /* UNIX_USE_AUTHTOK */ {"use_authtok", _ALL_ON_, 04000, 0},
+ /* UNIX_SHADOW */ {"shadow", _ALL_ON_, 010000, 0},
+@@ -139,6 +140,7 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_CTRLS_] =
+ /* UNIX_QUIET */ {"quiet", _ALL_ON_, 01000000000, 0},
+ /* UNIX_NO_PASS_EXPIRY */ {"no_pass_expiry", _ALL_ON_, 02000000000, 0},
+ /* UNIX_DES */ {"des", _ALL_ON_^(0260420000), 0, 1},
++/* UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE */ {"nullok_secure", _ALL_ON_^(01000), 02000000000, 0},
+ };
+
+ #define UNIX_DEFAULTS (unix_args[UNIX__NONULL].flag)
+@@ -172,6 +174,8 @@ extern int _unix_read_password(pam_handle_t * pamh
+ ,const char *data_name
+ ,const void **pass);
+
++extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *uttyname);
++
+ extern int _unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ unsigned int ctrl, const char *user, int *daysleft);
+ #endif /* _PAM_UNIX_SUPPORT_H */
+--
+2.4.0
+