blob: 6344f387279170991df8b5911c735c29965c650c [file] [log] [blame]
diff --git a/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c b/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
index 0fabf98..69511d1 100644
--- a/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
+++ b/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
@@ -3343,6 +3343,39 @@ static TPM_RESULT execute_TPM_ParentSignEK(TPM_REQUEST *req, TPM_RESPONSE *rsp)
return res;
}
+static TPM_RESULT execute_TPM_DeepQuote(TPM_REQUEST *req, TPM_RESPONSE *rsp)
+{
+ TPM_NONCE nonce;
+ TPM_RESULT res;
+ UINT32 sigSize;
+ BYTE *sig;
+ BYTE *ptr;
+ UINT32 len;
+ TPM_PCR_SELECTION myPCR;
+ TPM_PCR_SELECTION ptPCR;
+
+ tpm_compute_in_param_digest(req);
+
+ ptr = req->param;
+ len = req->paramSize;
+ if (tpm_unmarshal_TPM_NONCE(&ptr, &len, &nonce)
+ || tpm_unmarshal_TPM_PCR_SELECTION(&ptr, &len, &myPCR)
+ || tpm_unmarshal_TPM_PCR_SELECTION(&ptr, &len, &ptPCR)
+ || len != 0) return TPM_BAD_PARAMETER;
+
+ res = TPM_DeepQuote(&nonce, &myPCR, &ptPCR, &req->auth1, &sigSize, &sig);
+ if (res != TPM_SUCCESS) return res;
+ rsp->paramSize = len = sigSize;
+ rsp->param = ptr = tpm_malloc(len);
+ if (ptr == NULL || tpm_marshal_BLOB(&ptr, &len, sig, sigSize)) {
+ tpm_free(rsp->param);
+ res = TPM_FAIL;
+ }
+ tpm_free(sig);
+
+ return res;
+}
+
static void tpm_setup_rsp_auth(TPM_COMMAND_CODE ordinal, TPM_RESPONSE *rsp)
{
tpm_hmac_ctx_t hmac;
@@ -4098,6 +4131,11 @@ void tpm_execute_command(TPM_REQUEST *req, TPM_RESPONSE *rsp)
res = execute_TPM_ParentSignEK(req, rsp);
break;
+ case TPM_ORD_DeepQuote:
+ debug("[TPM_ORD_DeepQuote]");
+ res = execute_TPM_DeepQuote(req, rsp);
+ break;
+
default:
#ifdef MTM_EMULATOR
res = mtm_execute_command(req, rsp);
diff --git a/tpm/tpm_commands.h b/tpm/tpm_commands.h
index 7fef934..328d1be 100644
--- a/tpm/tpm_commands.h
+++ b/tpm/tpm_commands.h
@@ -3071,6 +3071,25 @@ TPM_RESULT TPM_ParentSignEK(
BYTE **sig
);
+/**
+ * TPM_DeepQuote - gets a hardware TPM quote of a vTPM's PCRs
+ * @externalData: [in] AntiReplay nonce to prevent replay of messages
+ * @myPCR: [in] PCR selection for the virtual TPM
+ * @ptPCR: [in] PCR selection for the hardware TPM
+ * @auth1: [in, out] Authorization protocol parameters
+ * @sigSize: [out] The length of the returned digital signature
+ * @sig: [out] The resulting digital signature and PCR values
+ * Returns: TPM_SUCCESS on success, a TPM error code otherwise.
