meta-security/meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/Revert-ima-limit-file-hash-setting-by-user-to-fix-an.patch

From a34d61850b680c152e1dcc958ee83c3ab3261c3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Patrick Ohly <patrick.ohly@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2016 10:10:23 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Revert "ima: limit file hash setting by user to fix and log
 modes"

This reverts commit c68ed80c97d9720f51ef31fe91560fdd1e121533.

The original motivation was security hardening ("File hashes are
automatically set and updated and should not be manually set.")

However, that hardening ignores and breaks some valid use cases:
- File hashes might not be set because the file is currently
  outside of the policy and therefore have to be set by the
  creator. Examples:
  - Booting into an initramfs with an IMA-enabled kernel but
    without setting an IMA policy, then installing
    the OS onto the target partition by unpacking a rootfs archive
    which has the file hashes pre-computed.
  - Unpacking a file into a staging area with meta data (like owner)
    that leaves the file outside of the current policy, then changing
    the meta data such that it becomes part of the current policy.
- "should not be set manually" implies that the creator is aware
  of IMA semantic, the current system's configuration, and then
  skips setting file hashes in security.ima if (and only if) the
  kernel would prevent it. That's not the case for standard, unmodified
  tools. Example: unpacking an archive with security.ima xattrs with
  bsdtar or GNU tar.

Upstream-Status: Submitted [https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/mailman/message/35492824/]

Signed-off-by: Patrick Ohly <patrick.ohly@intel.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 8 ++------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 4b9b4a4..b8b2dd9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -385,14 +385,10 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 	result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
 				   xattr_value_len);
 	if (result == 1) {
-		bool digsig;
-
 		if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST))
 			return -EINVAL;
-		digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG);
-		if (!digsig && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
-			return -EPERM;
-		ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig);
+		ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry),
+			 (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) ? 1 : 0);
 		result = 0;
 	}
 	return result;
-- 
2.1.4