diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu-system-native_5.2.0.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu-system-native_5.2.0.bb
index 222b55c..390dade 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu-system-native_5.2.0.bb
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu-system-native_5.2.0.bb
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 BPN = "qemu"
 
+inherit python3-dir
+
 require qemu-native.inc
 
 # As some of the files installed by qemu-native and qemu-system-native
@@ -23,4 +25,7 @@
     rm -f ${D}${datadir}/qemu/trace-events-all
     rm -rf ${D}${datadir}/qemu/keymaps
     rm -rf ${D}${datadir}/icons/
+
+    # Install qmp.py to be used with testimage
+    install -D ${S}/python/qemu/qmp.py ${D}${PYTHON_SITEPACKAGES_DIR}/qmp.py
 }
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc
index a625809..384b0c1 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc
@@ -30,7 +30,33 @@
            file://mmap2.patch \
            file://determinism.patch \
            file://0001-tests-meson.build-use-relative-path-to-refer-to-file.patch \
-	   file://CVE-2021-20203.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-20203.patch \
+           file://CVE-2020-35517_1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2020-35517_2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2020-35517_3.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-20181.patch \
+           file://CVE-2020-29443.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-20221.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-3409_1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-3409_2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-3409_3.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-3409_4.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-3409_5.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-3409_6.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-3416_1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-3416_2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-3416_3.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-3416_4.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-3416_5.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-3416_6.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-3416_7.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-3416_8.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-3416_9.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-3416_10.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-20257.patch \
+           file://CVE-2020-27821.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-20263.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-3392.patch \
            "
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
 
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-27821.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-27821.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..58622f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-27821.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+From 279f90a9ab07304f0a49fc10e4bfd1243a8cddbe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2020 09:29:56 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] memory: clamp cached translation in case it points to an
+ MMIO region
+
+In using the address_space_translate_internal API, address_space_cache_init
+forgot one piece of advice that can be found in the code for
+address_space_translate_internal:
+
+    /* MMIO registers can be expected to perform full-width accesses based only
+     * on their address, without considering adjacent registers that could
+     * decode to completely different MemoryRegions.  When such registers
+     * exist (e.g. I/O ports 0xcf8 and 0xcf9 on most PC chipsets), MMIO
+     * regions overlap wildly.  For this reason we cannot clamp the accesses
+     * here.
+     *
+     * If the length is small (as is the case for address_space_ldl/stl),
+     * everything works fine.  If the incoming length is large, however,
+     * the caller really has to do the clamping through memory_access_size.
+     */
+
+address_space_cache_init is exactly one such case where "the incoming length
+is large", therefore we need to clamp the resulting length---not to
+memory_access_size though, since we are not doing an access yet, but to
+the size of the resulting section.  This ensures that subsequent accesses
+to the cached MemoryRegionSection will be in range.
+
+With this patch, the enclosed testcase notices that the used ring does
+not fit into the MSI-X table and prints a "qemu-system-x86_64: Cannot map used"
+error.
+
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [4bfb024bc76973d40a359476dc0291f46e435442]
+CVE: CVE-2020-27821
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ softmmu/physmem.c       | 10 ++++++++
+ tests/qtest/fuzz-test.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/softmmu/physmem.c b/softmmu/physmem.c
+index 3027747c0..2cd1de4a2 100644
+--- a/softmmu/physmem.c
++++ b/softmmu/physmem.c
+@@ -3255,6 +3255,7 @@ int64_t address_space_cache_init(MemoryRegionCache *cache,
+     AddressSpaceDispatch *d;
+     hwaddr l;
+     MemoryRegion *mr;
++    Int128 diff;
+ 
+     assert(len > 0);
+ 
+@@ -3263,6 +3264,15 @@ int64_t address_space_cache_init(MemoryRegionCache *cache,
+     d = flatview_to_dispatch(cache->fv);
+     cache->mrs = *address_space_translate_internal(d, addr, &cache->xlat, &l, true);
+ 
++    /*
++     * cache->xlat is now relative to cache->mrs.mr, not to the section itself.
++     * Take that into account to compute how many bytes are there between
++     * cache->xlat and the end of the section.
++     */
++    diff = int128_sub(cache->mrs.size,
++		      int128_make64(cache->xlat - cache->mrs.offset_within_region));
++    l = int128_get64(int128_min(diff, int128_make64(l)));
++
+     mr = cache->mrs.mr;
+     memory_region_ref(mr);
+     if (memory_access_is_direct(mr, is_write)) {
+diff --git a/tests/qtest/fuzz-test.c b/tests/qtest/fuzz-test.c
+index 9cb4c42bd..28739248e 100644
+--- a/tests/qtest/fuzz-test.c
++++ b/tests/qtest/fuzz-test.c
+@@ -47,6 +47,55 @@ static void test_lp1878642_pci_bus_get_irq_level_assert(void)
+     qtest_outl(s, 0x5d02, 0xebed205d);
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Here a MemoryRegionCache pointed to an MMIO region but had a
++ * larger size than the underlying region.
++ */
++static void test_mmio_oob_from_memory_region_cache(void)
++{
++    QTestState *s;
++
++    s = qtest_init("-M pc-q35-5.2 -display none -m 512M "
++		   "-device virtio-scsi,num_queues=8,addr=03.0 ");
++
++    qtest_outl(s, 0xcf8, 0x80001811);
++    qtest_outb(s, 0xcfc, 0x6e);
++    qtest_outl(s, 0xcf8, 0x80001824);
++    qtest_outl(s, 0xcf8, 0x80001813);
++    qtest_outl(s, 0xcfc, 0xa080000);
++    qtest_outl(s, 0xcf8, 0x80001802);
++    qtest_outl(s, 0xcfc, 0x5a175a63);
++    qtest_outb(s, 0x6e08, 0x9e);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9f003, 0xff);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9f004, 0x01);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9e012, 0x0e);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9e01b, 0x0e);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9f006, 0x01);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9f008, 0x01);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9f00a, 0x01);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9f00c, 0x01);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9f00e, 0x01);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9f010, 0x01);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9f012, 0x01);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9f014, 0x01);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9f016, 0x01);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9f018, 0x01);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9f01a, 0x01);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9f01c, 0x01);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9f01e, 0x01);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9f020, 0x01);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9f022, 0x01);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9f024, 0x01);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9f026, 0x01);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9f028, 0x01);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9f02a, 0x01);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9f02c, 0x01);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9f02e, 0x01);
++    qtest_writeb(s, 0x9f030, 0x01);
++    qtest_outb(s, 0x6e10, 0x00);
++    qtest_quit(s);
++}
++
+ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ {
+     const char *arch = qtest_get_arch();
+@@ -58,6 +107,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+                        test_lp1878263_megasas_zero_iov_cnt);
+         qtest_add_func("fuzz/test_lp1878642_pci_bus_get_irq_level_assert",
+                        test_lp1878642_pci_bus_get_irq_level_assert);
++        qtest_add_func("fuzz/test_mmio_oob_from_memory_region_cache",
++                       test_mmio_oob_from_memory_region_cache);
+     }
+ 
+     return g_test_run();
+-- 
+2.29.2
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-29443.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-29443.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c72324f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-29443.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+From c9a71afe182be5b62bd2ccdaf861695e0ec0731a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2021 17:21:30 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] ide: atapi: check logical block address and read size
+ (CVE-2020-29443)
+
+While processing ATAPI cmd_read/cmd_read_cd commands,
+Logical Block Address (LBA) maybe invalid OR closer to the last block,
+leading to an OOB access issues. Add range check to avoid it.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2020-29443
+Reported-by: Wenxiang Qian <leonwxqian@gmail.com>
+Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Message-Id: <20210118115130.457044-1-ppandit@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [b8d7f1bc59276fec85e4d09f1567613a3e14d31e]
+CVE: CVE-2020-29443
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/ide/atapi.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/ide/atapi.c b/hw/ide/atapi.c
+index e79157863..b626199e3 100644
+--- a/hw/ide/atapi.c
++++ b/hw/ide/atapi.c
+@@ -322,6 +322,8 @@ static void ide_atapi_cmd_reply(IDEState *s, int size, int max_size)
+ static void ide_atapi_cmd_read_pio(IDEState *s, int lba, int nb_sectors,
+                                    int sector_size)
+ {
++    assert(0 <= lba && lba < (s->nb_sectors >> 2));
++
+     s->lba = lba;
+     s->packet_transfer_size = nb_sectors * sector_size;
+     s->elementary_transfer_size = 0;
+@@ -420,6 +422,8 @@ eot:
+ static void ide_atapi_cmd_read_dma(IDEState *s, int lba, int nb_sectors,
+                                    int sector_size)
+ {
++    assert(0 <= lba && lba < (s->nb_sectors >> 2));
++
+     s->lba = lba;
+     s->packet_transfer_size = nb_sectors * sector_size;
+     s->io_buffer_size = 0;
+@@ -973,35 +977,49 @@ static void cmd_prevent_allow_medium_removal(IDEState *s, uint8_t* buf)
+ 
+ static void cmd_read(IDEState *s, uint8_t* buf)
+ {
+-    int nb_sectors, lba;
++    unsigned int nb_sectors, lba;
++
++    /* Total logical sectors of ATAPI_SECTOR_SIZE(=2048) bytes */
++    uint64_t total_sectors = s->nb_sectors >> 2;
+ 
+     if (buf[0] == GPCMD_READ_10) {
+         nb_sectors = lduw_be_p(buf + 7);
+     } else {
+         nb_sectors = ldl_be_p(buf + 6);
+     }
+-
+-    lba = ldl_be_p(buf + 2);
+     if (nb_sectors == 0) {
+         ide_atapi_cmd_ok(s);
+         return;
+     }
+ 
++    lba = ldl_be_p(buf + 2);
++    if (lba >= total_sectors || lba + nb_sectors - 1 >= total_sectors) {
++        ide_atapi_cmd_error(s, ILLEGAL_REQUEST, ASC_LOGICAL_BLOCK_OOR);
++        return;
++    }
++
+     ide_atapi_cmd_read(s, lba, nb_sectors, 2048);
+ }
+ 
+ static void cmd_read_cd(IDEState *s, uint8_t* buf)
+ {
+-    int nb_sectors, lba, transfer_request;
++    unsigned int nb_sectors, lba, transfer_request;
+ 
+-    nb_sectors = (buf[6] << 16) | (buf[7] << 8) | buf[8];
+-    lba = ldl_be_p(buf + 2);
++    /* Total logical sectors of ATAPI_SECTOR_SIZE(=2048) bytes */
++    uint64_t total_sectors = s->nb_sectors >> 2;
+ 
++    nb_sectors = (buf[6] << 16) | (buf[7] << 8) | buf[8];
+     if (nb_sectors == 0) {
+         ide_atapi_cmd_ok(s);
+         return;
+     }
+ 
++    lba = ldl_be_p(buf + 2);
++    if (lba >= total_sectors || lba + nb_sectors - 1 >= total_sectors) {
++        ide_atapi_cmd_error(s, ILLEGAL_REQUEST, ASC_LOGICAL_BLOCK_OOR);
++        return;
++    }
++
+     transfer_request = buf[9] & 0xf8;
+     if (transfer_request == 0x00) {
+         /* nothing */
+-- 
+2.29.2
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-35517_1.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-35517_1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..73a4cb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-35517_1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+From 8afaaee976965b7fb90ec225a51d60f35c5f173c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 15:02:06 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] virtiofsd: extract lo_do_open() from lo_open()
+
+Both lo_open() and lo_create() have similar code to open a file. Extract
+a common lo_do_open() function from lo_open() that will be used by
+lo_create() in a later commit.
+
+Since lo_do_open() does not otherwise need fuse_req_t req, convert
+lo_add_fd_mapping() to use struct lo_data *lo instead.
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
+Message-Id: <20210204150208.367837-2-stefanha@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/8afaaee976965b7fb90ec225a51d60f35c5f173c]
+
+CVE: CVE-2020-35517
+
+Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Khairul Rohaizzat Jamaluddin <khairul.rohaizzat.jamaluddin@intel.com>
+---
+ tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
+index 5fb36d9..f14fa51 100644
+--- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
++++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
+@@ -459,17 +459,17 @@ static void lo_map_remove(struct lo_map *map, size_t key)
+ }
+ 
+ /* Assumes lo->mutex is held */
+-static ssize_t lo_add_fd_mapping(fuse_req_t req, int fd)
++static ssize_t lo_add_fd_mapping(struct lo_data *lo, int fd)
+ {
+     struct lo_map_elem *elem;
+ 
+-    elem = lo_map_alloc_elem(&lo_data(req)->fd_map);
++    elem = lo_map_alloc_elem(&lo->fd_map);
+     if (!elem) {
+         return -1;
+     }
+ 
+     elem->fd = fd;
+-    return elem - lo_data(req)->fd_map.elems;
++    return elem - lo->fd_map.elems;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Assumes lo->mutex is held */
+@@ -1651,6 +1651,38 @@ static void update_open_flags(int writeback, int allow_direct_io,
+     }
+ }
+ 
++static int lo_do_open(struct lo_data *lo, struct lo_inode *inode,
++                      struct fuse_file_info *fi)
++{
++    char buf[64];
++    ssize_t fh;
++    int fd;
++
++    update_open_flags(lo->writeback, lo->allow_direct_io, fi);
++
++    sprintf(buf, "%i", inode->fd);
++    fd = openat(lo->proc_self_fd, buf, fi->flags & ~O_NOFOLLOW);
++    if (fd == -1) {
++        return errno;
++    }
++
++    pthread_mutex_lock(&lo->mutex);
++    fh = lo_add_fd_mapping(lo, fd);
++    pthread_mutex_unlock(&lo->mutex);
++    if (fh == -1) {
++        close(fd);
++        return ENOMEM;
++    }
++
++    fi->fh = fh;
++    if (lo->cache == CACHE_NONE) {
++        fi->direct_io = 1;
++    } else if (lo->cache == CACHE_ALWAYS) {
++        fi->keep_cache = 1;
++    }
++    return 0;
++}
++
+ static void lo_create(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent, const char *name,
+                       mode_t mode, struct fuse_file_info *fi)
+ {
+@@ -1691,7 +1723,7 @@ static void lo_create(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent, const char *name,
+         ssize_t fh;
+ 
+         pthread_mutex_lock(&lo->mutex);
+-        fh = lo_add_fd_mapping(req, fd);
++        fh = lo_add_fd_mapping(lo, fd);
+         pthread_mutex_unlock(&lo->mutex);
+         if (fh == -1) {
+             close(fd);
+@@ -1892,38 +1924,25 @@ static void lo_fsyncdir(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, int datasync,
+ 
+ static void lo_open(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, struct fuse_file_info *fi)
+ {
+-    int fd;
+-    ssize_t fh;
+-    char buf[64];
+     struct lo_data *lo = lo_data(req);
++    struct lo_inode *inode = lo_inode(req, ino);
++    int err;
+ 
+     fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "lo_open(ino=%" PRIu64 ", flags=%d)\n", ino,
+              fi->flags);
+ 
+-    update_open_flags(lo->writeback, lo->allow_direct_io, fi);
+-
+-    sprintf(buf, "%i", lo_fd(req, ino));
+-    fd = openat(lo->proc_self_fd, buf, fi->flags & ~O_NOFOLLOW);
+-    if (fd == -1) {
+-        return (void)fuse_reply_err(req, errno);
+-    }
+-
+-    pthread_mutex_lock(&lo->mutex);
+-    fh = lo_add_fd_mapping(req, fd);
+-    pthread_mutex_unlock(&lo->mutex);
+-    if (fh == -1) {
+-        close(fd);
+-        fuse_reply_err(req, ENOMEM);
++    if (!inode) {
++        fuse_reply_err(req, EBADF);
+         return;
+     }
+ 
+-    fi->fh = fh;
+-    if (lo->cache == CACHE_NONE) {
+-        fi->direct_io = 1;
+-    } else if (lo->cache == CACHE_ALWAYS) {
+-        fi->keep_cache = 1;
++    err = lo_do_open(lo, inode, fi);
++    lo_inode_put(lo, &inode);
++    if (err) {
++        fuse_reply_err(req, err);
++    } else {
++        fuse_reply_open(req, fi);
+     }
+-    fuse_reply_open(req, fi);
+ }
+ 
+ static void lo_release(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino,
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-35517_2.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-35517_2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf11bdb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-35517_2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+From 22d2ece71e533310da31f2857ebc4a00d91968b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 15:02:07 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] virtiofsd: optionally return inode pointer from
+ lo_do_lookup()
+
+lo_do_lookup() finds an existing inode or allocates a new one. It
+increments nlookup so that the inode stays alive until the client
+releases it.
+
+Existing callers don't need the struct lo_inode so the function doesn't
+return it. Extend the function to optionally return the inode. The next
+commit will need it.
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Message-Id: <20210204150208.367837-3-stefanha@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/22d2ece71e533310da31f2857ebc4a00d91968b3]
+
+CVE: CVE-2020-35517
+
+Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Khairul Rohaizzat Jamaluddin <khairul.rohaizzat.jamaluddin@intel.com>
+---
+ tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
+index f14fa51..aa35fc6 100644
+--- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
++++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
+@@ -831,11 +831,13 @@ static int do_statx(struct lo_data *lo, int dirfd, const char *pathname,
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+- * Increments nlookup and caller must release refcount using
+- * lo_inode_put(&parent).
++ * Increments nlookup on the inode on success. unref_inode_lolocked() must be
++ * called eventually to decrement nlookup again. If inodep is non-NULL, the
++ * inode pointer is stored and the caller must call lo_inode_put().
+  */
+ static int lo_do_lookup(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent, const char *name,
+-                        struct fuse_entry_param *e)
++                        struct fuse_entry_param *e,
++                        struct lo_inode **inodep)
+ {
+     int newfd;
+     int res;
+@@ -845,6 +847,10 @@ static int lo_do_lookup(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent, const char *name,
+     struct lo_inode *inode = NULL;
+     struct lo_inode *dir = lo_inode(req, parent);
+ 
++    if (inodep) {
++        *inodep = NULL;
++    }
++
+     /*
+      * name_to_handle_at() and open_by_handle_at() can reach here with fuse
+      * mount point in guest, but we don't have its inode info in the
+@@ -913,7 +919,14 @@ static int lo_do_lookup(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent, const char *name,
+         pthread_mutex_unlock(&lo->mutex);
+     }
+     e->ino = inode->fuse_ino;
+-    lo_inode_put(lo, &inode);
++
++    /* Transfer ownership of inode pointer to caller or drop it */
++    if (inodep) {
++        *inodep = inode;
++    } else {
++        lo_inode_put(lo, &inode);
++    }
++
+     lo_inode_put(lo, &dir);
+ 
+     fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "  %lli/%s -> %lli\n", (unsigned long long)parent,
+@@ -948,7 +961,7 @@ static void lo_lookup(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent, const char *name)
+         return;
+     }
+ 
+-    err = lo_do_lookup(req, parent, name, &e);
++    err = lo_do_lookup(req, parent, name, &e, NULL);
+     if (err) {
+         fuse_reply_err(req, err);
+     } else {
+@@ -1056,7 +1069,7 @@ static void lo_mknod_symlink(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent,
+         goto out;
+     }
+ 
+-    saverr = lo_do_lookup(req, parent, name, &e);
++    saverr = lo_do_lookup(req, parent, name, &e, NULL);
+     if (saverr) {
+         goto out;
+     }
+@@ -1534,7 +1547,7 @@ static void lo_do_readdir(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, size_t size,
+ 
+         if (plus) {
+             if (!is_dot_or_dotdot(name)) {
+-                err = lo_do_lookup(req, ino, name, &e);
++                err = lo_do_lookup(req, ino, name, &e, NULL);
+                 if (err) {
+                     goto error;
+                 }
+@@ -1732,7 +1745,7 @@ static void lo_create(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent, const char *name,
+         }
+ 
+         fi->fh = fh;
+-        err = lo_do_lookup(req, parent, name, &e);
++        err = lo_do_lookup(req, parent, name, &e, NULL);
+     }
+     if (lo->cache == CACHE_NONE) {
+         fi->direct_io = 1;
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-35517_3.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-35517_3.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f348f3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-35517_3.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+From a3fdbbc7f271bff7d53d0501b29d910ece0b3789 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 15:02:08 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] virtiofsd: prevent opening of special files (CVE-2020-35517)
+
+A well-behaved FUSE client does not attempt to open special files with
+FUSE_OPEN because they are handled on the client side (e.g. device nodes
+are handled by client-side device drivers).
+
+The check to prevent virtiofsd from opening special files is missing in
+a few cases, most notably FUSE_OPEN. A malicious client can cause
+virtiofsd to open a device node, potentially allowing the guest to
+escape. This can be exploited by a modified guest device driver. It is
+not exploitable from guest userspace since the guest kernel will handle
+special files inside the guest instead of sending FUSE requests.
