poky: sumo refresh 874976b..45ef387
Update poky to sumo HEAD.
Alexander Kanavin (1):
openssl: fix upstream version check for 1.0 version
Andre McCurdy (19):
openssl_1.1: avoid using += with an over-ride
openssl_1.1: minor recipe formatting tweaks etc
openssl_1.0: merge openssl10.inc into the openssl_1.0.2o.bb recipe
openssl_1.0: minor recipe formatting tweaks etc
openssl_1.0: drop curly brackets from shell local variables
openssl_1.0: fix cryptodev-linux PACKAGECONFIG support
openssl_1.0: drop leading "-" from no-ssl3 config option
openssl_1.0: avoid running make twice for target do_compile()
openssl: remove uclibc remnants
openssl: support musl-x32 build
openssl: minor indent fixes
openssl_1.0: drop obsolete ca.patch
openssl_1.0: drop obsolete exporting of AS, EX_LIBS and DIRS
openssl_1.0: drop unmaintained darwin support
openssl_1.0: add PACKAGECONFIG option to control manpages
openssl_1.0: squash whitespace in CC_INFO
openssl: fix missing dependency on hostperl-runtime-native
openssl_1.0: drop unnecessary dependency on makedepend-native
openssl_1.0: drop unnecessary call to perlpath.pl from do_configure()
Andrej Valek (3):
openssl-1.1: fix c_rehash perl errors
openssl: update 1.0.2o -> 1.0.2p
openssl: update 1.1.0h -> 1.1.0i
Anuj Mittal (1):
wic/qemux86: don't pass ip parameter to kernel in wks
Changqing Li (1):
unzip: fix CVE-2018-1000035
Hongxu Jia (2):
nasm: fix CVE-2018-8883 & CVE-2018-8882 & CVE-2018-10316
patch: fix CVE-2018-6952
Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa (19):
libvorbis: CVE-2017-14160 CVE-2018-10393
libvorbis: CVE-2018-10392
flac: CVE-2017-6888
libarchive: CVE-2017-14503
libsndfile1: CVE-2017-14245 CVE-2017-14246
libsndfile1: CVE-2017-14634
coreutils: CVE-2017-18018
libgcrypt: CVE-2018-0495
git: CVE-2018-11235
gnupg: CVE-2018-12020
shadow: CVE-2018-7169
procps: CVE-2018-1124
python: CVE-2018-1000030
qemu: CVE-2018-7550
qemu: CVE-2018-12617
perl: CVE-2018-6798
perl: CVE-2018-6797
perl: CVE-2018-6913
perl: CVE-2018-12015
Joshua Watt (2):
alsa-lib: Cleanup packaging
swig: Remove superfluous python dependency
Ovidiu Panait (1):
openssl-nativesdk: Fix "can't open config file" warning
Ross Burton (6):
bzip2: use Yocto Project mirror for SRC_URI
classes: sanity-check LIC_FILES_CHKSUM
openssl: disable ccache usage
unzip: fix symlink problem
bitbake: utils/md5_file: don't iterate line-by-line
bitbake: checksum: sanity check path when recursively checksumming
Change-Id: I262a451f483cb276343ae6f02c272af053d33d7a
Signed-off-by: Brad Bishop <bradleyb@fuzziesquirrel.com>
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/bzip2/bzip2_1.0.6.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/bzip2/bzip2_1.0.6.bb
index de668d6..acbf80a 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/bzip2/bzip2_1.0.6.bb
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/bzip2/bzip2_1.0.6.bb
@@ -2,13 +2,13 @@
DESCRIPTION = "bzip2 compresses files using the Burrows-Wheeler block-sorting text compression algorithm, and \
Huffman coding. Compression is generally considerably better than that achieved by more conventional \
LZ77/LZ78-based compressors, and approaches the performance of the PPM family of statistical compressors."
