blob: 3265be3485192dd5da8e079aa8704089534a5ea2 [file] [log] [blame]
Brad Bishop64c979e2019-11-04 13:55:29 -05001From 2014fad3d28090b59d2f8a0971166c06e5fa6da6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
3Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2019 14:56:58 +0800
4Subject: [PATCH] upstream: fix integer overflow in XMSS private key parsing.
5
6Reported by Adam Zabrocki via SecuriTeam's SSH program.
7
8Note that this code is experimental and not compiled by default.
9
10ok markus@
11
12OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cd0361896d15e8a1bac495ac583ff065ffca2be1
13
14Signed-off-by: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
15
16Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/a546b17bbaeb12beac4c9aeed56f74a42b18a93a]
17CVE: CVE-2019-16905
18
19Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
20---
21 sshkey-xmss.c | 3 ++-
22 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
23
24diff --git a/sshkey-xmss.c b/sshkey-xmss.c
25index aaae702..c57681a 100644
26--- a/sshkey-xmss.c
27+++ b/sshkey-xmss.c
28@@ -977,7 +977,8 @@ sshkey_xmss_decrypt_state(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *encoded,
29 goto out;
30 }
31 /* check that an appropriate amount of auth data is present */
32- if (sshbuf_len(encoded) < encrypted_len + authlen) {
33+ if (sshbuf_len(encoded) < authlen ||
34+ sshbuf_len(encoded) - authlen < encrypted_len) {
35 r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
36 goto out;
37 }
38--
392.7.4
40