+
+This patch fixes this issue by introducing the lo_inode_open() function
+to check the file type before opening it. This is a short-term solution
+because it does not prevent a compromised virtiofsd process from opening
+device nodes on the host.
+
+Restructure lo_create() to try O_CREAT | O_EXCL first. Note that O_CREAT
+| O_EXCL does not follow symlinks, so O_NOFOLLOW masking is not
+necessary here. If the file exists and the user did not specify O_EXCL,
+open it via lo_do_open().
+
+Reported-by: Alex Xu <alex@alxu.ca>
+Fixes: CVE-2020-35517
+Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
+Message-Id: <20210204150208.367837-4-stefanha@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/a3fdbbc7f271bff7d53d0501b29d910ece0b3789]
+
+CVE: CVE-2020-35517
+
+Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Khairul Rohaizzat Jamaluddin <khairul.rohaizzat.jamaluddin@intel.com>
+---
+ tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 144 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 92 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
+index aa35fc6ba5a5..147b59338a18 100644
+--- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
++++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
+@@ -555,6 +555,38 @@ static int lo_fd(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino)
+     return fd;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Open a file descriptor for an inode. Returns -EBADF if the inode is not a
++ * regular file or a directory.
++ *
++ * Use this helper function instead of raw openat(2) to prevent security issues
++ * when a malicious client opens special files such as block device nodes.
++ * Symlink inodes are also rejected since symlinks must already have been
++ * traversed on the client side.
++ */
++static int lo_inode_open(struct lo_data *lo, struct lo_inode *inode,
++                         int open_flags)
++{
++    g_autofree char *fd_str = g_strdup_printf("%d", inode->fd);
++    int fd;
++
++    if (!S_ISREG(inode->filetype) && !S_ISDIR(inode->filetype)) {
++        return -EBADF;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * The file is a symlink so O_NOFOLLOW must be ignored. We checked earlier
++     * that the inode is not a special file but if an external process races
++     * with us then symlinks are traversed here. It is not possible to escape
++     * the shared directory since it is mounted as "/" though.
++     */
++    fd = openat(lo->proc_self_fd, fd_str, open_flags & ~O_NOFOLLOW);
++    if (fd < 0) {
++        return -errno;
++    }
++    return fd;
++}
++
+ static void lo_init(void *userdata, struct fuse_conn_info *conn)
+ {
+     struct lo_data *lo = (struct lo_data *)userdata;
+@@ -684,9 +716,9 @@ static void lo_setattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, struct stat *attr,
+         if (fi) {
+             truncfd = fd;
+         } else {
+-            sprintf(procname, "%i", ifd);
+-            truncfd = openat(lo->proc_self_fd, procname, O_RDWR);
++            truncfd = lo_inode_open(lo, inode, O_RDWR);
+             if (truncfd < 0) {
++                errno = -truncfd;
+                 goto out_err;
+             }
+         }
+@@ -848,7 +880,7 @@ static int lo_do_lookup(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent, const char *name,
+     struct lo_inode *dir = lo_inode(req, parent);
+ 
+     if (inodep) {
+-        *inodep = NULL;
++        *inodep = NULL; /* in case there is an error */
+     }
+ 
+     /*
+@@ -1664,19 +1696,26 @@ static void update_open_flags(int writeback, int allow_direct_io,
+     }
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Open a regular file, set up an fd mapping, and fill out the struct
++ * fuse_file_info for it. If existing_fd is not negative, use that fd instead
++ * opening a new one. Takes ownership of existing_fd.
++ *
++ * Returns 0 on success or a positive errno.
++ */
+ static int lo_do_open(struct lo_data *lo, struct lo_inode *inode,
+-                      struct fuse_file_info *fi)
++                      int existing_fd, struct fuse_file_info *fi)
+ {
+-    char buf[64];
+     ssize_t fh;
+-    int fd;
++    int fd = existing_fd;
+ 
+     update_open_flags(lo->writeback, lo->allow_direct_io, fi);
+ 
+-    sprintf(buf, "%i", inode->fd);
+-    fd = openat(lo->proc_self_fd, buf, fi->flags & ~O_NOFOLLOW);
+-    if (fd == -1) {
+-        return errno;
++    if (fd < 0) {
++        fd = lo_inode_open(lo, inode, fi->flags);
++        if (fd < 0) {
++            return -fd;
++        }
+     }
+ 
+     pthread_mutex_lock(&lo->mutex);
+@@ -1699,9 +1738,10 @@ static int lo_do_open(struct lo_data *lo, struct lo_inode *inode,
+ static void lo_create(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent, const char *name,
+                       mode_t mode, struct fuse_file_info *fi)
+ {
+-    int fd;
++    int fd = -1;
+     struct lo_data *lo = lo_data(req);
+     struct lo_inode *parent_inode;
++    struct lo_inode *inode = NULL;
+     struct fuse_entry_param e;
+     int err;
+     struct lo_cred old = {};
+@@ -1727,36 +1767,38 @@ static void lo_create(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent, const char *name,
+ 
+     update_open_flags(lo->writeback, lo->allow_direct_io, fi);
+ 
+-    fd = openat(parent_inode->fd, name, (fi->flags | O_CREAT) & ~O_NOFOLLOW,
+-                mode);
++    /* Try to create a new file but don't open existing files */
++    fd = openat(parent_inode->fd, name, fi->flags | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, mode);
+     err = fd == -1 ? errno : 0;
+-    lo_restore_cred(&old);
+ 
+-    if (!err) {
+-        ssize_t fh;
++    lo_restore_cred(&old);
+ 
+-        pthread_mutex_lock(&lo->mutex);
+-        fh = lo_add_fd_mapping(lo, fd);
+-        pthread_mutex_unlock(&lo->mutex);
+-        if (fh == -1) {
+-            close(fd);
+-            err = ENOMEM;
+-            goto out;
+-        }
++    /* Ignore the error if file exists and O_EXCL was not given */
++    if (err && (err != EEXIST || (fi->flags & O_EXCL))) {
++        goto out;
++    }
+ 
+-        fi->fh = fh;
+-        err = lo_do_lookup(req, parent, name, &e, NULL);
++    err = lo_do_lookup(req, parent, name, &e, &inode);
++    if (err) {
++        goto out;
+     }
+-    if (lo->cache == CACHE_NONE) {
+-        fi->direct_io = 1;
+-    } else if (lo->cache == CACHE_ALWAYS) {
+-        fi->keep_cache = 1;
++
++    err = lo_do_open(lo, inode, fd, fi);
++    fd = -1; /* lo_do_open() takes ownership of fd */
++    if (err) {
++        /* Undo lo_do_lookup() nlookup ref */
++        unref_inode_lolocked(lo, inode, 1);
+     }
+ 
+ out:
++    lo_inode_put(lo, &inode);
+     lo_inode_put(lo, &parent_inode);
+ 
+     if (err) {
++        if (fd >= 0) {
++            close(fd);
++        }
++
+         fuse_reply_err(req, err);
+     } else {
+         fuse_reply_create(req, &e, fi);
+@@ -1770,7 +1812,6 @@ static struct lo_inode_plock *lookup_create_plock_ctx(struct lo_data *lo,
+                                                       pid_t pid, int *err)
+ {
+     struct lo_inode_plock *plock;
+-    char procname[64];
+     int fd;
+ 
+     plock =
+@@ -1787,12 +1828,10 @@ static struct lo_inode_plock *lookup_create_plock_ctx(struct lo_data *lo,
+     }
+ 
+     /* Open another instance of file which can be used for ofd locks. */
+-    sprintf(procname, "%i", inode->fd);
+-
+     /* TODO: What if file is not writable? */
+-    fd = openat(lo->proc_self_fd, procname, O_RDWR);
+-    if (fd == -1) {
+-        *err = errno;
++    fd = lo_inode_open(lo, inode, O_RDWR);
++    if (fd < 0) {
++        *err = -fd;
+         free(plock);
+         return NULL;
+     }
+@@ -1949,7 +1988,7 @@ static void lo_open(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, struct fuse_file_info *fi)
+         return;
+     }
+ 
+-    err = lo_do_open(lo, inode, fi);
++    err = lo_do_open(lo, inode, -1, fi);
+     lo_inode_put(lo, &inode);
+     if (err) {
+         fuse_reply_err(req, err);
+@@ -2014,39 +2053,40 @@ static void lo_flush(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, struct fuse_file_info *fi)
+ static void lo_fsync(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, int datasync,
+                      struct fuse_file_info *fi)
+ {
++    struct lo_inode *inode = lo_inode(req, ino);
++    struct lo_data *lo = lo_data(req);
+     int res;
+     int fd;
+-    char *buf;
+ 
+     fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "lo_fsync(ino=%" PRIu64 ", fi=0x%p)\n", ino,
+              (void *)fi);
+ 
+-    if (!fi) {
+-        struct lo_data *lo = lo_data(req);
+-
+-        res = asprintf(&buf, "%i", lo_fd(req, ino));
+-        if (res == -1) {
+-            return (void)fuse_reply_err(req, errno);
+-        }
++    if (!inode) {
++        fuse_reply_err(req, EBADF);
++        return;
++    }
+ 
+-        fd = openat(lo->proc_self_fd, buf, O_RDWR);
+-        free(buf);
+-        if (fd == -1) {
+-            return (void)fuse_reply_err(req, errno);
++    if (!fi) {
++        fd = lo_inode_open(lo, inode, O_RDWR);
++        if (fd < 0) {
++            res = -fd;
++            goto out;
+         }
+     } else {
+         fd = lo_fi_fd(req, fi);
+     }
+ 
+     if (datasync) {
+-        res = fdatasync(fd);
++        res = fdatasync(fd) == -1 ? errno : 0;
+     } else {
+-        res = fsync(fd);
++        res = fsync(fd) == -1 ? errno : 0;
+     }
+     if (!fi) {
+         close(fd);
+     }
+-    fuse_reply_err(req, res == -1 ? errno : 0);
++out:
++    lo_inode_put(lo, &inode);
++    fuse_reply_err(req, res);
+ }
+ 
+ static void lo_read(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, size_t size, off_t offset,
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-20181.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-20181.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1b8c77f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-20181.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+From c2d2d14e8deece958bbc4fc649d22c3564bc4e7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2021 17:04:12 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: Fully restart unreclaim loop (CVE-2021-20181)
+
+Depending on the client activity, the server can be asked to open a huge
+number of file descriptors and eventually hit RLIMIT_NOFILE. This is
+currently mitigated using a reclaim logic : the server closes the file
+descriptors of idle fids, based on the assumption that it will be able
+to re-open them later. This assumption doesn't hold of course if the
+client requests the file to be unlinked. In this case, we loop on the
+entire fid list and mark all related fids as unreclaimable (the reclaim
+logic will just ignore them) and, of course, we open or re-open their
+file descriptors if needed since we're about to unlink the file.