+ */
+TPM_RESULT TPM_DeepQuote(
+ TPM_NONCE *externalData,
+ TPM_PCR_SELECTION *myPCR,
+ TPM_PCR_SELECTION *ptPCR,
+ TPM_AUTH *auth1,
+ UINT32 *sigSize,
+ BYTE **sig
+);
+
/*
* Error handling
* [tpm_error.c]
diff --git a/tpm/tpm_credentials.c b/tpm/tpm_credentials.c
index 01f29e6..c0d62e7 100644
--- a/tpm/tpm_credentials.c
+++ b/tpm/tpm_credentials.c
@@ -211,3 +211,49 @@ TPM_RESULT TPM_ParentSignEK(TPM_NONCE *externalData, TPM_PCR_SELECTION *sel,
free_TPM_PUBKEY(pubKey);
return res;
}
+
+static const BYTE dquot_hdr[] = {
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 'D', 'Q', 'U', 'T'
+};
+
+TPM_RESULT TPM_DeepQuote(TPM_NONCE *externalData, TPM_PCR_SELECTION *myPCR,
+ TPM_PCR_SELECTION *ptPCR, TPM_AUTH *auth1,
+ UINT32 *sigSize, BYTE **sig)
+{
+ TPM_RESULT res;
+ TPM_DIGEST hres;
+ TPM_PCR_INFO_SHORT pcrData;
+ tpm_sha1_ctx_t ctx;
+ BYTE *buf, *ptr;
+ UINT32 size, len;
+
+ info("TPM_DeepQuote()");
+
+ res = tpm_verify_auth(auth1, tpmData.permanent.data.ownerAuth, TPM_KH_OWNER);
+ if (res != TPM_SUCCESS) return res;
+
+ res = tpm_compute_pcr_digest(myPCR, &pcrData.digestAtRelease, NULL);
+ if (res != TPM_SUCCESS) return res;
+
+ pcrData.pcrSelection.sizeOfSelect = myPCR->sizeOfSelect;
+ memcpy(pcrData.pcrSelection.pcrSelect, myPCR->pcrSelect, myPCR->sizeOfSelect);
+ pcrData.localityAtRelease = 1 << tpmData.stany.flags.localityModifier;
+
+ size = len = sizeof_TPM_PCR_INFO_SHORT(pcrData);
+ buf = ptr = tpm_malloc(size);
+ if (buf == NULL) return TPM_NOSPACE;
+ if (tpm_marshal_TPM_PCR_INFO_SHORT(&ptr, &len, &pcrData))
+ return TPM_FAIL;
+
+ tpm_sha1_init(&ctx);
+ tpm_sha1_update(&ctx, dquot_hdr, 8);
+ tpm_sha1_update(&ctx, externalData->nonce, 20);
+ tpm_sha1_update(&ctx, buf, size);
+ tpm_sha1_final(&ctx, hres.digest);
+
+ tpm_free(buf);
+
+ res = VTPM_GetParentQuote(&hres, ptPCR, sigSize, sig);
+
+ return res;
+}
diff --git a/tpm/tpm_structures.h b/tpm/tpm_structures.h
index b0f4625..dfb1894 100644
--- a/tpm/tpm_structures.h
+++ b/tpm/tpm_structures.h
@@ -660,6 +660,42 @@ typedef struct tdTPM_CMK_MA_APPROVAL {
/* VTPM-only commands: */
/*
+ * Deep Quote - Create quote of PCRs
+ * Input:
+ * TPM_TAG tag TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
+ * UINT32 paramSize Total size of request
+ * TPM_COMMAND_CODE ordinal TPM_ORD_DeepQuote
+ * TPM_NONCE externData 20 bytes of external data
+ * TPM_PCR_SELECTION vtSel PCR selection for virtual TPM
+ * TPM_PCR_SELECTION ptSel PCR selection for physical TPM
+ * ---
+ * UINT32 authHandle Owner authorization session (OIAP)
+ * TPM_NONCE nonceOdd Nonce for authHandle
+ * BOOL continueAuth Continue flag for authHandle
+ * TPM_AUTHDATA privAuth Authorization digest for command
+ *
+ * Output:
+ * TPM_TAG tag TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
+ * UINT32 paramSize Total size of response
+ * TPM_RESULT returnCode Return code of the operation
+ * BYTE[] sig Signature provided by physical TPM
+ * TPM_PCRVALUE[] pcrValue Values of hardware PCRs used in the quote
+ * ---
+ * TPM_NONCE nonceEven Nonce for authHandle
+ * BOOL continueAuth Continue flag for authHandle
+ * TPM_AUTHDATA resAuth Authorization digest for response
+ *
+ * The values of the virutal TPM's PCRs are not included in the response.
+ * The signature is a standard TPM_Quote response from the physical TPM; its
+ * externalData is the SHA1 hash of the following structure:
+ * TPM_STRUCT_VER version MUST be 0.0.0.0
+ * BYTE[4] fixed MUST be the string "DQUT"
+ * TPM_NONCE externData From input to the deep quote
+ * TPM_PCR_INFO_SHORT pcrData Virtual TPM's PCRs
+ */
+#define TPM_ORD_DeepQuote (TPM_VENDOR_COMMAND | TPM_ORD_Quote)
+
+/*
* ParentSignEK - Proof of fresh provisioning and EK value
*
* Input: