Revert "libpam: update 1.3.1 -> 1.5.1"

This reverts commit b0384720a46fb25c4ad180e3f256ffdeb53dc8a6.

OpenBMC is not ready for the removal of pam_cracklib and pam_tally2.
Until code is ready to move to new libs in libpam_1.5, carry a revert
in OpenBMC to stay at libpam_1.3.

openbmc/openbmc#3750 tracks this work

Signed-off-by: Andrew Geissler <geissonator@yahoo.com>
Change-Id: I8da478dd1965f52d3a21e5274a96bd16e95bc7f9
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0001-modules-pam_namespace-Makefile.am-correctly-install-.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0001-modules-pam_namespace-Makefile.am-correctly-install-.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b41d1e5..0000000
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/0001-modules-pam_namespace-Makefile.am-correctly-install-.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-From e2db4082f6b988f1d5803028e9e47aee5f3519ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alexander Kanavin <alex.kanavin@gmail.com>
-Date: Sun, 27 Dec 2020 00:30:45 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] modules/pam_namespace/Makefile.am: correctly install systemd
- unit file
-
-Upstream-Status: Pending
-Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin <alex.kanavin@gmail.com>
----
- modules/pam_namespace/Makefile.am | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/Makefile.am b/modules/pam_namespace/Makefile.am
-index 21e1b33..ddd5fc0 100644
---- a/modules/pam_namespace/Makefile.am
-+++ b/modules/pam_namespace/Makefile.am
-@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ TESTS = $(dist_check_SCRIPTS)
- securelibdir = $(SECUREDIR)
- secureconfdir = $(SCONFIGDIR)
- namespaceddir = $(SCONFIGDIR)/namespace.d
--servicedir = $(prefix)/lib/systemd/system
-+servicedir = /lib/systemd/system
- 
- AM_CFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/libpam/include -I$(top_srcdir)/libpamc/include \
-         -DSECURECONF_DIR=\"$(SCONFIGDIR)/\" $(WARN_CFLAGS)
--- 
-2.24.0
-
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/crypt_configure.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/crypt_configure.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..917a8af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/crypt_configure.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From b86575ab4a0df07da160283459da270e1c0372a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Maxin B. John" <maxin.john@intel.com>
+Date: Tue, 24 May 2016 14:11:09 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] crypt_configure
+
+This patch fixes a case where it find crypt defined in libc (musl) but
+not in specified libraries then it ends up assigning
+LIBCRYPT="-l" which then goes into makefile cause all sort of problems
+e.g.
+
+ld: cannot find -l-m32
+| collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status
+The reason is that -l appears on commandline with
+out any library and compiler treats the next argument as library name
+whatever it is.
+
+Upstream-Status: Pending
+
+Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maxin B. John <maxin.john@intel.com>
+---
+ configure.ac | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index df39d07..e68d856 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ AS_IF([test "x$ac_cv_header_xcrypt_h" = "xyes"],
+   [crypt_libs="crypt"])
+ 
+ BACKUP_LIBS=$LIBS
+-AC_SEARCH_LIBS([crypt],[$crypt_libs], LIBCRYPT="${ac_lib:+-l$ac_lib}", LIBCRYPT="")
++AC_SEARCH_LIBS([crypt],[$crypt_libs], [test "$ac_cv_search_crypt" = "none required" || LIBCRYPT="$ac_cv_search_crypt"])
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(crypt_r crypt_gensalt_r)
+ LIBS=$BACKUP_LIBS
+ AC_SUBST(LIBCRYPT)
+-- 
+2.4.0
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9b8d4c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+Description: extract the securetty logic for use with the "nullok_secure" option
+ introduced in the "055_pam_unix_nullok_secure" patch.
+
+Upstream-Status: Pending
+
+Signed-off-by: Ming Liu <ming.liu@windriver.com>
+===================================================================
+Index: Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am
+===================================================================
+--- Linux-PAM-1.3.0.orig/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am
++++ Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am
+@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ endif
+ securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_securetty.la
+ pam_securetty_la_LIBADD = $(top_builddir)/libpam/libpam.la
+ 
++pam_securetty_la_SOURCES =	\
++	pam_securetty.c		\
++	tty_secure.c
++
+ if ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN
+ noinst_DATA = README
+ README: pam_securetty.8.xml
+Index: Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c
+===================================================================
+--- Linux-PAM-1.3.0.orig/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c
++++ Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
+ /* pam_securetty module */
+ 
+-#define SECURETTY_FILE "/etc/securetty"
+-#define TTY_PREFIX     "/dev/"
+ #define CMDLINE_FILE   "/proc/cmdline"
+ #define CONSOLEACTIVE_FILE	"/sys/class/tty/console/active"
+ 
+@@ -40,6 +38,9 @@
+ #include <security/pam_modutil.h>
+ #include <security/pam_ext.h>
+ 
++extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh,
++                                  const char *uttyname);
++
+ #define PAM_DEBUG_ARG       0x0001
+ #define PAM_NOCONSOLE_ARG   0x0002
+ 
+@@ -73,11 +74,7 @@ securetty_perform_check (pam_handle_t *p
+     const char *username;
+     const char *uttyname;
+     const void *void_uttyname;
+-    char ttyfileline[256];
+-    char ptname[256];
+-    struct stat ttyfileinfo;
+     struct passwd *user_pwd;
+-    FILE *ttyfile;
+ 
+     /* log a trail for debugging */
+     if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG) {
+@@ -105,50 +102,7 @@ securetty_perform_check (pam_handle_t *p
+ 	return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+     }
+ 
+-    /* The PAM_TTY item may be prefixed with "/dev/" - skip that */
+-    if (strncmp(TTY_PREFIX, uttyname, sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1) == 0) {
+-	uttyname += sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1;
+-    }
+-
+-    if (stat(SECURETTY_FILE, &ttyfileinfo)) {
+-	pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Couldn't open %s: %m", SECURETTY_FILE);
+-	return PAM_SUCCESS; /* for compatibility with old securetty handling,
+-			       this needs to succeed.  But we still log the
+-			       error. */
+-    }
+-
+-    if ((ttyfileinfo.st_mode & S_IWOTH) || !S_ISREG(ttyfileinfo.st_mode)) {
+-	/* If the file is world writable or is not a
+-	   normal file, return error */
+-	pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+-		   "%s is either world writable or not a normal file",
+-		   SECURETTY_FILE);
+-	return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+-    }
+-
+-    ttyfile = fopen(SECURETTY_FILE,"r");
+-    if (ttyfile == NULL) { /* Check that we opened it successfully */
+-	pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error opening %s: %m", SECURETTY_FILE);
+-	return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+-    }
+-
+-    if (isdigit(uttyname[0])) {
+-	snprintf(ptname, sizeof(ptname), "pts/%s", uttyname);
+-    } else {
+-	ptname[0] = '\0';
+-    }
+-
+-    retval = 1;
+-
+-    while ((fgets(ttyfileline, sizeof(ttyfileline)-1, ttyfile) != NULL)
+-	   && retval) {
+-	if (ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] == '\n')
+-	    ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] = '\0';
+-
+-	retval = ( strcmp(ttyfileline, uttyname)
+-		   && (!ptname[0] || strcmp(ptname, uttyname)) );
+-    }
+-    fclose(ttyfile);
++    retval = _pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, uttyname);
+ 
+     if (retval && !(ctrl & PAM_NOCONSOLE_ARG)) {
+         FILE *cmdlinefile;
+Index: Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
++++ Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
++/*
++ * A function to determine if a particular line is in /etc/securetty
++ */
++
++
++#define SECURETTY_FILE "/etc/securetty"
++#define TTY_PREFIX     "/dev/"
++
++/* This function taken out of pam_securetty by Sam Hartman
++ * <hartmans@debian.org>*/
++/*
++ * by Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>, Red Hat Software.
++ * July 25, 1996.
++ * Slight modifications AGM. 1996/12/3
++ */
++
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <security/pam_modules.h>
++#include <stdarg.h>
++#include <syslog.h>
++#include <sys/syslog.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <ctype.h>
++#include <security/pam_modutil.h>
++#include <security/pam_ext.h>
++
++extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh,
++                                  const char *uttyname);
++
++int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *uttyname)
++{
++    int retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
++    char ttyfileline[256];
++    char ptname[256];
++    struct stat ttyfileinfo;
++    FILE *ttyfile;
++    /* The PAM_TTY item may be prefixed with "/dev/" - skip that */
++    if (strncmp(TTY_PREFIX, uttyname, sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1) == 0)
++	uttyname += sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1;
++
++    if (stat(SECURETTY_FILE, &ttyfileinfo)) {
++	pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Couldn't open %s: %m",
++	           SECURETTY_FILE);
++	return PAM_SUCCESS; /* for compatibility with old securetty handling,
++			       this needs to succeed.  But we still log the
++			       error. */
++    }
++
++    if ((ttyfileinfo.st_mode & S_IWOTH) || !S_ISREG(ttyfileinfo.st_mode)) {
++	/* If the file is world writable or is not a
++	   normal file, return error */
++	pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
++	           "%s is either world writable or not a normal file",
++	           SECURETTY_FILE);
++	return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
++    }
++
++    ttyfile = fopen(SECURETTY_FILE,"r");
++    if(ttyfile == NULL) { /* Check that we opened it successfully */
++	pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error opening %s: %m", SECURETTY_FILE);
++	return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
++    }
++
++    if (isdigit(uttyname[0])) {
++	snprintf(ptname, sizeof(ptname), "pts/%s", uttyname);
++    } else {
++	ptname[0] = '\0';
++    }
++
++    retval = 1;
++
++    while ((fgets(ttyfileline,sizeof(ttyfileline)-1, ttyfile) != NULL) 