+
+This is the purpose of v9fs_mark_fids_unreclaim(). Since the actual
+opening of a file can cause the coroutine to yield, another client
+request could possibly add a new fid that we may want to mark as
+non-reclaimable as well. The loop is thus restarted if the re-open
+request was actually transmitted to the backend. This is achieved
+by keeping a reference on the first fid (head) before traversing
+the list.
+
+This is wrong in several ways:
+- a potential clunk request from the client could tear the first
+  fid down and cause the reference to be stale. This leads to a
+  use-after-free error that can be detected with ASAN, using a
+  custom 9p client
+- fids are added at the head of the list : restarting from the
+  previous head will always miss fids added by a some other
+  potential request
+
+All these problems could be avoided if fids were being added at the
+end of the list. This can be achieved with a QSIMPLEQ, but this is
+probably too much change for a bug fix. For now let's keep it
+simple and just restart the loop from the current head.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-20181
+Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1911666
+Reported-by: Zero Day Initiative <zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com>
+Reviewed-by: Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>
+Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
+Message-Id: <161064025265.1838153.15185571283519390907.stgit@bahia.lan>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [89fbea8737e8f7b954745a1ffc4238d377055305]
+CVE: CVE-2021-20181
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index 94df440fc..6026b51a1 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -502,9 +502,9 @@ static int coroutine_fn v9fs_mark_fids_unreclaim(V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsPath *path)
+ {
+     int err;
+     V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
+-    V9fsFidState *fidp, head_fid;
++    V9fsFidState *fidp;
+ 
+-    head_fid.next = s->fid_list;
++again:
+     for (fidp = s->fid_list; fidp; fidp = fidp->next) {
+         if (fidp->path.size != path->size) {
+             continue;
+@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ static int coroutine_fn v9fs_mark_fids_unreclaim(V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsPath *path)
+              * switched to the worker thread
+              */
+             if (err == 0) {
+-                fidp = &head_fid;
++                goto again;
+             }
+         }
+     }
+-- 
+2.29.2
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-20221.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-20221.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d762a51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-20221.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+From e428bcfb86fb46d9773ae11e69712052dcff3d45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= <f4bug@amsat.org>
+Date: Sun, 31 Jan 2021 11:34:01 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] hw/intc/arm_gic: Fix interrupt ID in GICD_SGIR register
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Per the ARM Generic Interrupt Controller Architecture specification
+(document "ARM IHI 0048B.b (ID072613)"), the SGIINTID field is 4 bit,
+not 10:
+
+  - 4.3 Distributor register descriptions
+  - 4.3.15 Software Generated Interrupt Register, GICD_SG
+
+    - Table 4-21 GICD_SGIR bit assignments
+
+    The Interrupt ID of the SGI to forward to the specified CPU
+    interfaces. The value of this field is the Interrupt ID, in
+    the range 0-15, for example a value of 0b0011 specifies
+    Interrupt ID 3.
+
+Correct the irq mask to fix an undefined behavior (which eventually
+lead to a heap-buffer-overflow, see [Buglink]):
+
+   $ echo 'writel 0x8000f00 0xff4affb0' | qemu-system-aarch64 -M virt,accel=qtest -qtest stdio
+   [I 1612088147.116987] OPENED
+  [R +0.278293] writel 0x8000f00 0xff4affb0
+  ../hw/intc/arm_gic.c:1498:13: runtime error: index 944 out of bounds for type 'uint8_t [16][8]'
+  SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior ../hw/intc/arm_gic.c:1498:13
+
+This fixes a security issue when running with KVM on Arm with
+kernel-irqchip=off. (The default is kernel-irqchip=on, which is
+unaffected, and which is also the correct choice for performance.)
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Fixes: CVE-2021-20221
+Fixes: 9ee6e8bb853 ("ARMv7 support.")
+Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1913916
+Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1913917
+Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
+Message-id: 20210131103401.217160-1-f4bug@amsat.org
+Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [edfe2eb4360cde4ed5d95bda7777edcb3510f76a]
+CVE: CVE-2021-20221
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/intc/arm_gic.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/intc/arm_gic.c b/hw/intc/arm_gic.c
+index c60dc6b5e..fbde60de0 100644
+--- a/hw/intc/arm_gic.c
++++ b/hw/intc/arm_gic.c
+@@ -1474,7 +1474,7 @@ static void gic_dist_writel(void *opaque, hwaddr offset,
+         int target_cpu;
+ 
+         cpu = gic_get_current_cpu(s);
+-        irq = value & 0x3ff;
++        irq = value & 0xf;
+         switch ((value >> 24) & 3) {
+         case 0:
+             mask = (value >> 16) & ALL_CPU_MASK;
+-- 
+2.29.2
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-20257.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-20257.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7175b24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-20257.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+From affdf476543405045c281a7c67d1eaedbcea8135 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2021 13:45:28 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] e1000: fail early for evil descriptor
+
+During procss_tx_desc(), driver can try to chain data descriptor with
+legacy descriptor, when will lead underflow for the following
+calculation in process_tx_desc() for bytes:
+
+            if (tp->size + bytes > msh)
+                bytes = msh - tp->size;
+
+This will lead a infinite loop. So check and fail early if tp->size if
+greater or equal to msh.
+
+Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Reported-by: Cheolwoo Myung <cwmyung@snu.ac.kr>
+Reported-by: Ruhr-University Bochum <bugs-syssec@rub.de>
+Cc: Prasad J Pandit <ppandit@redhat.com>
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [3de46e6fc489c52c9431a8a832ad8170a7569bd8]
+CVE: CVE-2021-20257
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/net/e1000.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/e1000.c b/hw/net/e1000.c
+index cf22c4f07..c3564c7ce 100644
+--- a/hw/net/e1000.c
++++ b/hw/net/e1000.c
+@@ -670,6 +670,9 @@ process_tx_desc(E1000State *s, struct e1000_tx_desc *dp)
+         msh = tp->tso_props.hdr_len + tp->tso_props.mss;
+         do {
+             bytes = split_size;
++            if (tp->size >= msh) {
++                goto eop;
++            }
+             if (tp->size + bytes > msh)
+                 bytes = msh - tp->size;
+ 
+@@ -695,6 +698,7 @@ process_tx_desc(E1000State *s, struct e1000_tx_desc *dp)
+         tp->size += split_size;
+     }
+ 
++eop:
+     if (!(txd_lower & E1000_TXD_CMD_EOP))
+         return;
+     if (!(tp->cptse && tp->size < tp->tso_props.hdr_len)) {
+-- 
+2.29.2
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-20263.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-20263.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f9a91f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-20263.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+From aaa5f8e00c2e85a893b972f1e243fb14c26b70dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2021 19:56:25 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] virtiofs: drop remapped security.capability xattr as
+ needed
+
+On Linux, the 'security.capability' xattr holds a set of
+capabilities that can change when an executable is run, giving
+a limited form of privilege escalation to those programs that
+the writer of the file deemed worthy.
+
+Any write causes the 'security.capability' xattr to be dropped,
+stopping anyone from gaining privilege by modifying a blessed
+file.
+
+Fuse relies on the daemon to do this dropping, and in turn the
+daemon relies on the host kernel to drop the xattr for it.  However,
+with the addition of -o xattrmap, the xattr that the guest
+stores its capabilities in is now not the same as the one that
+the host kernel automatically clears.
+
+Where the mapping changes 'security.capability', explicitly clear
+the remapped name to preserve the same behaviour.
+
+This bug is assigned CVE-2021-20263.
+
+Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [e586edcb410543768ef009eaa22a2d9dd4a53846]
+CVE: CVE-2021-20263
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst         |  4 ++
+ tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 2 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst b/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst
+index 866b7db3e..00554c75b 100644
+--- a/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst
++++ b/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst
+@@ -228,6 +228,10 @@ The 'map' type adds a number of separate rules to add **prepend** as a prefix
+ to the matched **key** (or all attributes if **key** is empty).
+ There may be at most one 'map' rule and it must be the last rule in the set.
+ 
++Note: When the 'security.capability' xattr is remapped, the daemon has to do
++extra work to remove it during many operations, which the host kernel normally
++does itself.
++
+ xattr-mapping Examples
+ ----------------------
+ 
+diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
+index 03c5e0d13..c9197da86 100644
+--- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
++++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
+@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ struct lo_data {
+     int posix_lock;
+     int xattr;
+     char *xattrmap;
++    char *xattr_security_capability;
+     char *source;
+     char *modcaps;
+     double timeout;
+@@ -226,6 +227,8 @@ static __thread bool cap_loaded = 0;
+ 
+ static struct lo_inode *lo_find(struct lo_data *lo, struct stat *st,
+                                 uint64_t mnt_id);
++static int xattr_map_client(const struct lo_data *lo, const char *client_name,
++                            char **out_name);
+ 
+ static int is_dot_or_dotdot(const char *name)
+ {
+@@ -365,6 +368,37 @@ out:
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * The host kernel normally drops security.capability xattr's on
++ * any write, however if we're remapping xattr names we need to drop
++ * whatever the clients security.capability is actually stored as.
++ */
++static int drop_security_capability(const struct lo_data *lo, int fd)
++{
++    if (!lo->xattr_security_capability) {
++        /* We didn't remap the name, let the host kernel do it */
++        return 0;
++    }
++    if (!fremovexattr(fd, lo->xattr_security_capability)) {
++        /* All good */
++        return 0;
++    }
++
++    switch (errno) {
++    case ENODATA:
++        /* Attribute didn't exist, that's fine */
++        return 0;
++
++    case ENOTSUP:
++        /* FS didn't support attribute anyway, also fine */
++        return 0;
++
++    default:
++        /* Hmm other error */
++        return errno;
++    }
++}
++
+ static void lo_map_init(struct lo_map *map)
+ {
+     map->elems = NULL;
+@@ -717,6 +751,11 @@ static void lo_setattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, struct stat *attr,
+         uid_t uid = (valid & FUSE_SET_ATTR_UID) ? attr->st_uid : (uid_t)-1;
+         gid_t gid = (valid & FUSE_SET_ATTR_GID) ? attr->st_gid : (gid_t)-1;
+ 
++        saverr = drop_security_capability(lo, ifd);
++        if (saverr) {
++            goto out_err;
++        }
++
+         res = fchownat(ifd, "", uid, gid, AT_EMPTY_PATH | AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
+         if (res == -1) {
+             goto out_err;
+@@ -735,6 +774,14 @@ static void lo_setattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, struct stat *attr,
+             }
+         }
+ 
++	saverr = drop_security_capability(lo, truncfd);
++        if (saverr) {
++            if (!fi) {
++                close(truncfd);
++            }
++            goto out_err;
++        }
++
+         res = ftruncate(truncfd, attr->st_size);
+         if (!fi) {
+             saverr = errno;
+@@ -1726,6 +1773,13 @@ static int lo_do_open(struct lo_data *lo, struct lo_inode *inode,
+         if (fd < 0) {
+             return -fd;
+         }
++        if (fi->flags & (O_TRUNC)) {
++            int err = drop_security_capability(lo, fd);
++            if (err) {
++                close(fd);
++                return err;
++            }
++        }
+     }
+ 
+     pthread_mutex_lock(&lo->mutex);
+@@ -2114,6 +2168,12 @@ static void lo_write_buf(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino,
+              "lo_write_buf(ino=%" PRIu64 ", size=%zd, off=%lu)\n", ino,
+              out_buf.buf[0].size, (unsigned long)off);
+ 
++    res = drop_security_capability(lo_data(req), out_buf.buf[0].fd);
++    if (res) {
++        fuse_reply_err(req, res);
++        return;
++    }
++
+     /*
+      * If kill_priv is set, drop CAP_FSETID which should lead to kernel
+      * clearing setuid/setgid on file.
+@@ -2353,6 +2413,7 @@ static void parse_xattrmap(struct lo_data *lo)
+ {
+     const char *map = lo->xattrmap;
+     const char *tmp;
++    int ret;
+ 
+     lo->xattr_map_nentries = 0;
+     while (*map) {
+@@ -2383,7 +2444,7 @@ static void parse_xattrmap(struct lo_data *lo)
+              * the last entry.
+              */
+             parse_xattrmap_map(lo, map, sep);
+-            return;
++            break;
+         } else {
+             fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR,
+                      "%s: Unexpected type;"
+@@ -2452,6 +2513,19 @@ static void parse_xattrmap(struct lo_data *lo)
+         fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "Empty xattr map\n");
+         exit(1);
+     }
++
++    ret = xattr_map_client(lo, "security.capability",
++                           &lo->xattr_security_capability);
++    if (ret) {
++        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "Failed to map security.capability: %s\n",
++                strerror(ret));
++        exit(1);
++    }
++    if (!strcmp(lo->xattr_security_capability, "security.capability")) {
++        /* 1-1 mapping, don't need to do anything */
++        free(lo->xattr_security_capability);
++        lo->xattr_security_capability = NULL;
++    }
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -3480,6 +3554,7 @@ static void fuse_lo_data_cleanup(struct lo_data *lo)
+ 
+     free(lo->xattrmap);
+     free_xattrmap(lo);
++    free(lo->xattr_security_capability);
+     free(lo->source);
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.29.2
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3392.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3392.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af94cff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3392.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+From 3791642c8d60029adf9b00bcb4e34d7d8a1aea4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
+Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2021 15:42:47 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] mptsas: Remove unused MPTSASState 'pending' field
+ (CVE-2021-3392)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+While processing SCSI i/o requests in mptsas_process_scsi_io_request(),
+the Megaraid emulator appends new MPTSASRequest object 'req' to
+the 's->pending' queue. In case of an error, this same object gets
+dequeued in mptsas_free_request() only if SCSIRequest object
+'req->sreq' is initialised. This may lead to a use-after-free issue.
+
+Since s->pending is actually not used, simply remove it from
+MPTSASState.
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
+Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
+Reported-by: Cheolwoo Myung <cwmyung@snu.ac.kr>
+Message-id: 20210419134247.1467982-1-f4bug@amsat.org
+Message-Id: <20210416102243.1293871-1-mjt@msgid.tls.msk.ru>
+Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Reported-by: Cheolwoo Myung <cwmyung@snu.ac.kr>
+BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1914236 (CVE-2021-3392)
+Fixes: e351b826112 ("hw: Add support for LSI SAS1068 (mptsas) device")
+[PMD: Reworded description, added more tags]
+Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
+
+CVE: CVE-2021-3392
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=3791642c8d60029adf9b00bcb4e34d7d8a1aea4d]
+Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
+---
+ hw/scsi/mptsas.c | 6 ------
+ hw/scsi/mptsas.h | 1 -
+ 2 files changed, 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/scsi/mptsas.c b/hw/scsi/mptsas.c
+index 7416e7870614..db3219e7d206 100644
+--- a/hw/scsi/mptsas.c
++++ b/hw/scsi/mptsas.c
+@@ -251,13 +251,10 @@ static int mptsas_build_sgl(MPTSASState *s, MPTSASRequest *req, hwaddr addr)
+ 
+ static void mptsas_free_request(MPTSASRequest *req)
+ {
+-    MPTSASState *s = req->dev;
+-
+     if (req->sreq != NULL) {
+         req->sreq->hba_private = NULL;
+         scsi_req_unref(req->sreq);
+         req->sreq = NULL;
+-        QTAILQ_REMOVE(&s->pending, req, next);
+     }
+     qemu_sglist_destroy(&req->qsg);
+     g_free(req);
+@@ -303,7 +300,6 @@ static int mptsas_process_scsi_io_request(MPTSASState *s,
+     }
+ 
+     req = g_new0(MPTSASRequest, 1);
+-    QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&s->pending, req, next);
+     req->scsi_io = *scsi_io;
+     req->dev = s;
+ 
+@@ -1319,8 +1315,6 @@ static void mptsas_scsi_realize(PCIDevice *dev, Error **errp)
+ 
+     s->request_bh = qemu_bh_new(mptsas_fetch_requests, s);
+ 
+-    QTAILQ_INIT(&s->pending);
+-
+     scsi_bus_new(&s->bus, sizeof(s->bus), &dev->qdev, &mptsas_scsi_info, NULL);
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/hw/scsi/mptsas.h b/hw/scsi/mptsas.h
+index b85ac1a5fcc7..c046497db719 100644
+--- a/hw/scsi/mptsas.h
++++ b/hw/scsi/mptsas.h
+@@ -79,7 +79,6 @@ struct MPTSASState {
+     uint16_t reply_frame_size;
+ 
+     SCSIBus bus;
+-    QTAILQ_HEAD(, MPTSASRequest) pending;
+ };
+ 
+ void mptsas_fix_scsi_io_endianness(MPIMsgSCSIIORequest *req);
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3409_1.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3409_1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f9395ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3409_1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From c01ae9a35b3c6b4a8e1f1bfa0a0caafe394f8b5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2021 11:46:52 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 1/6] hw/sd: sdhci: Simplify updating s->prnsts in
+ sdhci_sdma_transfer_multi_blocks()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+s->prnsts is updated in both branches of the if () else () statement.
+Move the common bits outside so that it is cleaner.
+
+Signed-off-by: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
+Tested-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Reviewed-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
+Message-Id: <1613447214-81951-5-git-send-email-bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [8bc1f1aa51d32c3184e7b19d5b94c35ecc06f056]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3409
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/sd/sdhci.c | 7 +++----
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/sd/sdhci.c b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
+index 2f8b74a84..f83c5e295 100644
+--- a/hw/sd/sdhci.c
++++ b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
+@@ -596,9 +596,9 @@ static void sdhci_sdma_transfer_multi_blocks(SDHCIState *s)
+         page_aligned = true;
+     }
+ 
++    s->prnsts |= SDHC_DATA_INHIBIT | SDHC_DAT_LINE_ACTIVE;
+     if (s->trnmod & SDHC_TRNS_READ) {
+-        s->prnsts |= SDHC_DOING_READ | SDHC_DATA_INHIBIT |
+-                SDHC_DAT_LINE_ACTIVE;
++        s->prnsts |= SDHC_DOING_READ;
+         while (s->blkcnt) {
+             if (s->data_count == 0) {
+                 sdbus_read_data(&s->sdbus, s->fifo_buffer, block_size);
+@@ -625,8 +625,7 @@ static void sdhci_sdma_transfer_multi_blocks(SDHCIState *s)
+             }
+         }
+     } else {
+-        s->prnsts |= SDHC_DOING_WRITE | SDHC_DATA_INHIBIT |
+-                SDHC_DAT_LINE_ACTIVE;
++        s->prnsts |= SDHC_DOING_WRITE;
+         while (s->blkcnt) {
+             begin = s->data_count;
+             if (((boundary_count + begin) < block_size) && page_aligned) {
+-- 
+2.29.2
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3409_2.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3409_2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3d2bb1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3409_2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+From b9bb4700798bce98888c51d7b6dbc19ec49159d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 3 Mar 2021 20:26:35 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 2/6] hw/sd: sdhci: Don't transfer any data when command time
+ out
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+At the end of sdhci_send_command(), it starts a data transfer if the
+command register indicates data is associated. But the data transfer
+should only be initiated when the command execution has succeeded.