-HOMEPAGE = "http://www.bzip.org/"
+HOMEPAGE = "https://sourceware.org/bzip2/"
SECTION = "console/utils"
LICENSE = "bzip2"
LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;beginline=8;endline=37;md5=40d9d1eb05736d1bfc86cfdd9106e6b2"
PR = "r5"
-SRC_URI = "http://www.bzip.org/${PV}/${BP}.tar.gz \
+SRC_URI = "http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/mirror/sources/${BP}.tar.gz \
file://fix-bunzip2-qt-returns-0-for-corrupt-archives.patch \
file://configure.ac;subdir=${BP} \
file://Makefile.am;subdir=${BP} \
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "00b516f4704d4a7cb50a1d97e6e8e15b"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "a2848f34fcd5d6cf47def00461fcb528a0484d8edef8208d6d2e2909dc61d9cd"
-UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://www.bzip.org/downloads.html"
+UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://www.sourceware.org/bzip2/"
PACKAGES =+ "libbz2"
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14503.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14503.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..42fa68c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14503.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 2c8c83b9731ff822fad6cc8c670ea5519c366a14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Joerg Sonnenberger <joerg@bec.de>
+Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2018 21:14:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Reject LHA archive entries with negative size.
+
+CVE: CVE-2017-14503
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/2c8c83b9731ff822fad6cc8c670ea5519c366a14]
+
+Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <jkrishnanjanappa@mvista.com>
+---
+ libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c
+index b8ef4ae1..95c99bb1 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c
+@@ -701,6 +701,12 @@ archive_read_format_lha_read_header(struct archive_read *a,
+ * Prepare variables used to read a file content.
+ */
+ lha->entry_bytes_remaining = lha->compsize;
++ if (lha->entry_bytes_remaining < 0) {
++ archive_set_error(&a->archive,
++ ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
++ "Invalid LHa entry size");
++ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
++ }
+ lha->entry_offset = 0;
+ lha->entry_crc_calculated = 0;
+
+--
+2.13.3
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.3.2.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.3.2.bb
index 5daca27..3269716 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.3.2.bb
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.3.2.bb
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
file://CVE-2017-14166.patch \
file://CVE-2017-14502.patch \
file://non-recursive-extract-and-list.patch \
+ file://CVE-2017-14503.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "4583bd6b2ebf7e0e8963d90879eb1b27"
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/CVE-2018-1124.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/CVE-2018-1124.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc78faf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/CVE-2018-1124.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+From bdd058a0e676d2f013027fcfb2b344c313112a50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
+Date: Thu, 1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 074/126] proc/readproc.c: Fix bugs and overflows in
+ file2strvec().
+
+Note: this is by far the most important and complex patch of the whole
+series, please review it carefully; thank you very much!
+
+For this patch, we decided to keep the original function's design and
+skeleton, to avoid regressions and behavior changes, while fixing the
+various bugs and overflows. And like the "Harden file2str()" patch, this
+patch does not fail when about to overflow, but truncates instead: there
+is information available about this process, so return it to the caller;
+also, we used INT_MAX as a limit, but a lower limit could be used.
+
+The easy changes:
+
+- Replace sprintf() with snprintf() (and check for truncation).
+
+- Replace "if (n == 0 && rbuf == 0)" with "if (n <= 0 && tot <= 0)" and
+ do break instead of return: it simplifies the code (only one place to
+ handle errors), and also guarantees that in the while loop either n or
+ tot is > 0 (or both), even if n is reset to 0 when about to overflow.
+
+- Remove the "if (n < 0)" block in the while loop: it is (and was) dead
+ code, since we enter the while loop only if n >= 0.
+
+- Rewrite the missing-null-terminator detection: in the original
+ function, if the size of the file is a multiple of 2047, a null-
+ terminator is appended even if the file is already null-terminated.
+
+- Replace "if (n <= 0 && !end_of_file)" with "if (n < 0 || tot <= 0)":
+ originally, it was equivalent to "if (n < 0)", but we added "tot <= 0"
+ to handle the first break of the while loop, and to guarantee that in
+ the rest of the function tot is > 0.
+
+- Double-force ("belt and suspenders") the null-termination of rbuf:
+ this is (and was) essential to the correctness of the function.