++	   && retval) {
++	if(ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] == '\n')
++	    ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] = '\0';
++	retval = ( strcmp(ttyfileline,uttyname)
++	           && (!ptname[0] || strcmp(ptname, uttyname)) );
++    }
++    fclose(ttyfile);
++
++    if(retval) {
++	retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
++    }
++
++    return retval;
++}
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d2cc668
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+From b6545b83f94c5fb7aec1478b8d458a1393f479c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Maxin B. John" <maxin.john@intel.com>
+Date: Wed, 25 May 2016 14:12:25 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] pam_unix: support 'nullok_secure' option
+
+Debian patch to add a new 'nullok_secure' option to pam_unix,
+which accepts users with null passwords only when the applicant is
+connected from a tty listed in /etc/securetty.
+
+Authors: Sam Hartman <hartmans@debian.org>,
+         Steve Langasek <vorlon@debian.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Pending
+
+Signed-off-by: Ming Liu <ming.liu@windriver.com>
+Signed-off-by: Amarnath Valluri <amarnath.valluri@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maxin B. John <maxin.john@intel.com>
+---
+ modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am    |  3 ++-
+ modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
+ modules/pam_unix/support.c      | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ modules/pam_unix/support.h      |  8 ++++++--
+ 4 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am
+index 56df178..2bba460 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am
++++ b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am
+@@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ if HAVE_VERSIONING
+   pam_unix_la_LDFLAGS += -Wl,--version-script=$(srcdir)/../modules.map
+ endif
+ pam_unix_la_LIBADD = $(top_builddir)/libpam/libpam.la \
+-	@LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@ @TIRPC_LIBS@ @NSL_LIBS@
++	@LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@ @TIRPC_LIBS@ @NSL_LIBS@ \
++	../pam_securetty/tty_secure.lo
+ 
+ securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_unix.la
+ 
+diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
+index 1b318f1..be0330e 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
++++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
+@@ -159,7 +159,24 @@
+           <para>
+             The default action of this module is to not permit the
+             user access to a service if their official password is blank.
+-            The <option>nullok</option> argument overrides this default.
++            The <option>nullok</option> argument overrides this default
++            and allows any user with a blank password to access the
++            service.
++          </para>
++        </listitem>
++      </varlistentry>
++      <varlistentry>
++        <term>
++          <option>nullok_secure</option>
++        </term>
++        <listitem>
++          <para>
++            The default action of this module is to not permit the
++            user access to a service if their official password is blank.
++            The <option>nullok_secure</option> argument overrides this
++            default and allows any user with a blank password to access
++            the service as long as the value of PAM_TTY is set to one of
++            the values found in /etc/securetty.
+           </para>
+         </listitem>
+       </varlistentry>
+diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/support.c b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
+index fc8595e..29e3341 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.c
++++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
+@@ -183,13 +183,22 @@ int _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int *remember, int *rounds,
+ 	/* now parse the arguments to this module */
+ 
+ 	for (; argc-- > 0; ++argv) {
++		int sl;
+ 
+ 		D(("pam_unix arg: %s", *argv));
+ 
+ 		for (j = 0; j < UNIX_CTRLS_; ++j) {
+-			if (unix_args[j].token
+-			    && !strncmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token, strlen(unix_args[j].token))) {
+-				break;
++			if (unix_args[j].token) {
++				sl = strlen(unix_args[j].token);
++				if (unix_args[j].token[sl-1] == '=') {
++					/* exclude argument from comparison */
++					if (!strncmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token, sl))
++						break;
++				} else {
++				/* compare full strings */
++					if (!strcmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token))
++						break;
++				}
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -560,6 +569,7 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *passwd,
+     if (child == 0) {
+ 	static char *envp[] = { NULL };
+ 	const char *args[] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL };
++	int nullok = off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl);
+ 
+ 	/* XXX - should really tidy up PAM here too */
+ 
+@@ -587,7 +597,16 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *passwd,
+ 	/* exec binary helper */
+ 	args[0] = CHKPWD_HELPER;
+ 	args[1] = user;
+-	if (off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl)) {	/* this means we've succeeded */
++	if (on(UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE, ctrl)) {
++		const void *uttyname;
++		retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, &uttyname);
++		if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS || uttyname == NULL
++			|| _pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, (const char *)uttyname) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
++			nullok = 0;
++		}
++	}
++
++	if (nullok) {
+ 	  args[2]="nullok";
+ 	} else {
+ 	  args[2]="nonull";
+@@ -672,6 +691,17 @@ _unix_blankpasswd (pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const char *name)
+ 	if (on(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl))
+ 		return 0;	/* will fail but don't let on yet */
+ 
++	if (on(UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE, ctrl)) {
++		int retval2;
++		const void *uttyname;
++		retval2 = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, &uttyname);
++		if (retval2 != PAM_SUCCESS || uttyname == NULL)
++			return 0;
++
++		if (_pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, (const char *)uttyname) != PAM_SUCCESS)
++			return 0;
++	}
++
+ 	/* UNIX passwords area */
+ 
+ 	retval = get_pwd_hash(pamh, name, &pwd, &salt);
+@@ -758,7 +788,7 @@ int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t * pamh, const char *name
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 	} else {
+-		retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt, off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl));
++		retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt, _unix_blankpasswd(pamh, ctrl, name));
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/support.h b/modules/pam_unix/support.h
+index b4c279c..8da4a8e 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.h
++++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.h
+@@ -98,8 +98,9 @@ typedef struct {
+ #define UNIX_QUIET		 28	/* Don't print informational messages */
+ #define UNIX_NO_PASS_EXPIRY      29     /* Don't check for password expiration if not used for authentication */
+ #define UNIX_DES                 30     /* DES, default */
++#define UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE       31     /* NULL passwords allowed only on secure ttys */
+ /* -------------- */
+-#define UNIX_CTRLS_              31	/* number of ctrl arguments defined */
++#define UNIX_CTRLS_              32	/* number of ctrl arguments defined */
+ 
+ #define UNIX_DES_CRYPT(ctrl)	(off(UNIX_MD5_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BIGCRYPT,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA256_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA512_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS,ctrl))
+ 
+@@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_CTRLS_] =
+ /* UNIX_AUTHTOK_TYPE */    {"authtok_type=",   _ALL_ON_,                0100, 0},
+ /* UNIX__PRELIM */         {NULL,              _ALL_ON_^(0600),         0200, 0},
+ /* UNIX__UPDATE */         {NULL,              _ALL_ON_^(0600),         0400, 0},
+-/* UNIX__NONULL */         {NULL,              _ALL_ON_,               01000, 0},
++/* UNIX__NONULL */         {NULL,              _ALL_ON_^(02000000000), 01000, 0},
+ /* UNIX__QUIET */          {NULL,              _ALL_ON_,               02000, 0},
+ /* UNIX_USE_AUTHTOK */     {"use_authtok",     _ALL_ON_,               04000, 0},
+ /* UNIX_SHADOW */          {"shadow",          _ALL_ON_,              010000, 0},
+@@ -139,6 +140,7 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_CTRLS_] =
+ /* UNIX_QUIET */           {"quiet",           _ALL_ON_,         01000000000, 0},
+ /* UNIX_NO_PASS_EXPIRY */  {"no_pass_expiry",  _ALL_ON_,         02000000000, 0},
+ /* UNIX_DES */             {"des",             _ALL_ON_^(0260420000),      0, 1},
++/* UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE */   {"nullok_secure",   _ALL_ON_^(01000), 02000000000, 0},
+ };
+ 
+ #define UNIX_DEFAULTS  (unix_args[UNIX__NONULL].flag)
+@@ -172,6 +174,8 @@ extern int _unix_read_password(pam_handle_t * pamh
+ 			,const char *data_name
+ 			,const void **pass);
+ 
++extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *uttyname);
++
+ extern int _unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ 			unsigned int ctrl, const char *user, int *daysleft);
+ #endif /* _PAM_UNIX_SUPPORT_H */
+-- 
+2.4.0
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.5.1.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.3.1.bb
similarity index 92%
rename from poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.5.1.bb
rename to poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.3.1.bb
index 8c008a9..b58b9ac 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.5.1.bb
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.3.1.bb
@@ -21,11 +21,13 @@
            file://pam.d/common-session-noninteractive \
            file://pam.d/other \
            file://libpam-xtests.patch \
-           file://0001-modules-pam_namespace-Makefile.am-correctly-install-.patch \
-           file://0001-Makefile.am-support-usrmage.patch \
-           "
+           file://pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch \
+           file://pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch \
+           file://crypt_configure.patch \
+          "
 