+
+With this fix, the following reproducer:
+
+outl 0xcf8 0x80001810
+outl 0xcfc 0xe1068000
+outl 0xcf8 0x80001804
+outw 0xcfc 0x7
+write 0xe106802c 0x1 0x0f
+write 0xe1068004 0xc 0x2801d10101fffffbff28a384
+write 0xe106800c 0x1f 0x9dacbbcad9e8f7061524334251606f7e8d9cabbac9d8e7f60514233241505f
+write 0xe1068003 0x28 0x80d000251480d000252280d000253080d000253e80d000254c80d000255a80d000256880d0002576
+write 0xe1068003 0x1 0xfe
+
+cannot be reproduced with the following QEMU command line:
+
+$ qemu-system-x86_64 -nographic -M pc-q35-5.0 \
+      -device sdhci-pci,sd-spec-version=3 \
+      -drive if=sd,index=0,file=null-co://,format=raw,id=mydrive \
+      -device sd-card,drive=mydrive \
+      -monitor none -serial none -qtest stdio
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Fixes: CVE-2020-17380
+Fixes: CVE-2020-25085
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3409
+Fixes: d7dfca0807a0 ("hw/sdhci: introduce standard SD host controller")
+Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Reported-by: Cornelius Aschermann (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
+Reported-by: Sergej Schumilo (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
+Reported-by: Simon Wörner (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
+Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1892960
+Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1909418
+Buglink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1928146
+Acked-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
+Tested-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Tested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
+Signed-off-by: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
+Message-Id: <20210303122639.20004-2-bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [b263d8f928001b5cfa2a993ea43b7a5b3a1811e8]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3409
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/sd/sdhci.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/sd/sdhci.c b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
+index f83c5e295..44f8a82ea 100644
+--- a/hw/sd/sdhci.c
++++ b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
+@@ -326,6 +326,7 @@ static void sdhci_send_command(SDHCIState *s)
+     SDRequest request;
+     uint8_t response[16];
+     int rlen;
++    bool timeout = false;
+ 
+     s->errintsts = 0;
+     s->acmd12errsts = 0;
+@@ -349,6 +350,7 @@ static void sdhci_send_command(SDHCIState *s)
+             trace_sdhci_response16(s->rspreg[3], s->rspreg[2],
+                                    s->rspreg[1], s->rspreg[0]);
+         } else {
++            timeout = true;
+             trace_sdhci_error("timeout waiting for command response");
+             if (s->errintstsen & SDHC_EISEN_CMDTIMEOUT) {
+                 s->errintsts |= SDHC_EIS_CMDTIMEOUT;
+@@ -369,7 +371,7 @@ static void sdhci_send_command(SDHCIState *s)
+ 
+     sdhci_update_irq(s);
+ 
+-    if (s->blksize && (s->cmdreg & SDHC_CMD_DATA_PRESENT)) {
++    if (!timeout && s->blksize && (s->cmdreg & SDHC_CMD_DATA_PRESENT)) {
+         s->data_count = 0;
+         sdhci_data_transfer(s);
+     }
+-- 
+2.29.2
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3409_3.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3409_3.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c3b37ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3409_3.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+From 405ca416ccc8135544a4fe5732974497244128c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 3 Mar 2021 20:26:36 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 3/6] hw/sd: sdhci: Don't write to SDHC_SYSAD register when
+ transfer is in progress
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Per "SD Host Controller Standard Specification Version 7.00"
+chapter 2.2.1 SDMA System Address Register:
+
+This register can be accessed only if no transaction is executing
+(i.e., after a transaction has stopped).
+
+With this fix, the following reproducer:
+
+outl 0xcf8 0x80001010
+outl 0xcfc 0xfbefff00
+outl 0xcf8 0x80001001
+outl 0xcfc 0x06000000
+write 0xfbefff2c 0x1 0x05
+write 0xfbefff0f 0x1 0x37
+write 0xfbefff0a 0x1 0x01
+write 0xfbefff0f 0x1 0x29
+write 0xfbefff0f 0x1 0x02
+write 0xfbefff0f 0x1 0x03
+write 0xfbefff04 0x1 0x01
+write 0xfbefff05 0x1 0x01
+write 0xfbefff07 0x1 0x02
+write 0xfbefff0c 0x1 0x33
+write 0xfbefff0e 0x1 0x20
+write 0xfbefff0f 0x1 0x00
+write 0xfbefff2a 0x1 0x01
+write 0xfbefff0c 0x1 0x00
+write 0xfbefff03 0x1 0x00
+write 0xfbefff05 0x1 0x00
+write 0xfbefff2a 0x1 0x02
+write 0xfbefff0c 0x1 0x32
+write 0xfbefff01 0x1 0x01
+write 0xfbefff02 0x1 0x01
+write 0xfbefff03 0x1 0x01
+
+cannot be reproduced with the following QEMU command line:
+
+$ qemu-system-x86_64 -nographic -machine accel=qtest -m 512M \
+       -nodefaults -device sdhci-pci,sd-spec-version=3 \
+       -drive if=sd,index=0,file=null-co://,format=raw,id=mydrive \
+       -device sd-card,drive=mydrive -qtest stdio
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Fixes: CVE-2020-17380
+Fixes: CVE-2020-25085
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3409
+Fixes: d7dfca0807a0 ("hw/sdhci: introduce standard SD host controller")
+Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Reported-by: Cornelius Aschermann (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
+Reported-by: Sergej Schumilo (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
+Reported-by: Simon Wörner (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
+Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1892960
+Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1909418
+Buglink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1928146
+Tested-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
+Message-Id: <20210303122639.20004-3-bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [8be45cc947832b3c02144c9d52921f499f2d77fe]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3409
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/sd/sdhci.c | 20 +++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/sd/sdhci.c b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
+index 44f8a82ea..d8a46f307 100644
+--- a/hw/sd/sdhci.c
++++ b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
+@@ -1121,15 +1121,17 @@ sdhci_write(void *opaque, hwaddr offset, uint64_t val, unsigned size)
+ 
+     switch (offset & ~0x3) {
+     case SDHC_SYSAD:
+-        s->sdmasysad = (s->sdmasysad & mask) | value;
+-        MASKED_WRITE(s->sdmasysad, mask, value);
+-        /* Writing to last byte of sdmasysad might trigger transfer */
+-        if (!(mask & 0xFF000000) && TRANSFERRING_DATA(s->prnsts) && s->blkcnt &&
+-                s->blksize && SDHC_DMA_TYPE(s->hostctl1) == SDHC_CTRL_SDMA) {
+-            if (s->trnmod & SDHC_TRNS_MULTI) {
+-                sdhci_sdma_transfer_multi_blocks(s);
+-            } else {
+-                sdhci_sdma_transfer_single_block(s);
++        if (!TRANSFERRING_DATA(s->prnsts)) {
++            s->sdmasysad = (s->sdmasysad & mask) | value;
++            MASKED_WRITE(s->sdmasysad, mask, value);
++            /* Writing to last byte of sdmasysad might trigger transfer */
++            if (!(mask & 0xFF000000) && s->blkcnt && s->blksize &&
++                SDHC_DMA_TYPE(s->hostctl1) == SDHC_CTRL_SDMA) {
++                if (s->trnmod & SDHC_TRNS_MULTI) {
++                    sdhci_sdma_transfer_multi_blocks(s);
++                } else {
++                    sdhci_sdma_transfer_single_block(s);
++                }
+             }
+         }
+         break;
+-- 
+2.29.2
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3409_4.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3409_4.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d5be997
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3409_4.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+From b672bcaf5522294a4d8de3e88e0932d55585ee3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 3 Mar 2021 20:26:37 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 4/6] hw/sd: sdhci: Correctly set the controller status for
+ ADMA
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+When an ADMA transfer is started, the codes forget to set the
+controller status to indicate a transfer is in progress.
+
+With this fix, the following 2 reproducers:
+
+https://paste.debian.net/plain/1185136
+https://paste.debian.net/plain/1185141
+
+cannot be reproduced with the following QEMU command line:
+
+$ qemu-system-x86_64 -nographic -machine accel=qtest -m 512M \
+      -nodefaults -device sdhci-pci,sd-spec-version=3 \
+      -drive if=sd,index=0,file=null-co://,format=raw,id=mydrive \
+      -device sd-card,drive=mydrive -qtest stdio
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Fixes: CVE-2020-17380
+Fixes: CVE-2020-25085
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3409
+Fixes: d7dfca0807a0 ("hw/sdhci: introduce standard SD host controller")
+Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Reported-by: Cornelius Aschermann (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
+Reported-by: Sergej Schumilo (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
+Reported-by: Simon Wörner (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
+Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1892960
+Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1909418
+Buglink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1928146
+Tested-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
+Signed-off-by: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
+Message-Id: <20210303122639.20004-4-bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [bc6f28995ff88f5d82c38afcfd65406f0ae375aa]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3409
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/sd/sdhci.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/sd/sdhci.c b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
+index d8a46f307..7de03c6dd 100644
+--- a/hw/sd/sdhci.c
++++ b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
+@@ -768,7 +768,9 @@ static void sdhci_do_adma(SDHCIState *s)
+ 
+         switch (dscr.attr & SDHC_ADMA_ATTR_ACT_MASK) {
+         case SDHC_ADMA_ATTR_ACT_TRAN:  /* data transfer */
++            s->prnsts |= SDHC_DATA_INHIBIT | SDHC_DAT_LINE_ACTIVE;
+             if (s->trnmod & SDHC_TRNS_READ) {
++                s->prnsts |= SDHC_DOING_READ;
+                 while (length) {
+                     if (s->data_count == 0) {
+                         sdbus_read_data(&s->sdbus, s->fifo_buffer, block_size);
+@@ -796,6 +798,7 @@ static void sdhci_do_adma(SDHCIState *s)
+                     }
+                 }
+             } else {
++                s->prnsts |= SDHC_DOING_WRITE;
+                 while (length) {
+                     begin = s->data_count;
+                     if ((length + begin) < block_size) {
+-- 
+2.29.2
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3409_5.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3409_5.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7199056
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3409_5.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From c2298884cf6bcf2b047b4bae5f78432b052b5729 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 3 Mar 2021 20:26:38 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 5/6] hw/sd: sdhci: Limit block size only when SDHC_BLKSIZE
+ register is writable
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The codes to limit the maximum block size is only necessary when
+SDHC_BLKSIZE register is writable.
+
+Tested-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
+Signed-off-by: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
+Message-Id: <20210303122639.20004-5-bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [5cd7aa3451b76bb19c0f6adc2b931f091e5d7fcd]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3409
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/sd/sdhci.c | 14 +++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/sd/sdhci.c b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
+index 7de03c6dd..6c780126e 100644
+--- a/hw/sd/sdhci.c
++++ b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
+@@ -1142,15 +1142,15 @@ sdhci_write(void *opaque, hwaddr offset, uint64_t val, unsigned size)
+         if (!TRANSFERRING_DATA(s->prnsts)) {
+             MASKED_WRITE(s->blksize, mask, extract32(value, 0, 12));
+             MASKED_WRITE(s->blkcnt, mask >> 16, value >> 16);
+-        }
+ 
+-        /* Limit block size to the maximum buffer size */
+-        if (extract32(s->blksize, 0, 12) > s->buf_maxsz) {
+-            qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "%s: Size 0x%x is larger than "
+-                          "the maximum buffer 0x%x\n", __func__, s->blksize,
+-                          s->buf_maxsz);
++            /* Limit block size to the maximum buffer size */
++            if (extract32(s->blksize, 0, 12) > s->buf_maxsz) {
++                qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "%s: Size 0x%x is larger than "
++                              "the maximum buffer 0x%x\n", __func__, s->blksize,
++                              s->buf_maxsz);
+ 
+-            s->blksize = deposit32(s->blksize, 0, 12, s->buf_maxsz);
++                s->blksize = deposit32(s->blksize, 0, 12, s->buf_maxsz);
++            }
+         }
+ 
+         break;
+-- 
+2.29.2
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3409_6.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3409_6.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..624c1f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3409_6.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+From db916870a839346767b6d5ca7d0eed3128ba5fea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 3 Mar 2021 20:26:39 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 6/6] hw/sd: sdhci: Reset the data pointer of s->fifo_buffer[]
+ when a different block size is programmed
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+If the block size is programmed to a different value from the
+previous one, reset the data pointer of s->fifo_buffer[] so that
+s->fifo_buffer[] can be filled in using the new block size in
+the next transfer.