+
+- Replace the final "while" loop with a "for" loop that behaves just
+ like the preceding "for" loop: in the original function, this would
+ lead to unexpected results (for example, if rbuf is |\0|A|\0|, this
+ would return the array {"",NULL} but should return {"","A",NULL}; and
+ if rbuf is |A|\0|B| (should never happen because rbuf should be null-
+ terminated), this would make room for two pointers in ret, but would
+ write three pointers to ret).
+
+The hard changes:
+
+- Prevent the integer overflow of tot in the while loop, but unlike
+ file2str(), file2strvec() cannot let tot grow until it almost reaches
+ INT_MAX, because it needs more space for the pointers: this is why we
+ introduced ARG_LEN, which also guarantees that we can add "align" and
+ a few sizeof(char*)s to tot without overflowing.
+
+- Prevent the integer overflow of "tot + c + align": when INT_MAX is
+ (almost) reached, we write the maximal safe amount of pointers to ret
+ (ARG_LEN guarantees that there is always space for *ret = rbuf and the
+ NULL terminator).
+[carnil: backport for 3.3.9: Add include for limits.h and use of MAX_INT]
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-1124
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/procps-ng/procps/commit/36c350f07c75aabf747fb833f52a234ae5781b20]
+
+Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <jkrishnanjanappa@mvista.com>
+---
+ proc/readproc.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
+ 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
+
+diff -Naurp procps-ng-3.3.12_org/proc/readproc.c procps-ng-3.3.12/proc/readproc.c
+--- procps-ng-3.3.12_org/proc/readproc.c 2016-07-09 14:49:25.825306872 -0700
++++ procps-ng-3.3.12/proc/readproc.c 2018-07-24 00:46:49.366202531 -0700
+@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
+ #include <dirent.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <limits.h>
+ #ifdef WITH_SYSTEMD
+ #include <systemd/sd-login.h>
+ #endif
+--- a/proc/readproc.c
++++ b/proc/readproc.c
+@@ -600,11 +601,12 @@ static int file2str(const char *director
+
+ static char** file2strvec(const char* directory, const char* what) {
+ char buf[2048]; /* read buf bytes at a time */
+- char *p, *rbuf = 0, *endbuf, **q, **ret;
++ char *p, *rbuf = 0, *endbuf, **q, **ret, *strp;
+ int fd, tot = 0, n, c, end_of_file = 0;
+ int align;
+
+- sprintf(buf, "%s/%s", directory, what);
++ const int len = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", directory, what);
++ if(len <= 0 || (size_t)len >= sizeof buf) return NULL;
+ fd = open(buf, O_RDONLY, 0);
+ if(fd==-1) return NULL;
+
+@@ -612,18 +614,23 @@ static char** file2strvec(const char* di
+ while ((n = read(fd, buf, sizeof buf - 1)) >= 0) {
+ if (n < (int)(sizeof buf - 1))
+ end_of_file = 1;
+- if (n == 0 && rbuf == 0) {
+- close(fd);
+- return NULL; /* process died between our open and read */
++ if (n <= 0 && tot <= 0) { /* nothing read now, nothing read before */
++ break; /* process died between our open and read */
+ }
+- if (n < 0) {
+- if (rbuf)
+- free(rbuf);
+- close(fd);
+- return NULL; /* read error */
++ /* ARG_LEN is our guesstimated median length of a command-line argument
++ or environment variable (the minimum is 1, the maximum is 131072) */
++ #define ARG_LEN 64
++ if (tot >= INT_MAX / (ARG_LEN + (int)sizeof(char*)) * ARG_LEN - n) {
++ end_of_file = 1; /* integer overflow: null-terminate and break */
++ n = 0; /* but tot > 0 */
+ }
+- if (end_of_file && (n == 0 || buf[n-1]))/* last read char not null */
++ #undef ARG_LEN
++ if (end_of_file &&
++ ((n > 0 && buf[n-1] != '\0') || /* last read char not null */
++ (n <= 0 && rbuf[tot-1] != '\0'))) /* last read char not null */
+ buf[n++] = '\0'; /* so append null-terminator */
++
++ if (n <= 0) break; /* unneeded (end_of_file = 1) but avoid realloc */
+ rbuf = xrealloc(rbuf, tot + n); /* allocate more memory */