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "201d40730b1135b1b3cdea09f2c28ac634d73181ccd0172ceddee3649c5792fc"
+SRC_URI[md5sum] = "558ff53b0fc0563ca97f79e911822165"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "eff47a4ecd833fbf18de9686632a70ee8d0794b79aecb217ebd0ce11db4cd0db"
 
 DEPENDS = "bison-native flex flex-native cracklib libxml2-native virtual/crypt"
 
@@ -33,14 +35,13 @@
                 --libdir=${base_libdir} \
                 --disable-nis \
                 --disable-regenerate-docu \
-                --disable-doc \
 		--disable-prelude"
 
 CFLAGS_append = " -fPIC "
 
 S = "${WORKDIR}/Linux-PAM-${PV}"
 
-inherit autotools gettext pkgconfig systemd
+inherit autotools gettext pkgconfig
 
 PACKAGECONFIG ??= ""
 PACKAGECONFIG[audit] = "--enable-audit,--disable-audit,audit,"
@@ -49,7 +50,7 @@
 PACKAGES += "${PN}-runtime ${PN}-xtests"
 FILES_${PN} = "${base_libdir}/lib*${SOLIBS}"
 FILES_${PN}-dev += "${base_libdir}/security/*.la ${base_libdir}/*.la ${base_libdir}/lib*${SOLIBSDEV}"
-FILES_${PN}-runtime = "${sysconfdir} ${sbindir} ${systemd_system_unitdir}"
+FILES_${PN}-runtime = "${sysconfdir}"
 FILES_${PN}-xtests = "${datadir}/Linux-PAM/xtests"
 
 PACKAGES_DYNAMIC += "^${MLPREFIX}pam-plugin-.*"
@@ -72,10 +73,11 @@
 RDEPENDS_${PN}-xtests = "${PN}-${libpam_suffix} \
     ${MLPREFIX}pam-plugin-access-${libpam_suffix} \
     ${MLPREFIX}pam-plugin-debug-${libpam_suffix} \
+    ${MLPREFIX}pam-plugin-cracklib-${libpam_suffix} \
     ${MLPREFIX}pam-plugin-pwhistory-${libpam_suffix} \
     ${MLPREFIX}pam-plugin-succeed-if-${libpam_suffix} \
     ${MLPREFIX}pam-plugin-time-${libpam_suffix} \
-    bash coreutils"
+    coreutils"
 
 # FIXME: Native suffix breaks here, disable it for now
 RRECOMMENDS_${PN} = "${PN}-runtime-${libpam_suffix}"