+
+With this fix, the following reproducer:
+
+outl 0xcf8 0x80001010
+outl 0xcfc 0xe0000000
+outl 0xcf8 0x80001001
+outl 0xcfc 0x06000000
+write 0xe000002c 0x1 0x05
+write 0xe0000005 0x1 0x02
+write 0xe0000007 0x1 0x01
+write 0xe0000028 0x1 0x10
+write 0x0 0x1 0x23
+write 0x2 0x1 0x08
+write 0xe000000c 0x1 0x01
+write 0xe000000e 0x1 0x20
+write 0xe000000f 0x1 0x00
+write 0xe000000c 0x1 0x32
+write 0xe0000004 0x2 0x0200
+write 0xe0000028 0x1 0x00
+write 0xe0000003 0x1 0x40
+
+cannot be reproduced with the following QEMU command line:
+
+$ qemu-system-x86_64 -nographic -machine accel=qtest -m 512M \
+      -nodefaults -device sdhci-pci,sd-spec-version=3 \
+      -drive if=sd,index=0,file=null-co://,format=raw,id=mydrive \
+      -device sd-card,drive=mydrive -qtest stdio
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Fixes: CVE-2020-17380
+Fixes: CVE-2020-25085
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3409
+Fixes: d7dfca0807a0 ("hw/sdhci: introduce standard SD host controller")
+Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Reported-by: Cornelius Aschermann (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
+Reported-by: Sergej Schumilo (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
+Reported-by: Simon Wörner (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
+Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1892960
+Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1909418
+Buglink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1928146
+Tested-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
+Message-Id: <20210303122639.20004-6-bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [cffb446e8fd19a14e1634c7a3a8b07be3f01d5c9]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3409
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/sd/sdhci.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/sd/sdhci.c b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
+index 6c780126e..216842420 100644
+--- a/hw/sd/sdhci.c
++++ b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
+@@ -1140,6 +1140,8 @@ sdhci_write(void *opaque, hwaddr offset, uint64_t val, unsigned size)
+         break;
+     case SDHC_BLKSIZE:
+         if (!TRANSFERRING_DATA(s->prnsts)) {
++            uint16_t blksize = s->blksize;
++
+             MASKED_WRITE(s->blksize, mask, extract32(value, 0, 12));
+             MASKED_WRITE(s->blkcnt, mask >> 16, value >> 16);
+ 
+@@ -1151,6 +1153,16 @@ sdhci_write(void *opaque, hwaddr offset, uint64_t val, unsigned size)
+ 
+                 s->blksize = deposit32(s->blksize, 0, 12, s->buf_maxsz);
+             }
++
++            /*
++             * If the block size is programmed to a different value from
++             * the previous one, reset the data pointer of s->fifo_buffer[]
++             * so that s->fifo_buffer[] can be filled in using the new block
++             * size in the next transfer.
++             */
++            if (blksize != s->blksize) {
++                s->data_count = 0;
++            }
+         }
+ 
+         break;
+-- 
+2.29.2
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_1.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5bacd67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+From 4b1988a29d67277d6c8ce1df52975f5616592913 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2021 11:44:36 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 01/10] net: introduce qemu_receive_packet()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Some NIC supports loopback mode and this is done by calling
+nc->info->receive() directly which in fact suppresses the effort of
+reentrancy check that is done in qemu_net_queue_send().
+
+Unfortunately we can't use qemu_net_queue_send() here since for
+loopback there's no sender as peer, so this patch introduce a
+qemu_receive_packet() which is used for implementing loopback mode
+for a NIC with this check.
+
+NIC that supports loopback mode will be converted to this helper.
+
+This is intended to address CVE-2021-3416.
+
+Cc: Prasad J Pandit <ppandit@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [705df5466c98f3efdd2b68d3b31dad86858acad7]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3416
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ include/net/net.h   |  5 +++++
+ include/net/queue.h |  8 ++++++++
+ net/net.c           | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ net/queue.c         | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/net/net.h b/include/net/net.h
+index 778fc787c..03f058ecb 100644
+--- a/include/net/net.h
++++ b/include/net/net.h
+@@ -143,12 +143,17 @@ void *qemu_get_nic_opaque(NetClientState *nc);
+ void qemu_del_net_client(NetClientState *nc);
+ typedef void (*qemu_nic_foreach)(NICState *nic, void *opaque);
+ void qemu_foreach_nic(qemu_nic_foreach func, void *opaque);
++int qemu_can_receive_packet(NetClientState *nc);
+ int qemu_can_send_packet(NetClientState *nc);
+ ssize_t qemu_sendv_packet(NetClientState *nc, const struct iovec *iov,
+                           int iovcnt);
+ ssize_t qemu_sendv_packet_async(NetClientState *nc, const struct iovec *iov,
+                                 int iovcnt, NetPacketSent *sent_cb);
+ ssize_t qemu_send_packet(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, int size);
++ssize_t qemu_receive_packet(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, int size);
++ssize_t qemu_receive_packet_iov(NetClientState *nc,
++                                const struct iovec *iov,
++                                int iovcnt);
+ ssize_t qemu_send_packet_raw(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, int size);
+ ssize_t qemu_send_packet_async(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf,
+                                int size, NetPacketSent *sent_cb);
+diff --git a/include/net/queue.h b/include/net/queue.h
+index c0269bb1d..9f2f289d7 100644
+--- a/include/net/queue.h
++++ b/include/net/queue.h
+@@ -55,6 +55,14 @@ void qemu_net_queue_append_iov(NetQueue *queue,
+ 
+ void qemu_del_net_queue(NetQueue *queue);
+ 
++ssize_t qemu_net_queue_receive(NetQueue *queue,
++                               const uint8_t *data,
++                               size_t size);
++
++ssize_t qemu_net_queue_receive_iov(NetQueue *queue,
++                                   const struct iovec *iov,
++                                   int iovcnt);
++
+ ssize_t qemu_net_queue_send(NetQueue *queue,
+                             NetClientState *sender,
+                             unsigned flags,
+diff --git a/net/net.c b/net/net.c
+index 6a2c3d956..5e15e5d27 100644
+--- a/net/net.c
++++ b/net/net.c
+@@ -528,6 +528,17 @@ int qemu_set_vnet_be(NetClientState *nc, bool is_be)
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
++int qemu_can_receive_packet(NetClientState *nc)
++{
++    if (nc->receive_disabled) {
++        return 0;
++    } else if (nc->info->can_receive &&
++               !nc->info->can_receive(nc)) {
++        return 0;
++    }
++    return 1;
++}
++
+ int qemu_can_send_packet(NetClientState *sender)
+ {
+     int vm_running = runstate_is_running();
+@@ -540,13 +551,7 @@ int qemu_can_send_packet(NetClientState *sender)
+         return 1;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (sender->peer->receive_disabled) {
+-        return 0;
+-    } else if (sender->peer->info->can_receive &&
+-               !sender->peer->info->can_receive(sender->peer)) {
+-        return 0;
+-    }
+-    return 1;
++    return qemu_can_receive_packet(sender->peer);
+ }
+ 
+ static ssize_t filter_receive_iov(NetClientState *nc,
+@@ -679,6 +684,25 @@ ssize_t qemu_send_packet(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, int size)
+     return qemu_send_packet_async(nc, buf, size, NULL);
+ }
+ 
++ssize_t qemu_receive_packet(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, int size)
++{
++    if (!qemu_can_receive_packet(nc)) {
++        return 0;
++    }
++
++    return qemu_net_queue_receive(nc->incoming_queue, buf, size);
++}
++
++ssize_t qemu_receive_packet_iov(NetClientState *nc, const struct iovec *iov,
++                                int iovcnt)
++{
++    if (!qemu_can_receive_packet(nc)) {
++        return 0;
++    }
++
++    return qemu_net_queue_receive_iov(nc->incoming_queue, iov, iovcnt);
++}
++
+ ssize_t qemu_send_packet_raw(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, int size)
+ {
+     return qemu_send_packet_async_with_flags(nc, QEMU_NET_PACKET_FLAG_RAW,
+diff --git a/net/queue.c b/net/queue.c
+index 19e32c80f..c872d51df 100644
+--- a/net/queue.c
++++ b/net/queue.c
+@@ -182,6 +182,28 @@ static ssize_t qemu_net_queue_deliver_iov(NetQueue *queue,
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 
++ssize_t qemu_net_queue_receive(NetQueue *queue,
++                               const uint8_t *data,
++                               size_t size)
++{
++    if (queue->delivering) {
++        return 0;
++    }
++
++    return qemu_net_queue_deliver(queue, NULL, 0, data, size);
++}
++
++ssize_t qemu_net_queue_receive_iov(NetQueue *queue,
++                                   const struct iovec *iov,
++                                   int iovcnt)
++{
++    if (queue->delivering) {
++        return 0;
++    }
++
++    return qemu_net_queue_deliver_iov(queue, NULL, 0, iov, iovcnt);
++}
++
+ ssize_t qemu_net_queue_send(NetQueue *queue,
+                             NetClientState *sender,
+                             unsigned flags,
+-- 
+2.29.2
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_10.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_10.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7deec1a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_10.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 65b851efd3d0280425c202f4e5880c48f8334dae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Date: Mon, 1 Mar 2021 14:35:30 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 10/10] lan9118: switch to use qemu_receive_packet() for
+ loopback
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This patch switches to use qemu_receive_packet() which can detect
+reentrancy and return early.
+
+This is intended to address CVE-2021-3416.
+
+Cc: Prasad J Pandit <ppandit@redhat.com>
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [37cee01784ff0df13e5209517e1b3594a5e792d1]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3416
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/net/lan9118.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/lan9118.c b/hw/net/lan9118.c
+index ab57c02c8..75f18ae2d 100644
+--- a/hw/net/lan9118.c
++++ b/hw/net/lan9118.c
+@@ -669,7 +669,7 @@ static void do_tx_packet(lan9118_state *s)
+     /* FIXME: Honor TX disable, and allow queueing of packets.  */
+     if (s->phy_control & 0x4000)  {
+         /* This assumes the receive routine doesn't touch the VLANClient.  */
+-        lan9118_receive(qemu_get_queue(s->nic), s->txp->data, s->txp->len);
++        qemu_receive_packet(qemu_get_queue(s->nic), s->txp->data, s->txp->len);
+     } else {
+         qemu_send_packet(qemu_get_queue(s->nic), s->txp->data, s->txp->len);
+     }
+-- 
+2.29.2
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_2.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e53e20
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From e2a48a3c7cc33dbbe89f896e0f07462cb04ff6b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2021 12:13:22 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 02/10] e1000: switch to use qemu_receive_packet() for loopback
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This patch switches to use qemu_receive_packet() which can detect
+reentrancy and return early.