+ memcpy(rbuf + tot, buf, n); /* copy buffer into it */
+ tot += n; /* increment total byte ctr */
+@@ -631,29 +638,34 @@ static char** file2strvec(const char* di
+ break;
+ }
+ close(fd);
+- if (n <= 0 && !end_of_file) {
++ if (n < 0 || tot <= 0) { /* error, or nothing read */
+ if (rbuf) free(rbuf);
+ return NULL; /* read error */
+ }
++ rbuf[tot-1] = '\0'; /* belt and suspenders (the while loop did it, too) */
+ endbuf = rbuf + tot; /* count space for pointers */
+ align = (sizeof(char*)-1) - ((tot + sizeof(char*)-1) & (sizeof(char*)-1));
+- for (c = 0, p = rbuf; p < endbuf; p++) {
+- if (!*p || *p == '\n')
++ c = sizeof(char*); /* one extra for NULL term */
++ for (p = rbuf; p < endbuf; p++) {
++ if (!*p || *p == '\n') {
++ if (c >= INT_MAX - (tot + (int)sizeof(char*) + align)) break;
+ c += sizeof(char*);
++ }
+ if (*p == '\n')
+ *p = 0;
+ }
+- c += sizeof(char*); /* one extra for NULL term */
+
+ rbuf = xrealloc(rbuf, tot + c + align); /* make room for ptrs AT END */
+ endbuf = rbuf + tot; /* addr just past data buf */
+ q = ret = (char**) (endbuf+align); /* ==> free(*ret) to dealloc */
+- *q++ = p = rbuf; /* point ptrs to the strings */
+- endbuf--; /* do not traverse final NUL */
+- while (++p < endbuf)
+- if (!*p) /* NUL char implies that */
+- *q++ = p+1; /* next string -> next char */
+-
++ for (strp = p = rbuf; p < endbuf; p++) {
++ if (!*p) { /* NUL char implies that */
++ if (c < 2 * (int)sizeof(char*)) break;
++ c -= sizeof(char*);
++ *q++ = strp; /* point ptrs to the strings */
++ strp = p+1; /* next string -> next char */
++ }
++ }
+ *q = 0; /* null ptr list terminator */
+ return ret;
+ }
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps_3.3.12.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps_3.3.12.bb
index ecf215f..6e15b0a 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps_3.3.12.bb
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps_3.3.12.bb
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
SRC_URI = "http://downloads.sourceforge.net/project/procps-ng/Production/procps-ng-${PV}.tar.xz \
file://sysctl.conf \
+ file://CVE-2018-1124.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "957e42e8b193490b2111252e4a2b443c"
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/CVE-2018-7169.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/CVE-2018-7169.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..36887d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/CVE-2018-7169.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+From fb28c99b8a66ff2605c5cb96abc0a4d975f92de0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
+Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 23:49:40 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] newgidmap: enforce setgroups=deny if self-mapping a group
+
+This is necessary to match the kernel-side policy of "self-mapping in a
+user namespace is fine, but you cannot drop groups" -- a policy that was
+created in order to stop user namespaces from allowing trivial privilege
+escalation by dropping supplementary groups that were "blacklisted" from
+certain paths.
+
+This is the simplest fix for the underlying issue, and effectively makes
+it so that unless a user has a valid mapping set in /etc/subgid (which
+only administrators can modify) -- and they are currently trying to use
+that mapping -- then /proc/$pid/setgroups will be set to deny. This
+workaround is only partial, because ideally it should be possible to set
+an "allow_setgroups" or "deny_setgroups" flag in /etc/subgid to allow
+administrators to further restrict newgidmap(1).
+
+We also don't write anything in the "allow" case because "allow" is the
+default, and users may have already written "deny" even if they
+technically are allowed to use setgroups. And we don't write anything if
+the setgroups policy is already "deny".
+
+Ref: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/shadow/+bug/1729357
+Fixes: CVE-2018-7169
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/fb28c99b8a66ff2605c5cb96abc0a4d975f92de0]
+Reported-by: Craig Furman <craig.furman89@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
+Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <jkrishnanjanappa@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/newgidmap.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 80 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/newgidmap.c b/src/newgidmap.c
+index b1e33513..59a2e75c 100644
+--- a/src/newgidmap.c
++++ b/src/newgidmap.c
+@@ -46,32 +46,37 @@
+ */
+ const char *Prog;
+
+-static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range)
++
++static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range, bool *allow_setgroups)
+ {
+ /* An empty range is invalid */
+ if (range->count == 0)
+ return false;
+
+- /* Test /etc/subgid */
+- if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count))
++ /* Test /etc/subgid. If the mapping is valid then we allow setgroups. */
++ if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count)) {
++ *allow_setgroups = true;
+ return true;
++ }
+
+- /* Allow a process to map it's own gid */
+- if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower))
++ /* Allow a process to map its own gid. */
++ if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower)) {
++ /* noop -- if setgroups is enabled already we won't disable it. */
+ return true;
++ }
+
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ static void verify_ranges(struct passwd *pw, int ranges,
+- struct map_range *mappings)
++ struct map_range *mappings, bool *allow_setgroups)
+ {
+ struct map_range *mapping;
+ int idx;
+
+ mapping = mappings;
+ for (idx = 0; idx < ranges; idx++, mapping++) {
+- if (!verify_range(pw, mapping)) {
++ if (!verify_range(pw, mapping, allow_setgroups)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: gid range [%lu-%lu) -> [%lu-%lu) not allowed\n"),
+ Prog,
+ mapping->upper,
+@@ -89,6 +94,70 @@ static void usage(void)
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
++void write_setgroups(int proc_dir_fd, bool allow_setgroups)
++{
++ int setgroups_fd;
++ char *policy, policy_buffer[4096];
++
++ /*
++ * Default is "deny", and any "allow" will out-rank a "deny". We don't
++ * forcefully write an "allow" here because the process we are writing
++ * mappings for may have already set themselves to "deny" (and "allow"
++ * is the default anyway). So allow_setgroups == true is a noop.
++ */
++ policy = "deny\n";
++ if (allow_setgroups)
++ return;
++
++ setgroups_fd = openat(proc_dir_fd, "setgroups", O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC);
++ if (setgroups_fd < 0) {
++ /*
++ * If it's an ENOENT then we are on too old a kernel for the setgroups
++ * code to exist. Emit a warning and bail on this.
++ */
++ if (ENOENT == errno) {
++ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: kernel doesn't support setgroups restrictions\n"), Prog);
++ goto out;
++ }
++ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: couldn't open process setgroups: %s\n"),
++ Prog,
++ strerror(errno));
++ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Check whether the policy is already what we want. /proc/self/setgroups
++ * is write-once, so attempting to write after it's already written to will
++ * fail.
++ */
++ if (read(setgroups_fd, policy_buffer, sizeof(policy_buffer)) < 0) {
++ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to read setgroups: %s\n"),
++ Prog,
++ strerror(errno));
++ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++ }
++ if (!strncmp(policy_buffer, policy, strlen(policy)))
++ goto out;
++
++ /* Write the policy. */
++ if (lseek(setgroups_fd, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
++ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to seek setgroups: %s\n"),
++ Prog,
++ strerror(errno));
++ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++ }
++ if (dprintf(setgroups_fd, "%s", policy) < 0) {
++ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to setgroups %s policy: %s\n"),
++ Prog,
++ policy,
++ strerror(errno));
++ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++ }
++
++out:
++ close(setgroups_fd);
++}
++
+ /*
+ * newgidmap - Set the gid_map for the specified process
+ */
+@@ -103,6 +172,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ struct stat st;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ int written;
++ bool allow_setgroups = false;
+
+ Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
+
+@@ -145,7 +215,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ (unsigned long) getuid ()));
+ return EXIT_FAILURE;
+ }
+-
++
+ /* Get the effective uid and effective gid of the target process */
+ if (fstat(proc_dir_fd, &st) < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for target %u\n"),
+@@ -177,8 +247,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ if (!mappings)
+ usage();
+
+- verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings);
++ verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings, &allow_setgroups);
+
++ write_setgroups(proc_dir_fd, allow_setgroups);
+ write_mapping(proc_dir_fd, ranges, mappings, "gid_map");
+ sub_gid_close();
+
+--
+2.13.3
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow.inc b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow.inc
index 6efe4a9..9691c38 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow.inc
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow.inc
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
file://0001-shadow-CVE-2017-12424 \
file://CVE-2017-2616.patch \
${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'pam', '${PAM_SRC_URI}', '', d)} \
+ file://CVE-2018-7169.patch \
"
SRC_URI_append_class-target = " \
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/0001-unzip-fix-CVE-2018-1000035.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/0001-unzip-fix-CVE-2018-1000035.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..37289d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/0001-unzip-fix-CVE-2018-1000035.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From 349f566e6e757458843fa164a0f0584280e1501e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
+Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2018 16:20:53 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] unzip: fix CVE-2018-1000035
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-1000035
+
+backport from unzip6.10c23
+
+Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
+---
+ fileio.c | 11 ++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/fileio.c b/fileio.c
+index 36bfea3..7605a29 100644
+--- a/fileio.c
++++ b/fileio.c
+@@ -1582,6 +1582,8 @@ int UZ_EXP UzpPassword (pG, rcnt, pwbuf, size, zfn, efn)
+ int r = IZ_PW_ENTERED;
+ char *m;
+ char *prompt;
++ char *ep;
++ char *zp;
+
+ #ifndef REENTRANT
+ /* tell picky compilers to shut up about "unused variable" warnings */
+@@ -1590,9 +1592,12 @@ int UZ_EXP UzpPassword (pG, rcnt, pwbuf, size, zfn, efn)
+
+ if (*rcnt == 0) { /* First call for current entry */
+ *rcnt = 2;
+- if ((prompt = (char *)malloc(2*FILNAMSIZ + 15)) != (char *)NULL) {
+- sprintf(prompt, LoadFarString(PasswPrompt),
+- FnFilter1(zfn), FnFilter2(efn));
++ zp = FnFilter1( zfn);
++ ep = FnFilter2( efn);
++ prompt = (char *)malloc( /* Slightly too long (2* "%s"). */
++ sizeof( PasswPrompt)+ strlen( zp)+ strlen( ep));
++ if (prompt != (char *)NULL) {
++ sprintf(prompt, LoadFarString(PasswPrompt), zp, ep);
+ m = prompt;
+ } else
+ m = (char *)LoadFarString(PasswPrompt2);
+--
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/symlink.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/symlink.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a38f6f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/symlink.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+Unzip doesn't handle large zip files well and crashes:
+
+"This only happens if you have more then 16k entries and when one of
+the 16k entry infos is reused it happend to be previously used for
+a symlink entry."
+
+This patch is taken from Fedora (https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=972427)
+
+Upstream-Status: Pending (upstream is dead)
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
+
+--- unzip60/process.c.sav 2013-06-09 12:08:57.070392264 +0200
++++ unzip60/process.c 2013-06-09 12:10:08.641696988 +0200
+@@ -1751,6 +1751,12 @@
+ = (G.crec.general_purpose_bit_flag & (1 << 11)) == (1 << 11);
+ #endif
+
++#ifdef SYMLINKS
++ /* Initialize the symlink flag, may be set by the platform-specific
++ mapattr function. */
++ G.pInfo->symlink = 0;
++#endif
++
+ return PK_COOL;
+
+ } /* end function process_cdir_file_hdr() */
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb
index 105d048..a47491e 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
file://fix-security-format.patch \
file://18-cve-2014-9913-unzip-buffer-overflow.patch \
file://19-cve-2016-9844-zipinfo-buffer-overflow.patch \
+ file://symlink.patch \
+ file://0001-unzip-fix-CVE-2018-1000035.patch \
"
UPSTREAM_VERSION_UNKNOWN = "1"