+
+This is intended to address CVE-2021-3416.
+
+Cc: Prasad J Pandit <ppandit@redhat.com>
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [1caff0340f49c93d535c6558a5138d20d475315c]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3416
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/net/e1000.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/e1000.c b/hw/net/e1000.c
+index d7d05ae30..cf22c4f07 100644
+--- a/hw/net/e1000.c
++++ b/hw/net/e1000.c
+@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ e1000_send_packet(E1000State *s, const uint8_t *buf, int size)
+ 
+     NetClientState *nc = qemu_get_queue(s->nic);
+     if (s->phy_reg[PHY_CTRL] & MII_CR_LOOPBACK) {
+-        nc->info->receive(nc, buf, size);
++        qemu_receive_packet(nc, buf, size);
+     } else {
+         qemu_send_packet(nc, buf, size);
+     }
+-- 
+2.29.2
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_3.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_3.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3fc469e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_3.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From c041a4da1ff119715e0ccf2d4a7af62568f17b93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2021 12:57:40 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 03/10] dp8393x: switch to use qemu_receive_packet() for
+ loopback packet
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This patch switches to use qemu_receive_packet() which can detect
+reentrancy and return early.
+
+This is intended to address CVE-2021-3416.
+
+Cc: Prasad J Pandit <ppandit@redhat.com>
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [331d2ac9ea307c990dc86e6493e8f0c48d14bb33]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3416
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/net/dp8393x.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/dp8393x.c b/hw/net/dp8393x.c
+index 205c0decc..533a8304d 100644
+--- a/hw/net/dp8393x.c
++++ b/hw/net/dp8393x.c
+@@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ static void dp8393x_do_transmit_packets(dp8393xState *s)
+             s->regs[SONIC_TCR] |= SONIC_TCR_CRSL;
+             if (nc->info->can_receive(nc)) {
+                 s->loopback_packet = 1;
+-                nc->info->receive(nc, s->tx_buffer, tx_len);
++                qemu_receive_packet(nc, s->tx_buffer, tx_len);
+             }
+         } else {
+             /* Transmit packet */
+-- 
+2.29.2
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_4.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_4.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e14f377
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_4.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 9ac5345344b75995bc96d171eaa5dc8d26bf0e21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2021 13:00:01 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 04/10] msf2-mac: switch to use qemu_receive_packet() for
+ loopback
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This patch switches to use qemu_receive_packet() which can detect
+reentrancy and return early.
+
+This is intended to address CVE-2021-3416.
+
+Cc: Prasad J Pandit <ppandit@redhat.com>
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [26194a58f4eb83c5bdf4061a1628508084450ba1]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3416
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/net/msf2-emac.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/msf2-emac.c b/hw/net/msf2-emac.c
+index 32ba9e841..3e6206044 100644
+--- a/hw/net/msf2-emac.c
++++ b/hw/net/msf2-emac.c
+@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static void msf2_dma_tx(MSF2EmacState *s)
+          * R_CFG1 bit 0 is set.
+          */
+         if (s->regs[R_CFG1] & R_CFG1_LB_EN_MASK) {
+-            nc->info->receive(nc, buf, size);
++            qemu_receive_packet(nc, buf, size);
+         } else {
+             qemu_send_packet(nc, buf, size);
+         }
+-- 
+2.29.2
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_5.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_5.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c3f8f97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_5.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From d465dc79c9ee729d91ef086b993e956b1935be69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2021 13:14:35 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 05/10] sungem: switch to use qemu_receive_packet() for
+ loopback
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This patch switches to use qemu_receive_packet() which can detect
+reentrancy and return early.
+
+This is intended to address CVE-2021-3416.
+
+Cc: Prasad J Pandit <ppandit@redhat.com>
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Reviewed-by: Mark Cave-Ayland <mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk>
+Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [8c92060d3c0248bd4d515719a35922cd2391b9b4]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3416
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/net/sungem.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/sungem.c b/hw/net/sungem.c
+index 33c3722df..3684a4d73 100644
+--- a/hw/net/sungem.c
++++ b/hw/net/sungem.c
+@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ static void sungem_send_packet(SunGEMState *s, const uint8_t *buf,
+     NetClientState *nc = qemu_get_queue(s->nic);
+ 
+     if (s->macregs[MAC_XIFCFG >> 2] & MAC_XIFCFG_LBCK) {
+-        nc->info->receive(nc, buf, size);
++        qemu_receive_packet(nc, buf, size);
+     } else {
+         qemu_send_packet(nc, buf, size);
+     }
+-- 
+2.29.2
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_6.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_6.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..855c697
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_6.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From c0010f9b2bafe866fe32e3c2688454bc24147136 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2021 13:27:52 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 06/10] tx_pkt: switch to use qemu_receive_packet_iov() for
+ loopback
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This patch switches to use qemu_receive_receive_iov() which can detect
+reentrancy and return early.
+
+This is intended to address CVE-2021-3416.
+
+Cc: Prasad J Pandit <ppandit@redhat.com>
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [8c552542b81e56ff532dd27ec6e5328954bdda73]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3416
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c b/hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c
+index da262edc3..1f9aa59ec 100644
+--- a/hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c
++++ b/hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c
+@@ -553,7 +553,7 @@ static inline void net_tx_pkt_sendv(struct NetTxPkt *pkt,
+     NetClientState *nc, const struct iovec *iov, int iov_cnt)
+ {
+     if (pkt->is_loopback) {
+-        nc->info->receive_iov(nc, iov, iov_cnt);
++        qemu_receive_packet_iov(nc, iov, iov_cnt);
+     } else {
+         qemu_sendv_packet(nc, iov, iov_cnt);
+     }
+-- 
+2.29.2
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_7.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_7.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e1115d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_7.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 64b38675c728354e4015e4bec3d975cd4cb8a981 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2021 13:47:53 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 07/10] rtl8139: switch to use qemu_receive_packet() for
+ loopback
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This patch switches to use qemu_receive_packet() which can detect
+reentrancy and return early.
+
+This is intended to address CVE-2021-3416.
+
+Cc: Prasad J Pandit <ppandit@redhat.com>
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1910826
+Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [5311fb805a4403bba024e83886fa0e7572265de4]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3416
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/net/rtl8139.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/rtl8139.c b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
+index ba5ace1ab..d2dd03e6a 100644
+--- a/hw/net/rtl8139.c
++++ b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
+@@ -1795,7 +1795,7 @@ static void rtl8139_transfer_frame(RTL8139State *s, uint8_t *buf, int size,
+         }
+ 
+         DPRINTF("+++ transmit loopback mode\n");
+-        rtl8139_do_receive(qemu_get_queue(s->nic), buf, size, do_interrupt);
++        qemu_receive_packet(qemu_get_queue(s->nic), buf, size);
+ 
+         if (iov) {
+             g_free(buf2);
+-- 
+2.29.2
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_8.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_8.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ed71646
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_8.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 023ce62f0a788ad3a8233c7a828554bceeafd031 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Date: Mon, 1 Mar 2021 10:33:34 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 08/10] pcnet: switch to use qemu_receive_packet() for loopback
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This patch switches to use qemu_receive_packet() which can detect
+reentrancy and return early.
+
+This is intended to address CVE-2021-3416.
+
+Cc: Prasad J Pandit <ppandit@redhat.com>
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1917085
+Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [99ccfaa1edafd79f7a3a0ff7b58ae4da7c514928]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3416
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/net/pcnet.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/pcnet.c b/hw/net/pcnet.c
+index f3f18d859..dcd3fc494 100644
+--- a/hw/net/pcnet.c
++++ b/hw/net/pcnet.c
+@@ -1250,7 +1250,7 @@ txagain:
+             if (BCR_SWSTYLE(s) == 1)
+                 add_crc = !GET_FIELD(tmd.status, TMDS, NOFCS);
+             s->looptest = add_crc ? PCNET_LOOPTEST_CRC : PCNET_LOOPTEST_NOCRC;
+-            pcnet_receive(qemu_get_queue(s->nic), s->buffer, s->xmit_pos);
++            qemu_receive_packet(qemu_get_queue(s->nic), s->buffer, s->xmit_pos);
+             s->looptest = 0;
+         } else {
+             if (s->nic) {
+-- 
+2.29.2
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_9.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_9.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39d32b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3416_9.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From ecf7e62bb2cb02c9bd40082504ae376f3e19ffd2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Date: Mon, 1 Mar 2021 14:33:43 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 09/10] cadence_gem: switch to use qemu_receive_packet() for
+ loopback
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This patch switches to use qemu_receive_packet() which can detect
+reentrancy and return early.
+
+This is intended to address CVE-2021-3416.
+
+Cc: Prasad J Pandit <ppandit@redhat.com>
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [e73adfbeec9d4e008630c814759052ed945c3fed]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3416
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/net/cadence_gem.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/cadence_gem.c b/hw/net/cadence_gem.c
+index 7a534691f..43b760e3f 100644
+--- a/hw/net/cadence_gem.c
++++ b/hw/net/cadence_gem.c
+@@ -1275,8 +1275,8 @@ static void gem_transmit(CadenceGEMState *s)
+                 /* Send the packet somewhere */
+                 if (s->phy_loop || (s->regs[GEM_NWCTRL] &
+                                     GEM_NWCTRL_LOCALLOOP)) {
+-                    gem_receive(qemu_get_queue(s->nic), s->tx_packet,
+-                                total_bytes);
++                    qemu_receive_packet(qemu_get_queue(s->nic), s->tx_packet,
++                                        total_bytes);
+                 } else {
+                     qemu_send_packet(qemu_get_queue(s->nic), s->tx_packet,
+                                      total_bytes);
+-- 
+2.29.2
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_5.2.0.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_5.2.0.bb
index 7afa66e..f265204 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_5.2.0.bb
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_5.2.0.bb
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
     fdt sdl kvm \
     ${@bb.utils.filter('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'alsa xen', d)} \
     ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'opengl', 'virglrenderer glx', '', d)} \
+    ${@bb.utils.filter('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'seccomp', d)} \
 "
 PACKAGECONFIG_class-nativesdk ??= "fdt sdl kvm \
     ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'opengl', 'virglrenderer glx', '', d)} \