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gerrit.openbmc.org / stefanberger / openbmc / f1e5d6968976c2341c6d554bfcc8895f1b33c26b / . / meta / recipes-connectivity / socat / socat / CVE-2016-2217.patch
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Upstream-Status: Backport
http://www.dest-unreach.org/socat/download/socat-1.7.3.1.patch
CVE: CVE-2016-2217
[Yocto # 9024]
Singed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
Index: socat-1.7.3.0/CHANGES
===================================================================
--- socat-1.7.3.0.orig/CHANGES
+++ socat-1.7.3.0/CHANGES
@@ -1,8 +1,39 @@
+####################### V 1.7.3.1:
+
+security:
+ Socat security advisory 8
+ A stack overflow in vulnerability was found that can be triggered when
+ command line arguments (complete address specifications, host names,
+ file names) are longer than 512 bytes.
+ Successful exploitation might allow an attacker to execute arbitrary
+ code with the privileges of the socat process.
+ This vulnerability can only be exploited when an attacker is able to
+ inject data into socat's command line.
+ A vulnerable scenario would be a CGI script that reads data from clients
+ and uses (parts of) this data as hostname for a Socat invocation.
+ Test: NESTEDOVFL
+ Credits to Takumi Akiyama for finding and reporting this issue.
+
+ Socat security advisory 7
+ MSVR-1499
+ In the OpenSSL address implementation the hard coded 1024 bit DH p
+ parameter was not prime. The effective cryptographic strength of a key
+ exchange using these parameters was weaker than the one one could get by
+ using a prime p. Moreover, since there is no indication of how these
+ parameters were chosen, the existence of a trapdoor that makes possible
+ for an eavesdropper to recover the shared secret from a key exchange
+ that uses them cannot be ruled out.
+ Futhermore, 1024bit is not considered sufficiently secure.
+ Fix: generated a new 2048bit prime.
+ Thanks to Santiago Zanella-Beguelin and Microsoft Vulnerability
+ Research (MSVR) for finding and reporting this issue.
+
####################### V 1.7.3.0:
security:
- (CVE Id pending)
+ Socat security advisory 6
+ CVE-2015-1379: Possible DoS with fork
Fixed problems with signal handling caused by use of not async signal
safe functions in signal handlers that could freeze socat, allowing
denial of service attacks.
@@ -240,6 +271,7 @@ docu:
####################### V 1.7.2.3:
security:
+ Socat security advisory 5
CVE-2014-0019: socats PROXY-CONNECT address was vulnerable to a buffer
overflow with data from command line (see socat-secadv5.txt)
Credits to Florian Weimer of the Red Hat Product Security Team
@@ -247,6 +279,7 @@ security:
####################### V 1.7.2.2:
security:
+ Socat security advisory 4
CVE-2013-3571:
after refusing a client connection due to bad source address or source
port socat shutdown() the socket but did not close() it, resulting in
@@ -258,6 +291,7 @@ security:
####################### V 1.7.2.1:
security:
+ Socat security advisory 3
CVE-2012-0219:
fixed a possible heap buffer overflow in the readline address. This bug
could be exploited when all of the following conditions were met:
@@ -391,6 +425,7 @@ docu:
####################### V 1.7.1.3:
security:
+ Socat security advisory 2
CVE-2010-2799:
fixed a stack overflow vulnerability that occurred when command
line arguments (whole addresses, host names, file names) were longer
@@ -892,6 +927,7 @@ further corrections:
####################### V 1.4.0.3:
security:
+ Socat security advisory 1
CVE-2004-1484:
fix to a syslog() based format string vulnerability that can lead to
remote code execution. See advisory socat-adv-1.txt
Index: socat-1.7.3.0/VERSION
===================================================================
--- socat-1.7.3.0.orig/VERSION
+++ socat-1.7.3.0/VERSION
@@ -1 +1 @@
-"1.7.3.0"
+"1.7.3.1"
Index: socat-1.7.3.0/nestlex.c
===================================================================
--- socat-1.7.3.0.orig/nestlex.c
+++ socat-1.7.3.0/nestlex.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/* source: nestlex.c */
-/* Copyright Gerhard Rieger 2006-2010 */
+/* Copyright Gerhard Rieger */
/* Published under the GNU General Public License V.2, see file COPYING */
/* a function for lexical scanning of nested character patterns */
@@ -9,6 +9,17 @@
#include "sysincludes.h"
+static int _nestlex(const char **addr,
+ char **token,
+ ptrdiff_t *len,
+ const char *ends[],
+ const char *hquotes[],
+ const char *squotes[],
+ const char *nests[],
+ bool dropquotes,
+ bool c_esc,
+ bool html_esc
+ );
/* sub: scan a string and copy its value to output string
end scanning when an unescaped, unnested string from ends array is found
@@ -33,6 +44,22 @@ int nestlex(const char **addr, /* input
bool c_esc, /* solve C char escapes: \n \t \0 etc */
bool html_esc /* solve HTML char escapes: %0d %08 etc */
) {
+ return
+ _nestlex(addr, token, (ptrdiff_t *)len, ends, hquotes, squotes, nests,
+ dropquotes, c_esc, html_esc);
+}
+
+static int _nestlex(const char **addr,
+ char **token,
+ ptrdiff_t *len,
+ const char *ends[],
+ const char *hquotes[],
+ const char *squotes[],
+ const char *nests[],
+ bool dropquotes,
+ bool c_esc,
+ bool html_esc
+ ) {
const char *in = *addr; /* pointer into input string */
const char **endx; /* loops over end patterns */
const char **quotx; /* loops over quote patterns */
@@ -77,16 +104,18 @@ int nestlex(const char **addr, /* input
if (--*len <= 0) { *addr = in; *token = out; return -1; }
}
}
- /* we call nestlex recursively */
+ /* we call _nestlex recursively */
endnest[0] = *quotx;
endnest[1] = NULL;
result =
- nestlex(&in, &out, len, endnest, NULL/*hquotes*/,
+ _nestlex(&in, &out, len, endnest, NULL/*hquotes*/,
NULL/*squotes*/, NULL/*nests*/,
false, c_esc, html_esc);
if (result == 0 && dropquotes) {
/* we strip this quote */
in += strlen(*quotx);
+ } else if (result < 0) {
+ *addr = in; *token = out; return result;
} else {
/* we copy the trailing quote */
for (i = strlen(*quotx); i > 0; --i) {
@@ -110,7 +139,7 @@ int nestlex(const char **addr, /* input
if (!strncmp(in, *quotx, strlen(*quotx))) {
/* this quote pattern matches */
/* we strip this quote */
- /* we call nestlex recursively */
+ /* we call _nestlex recursively */
const char *endnest[2];
if (dropquotes) {
/* we strip this quote */
@@ -124,13 +153,15 @@ int nestlex(const char **addr, /* input
endnest[0] = *quotx;
endnest[1] = NULL;
result =
- nestlex(&in, &out, len, endnest, hquotes,
+ _nestlex(&in, &out, len, endnest, hquotes,
squotes, nests,
false, c_esc, html_esc);
if (result == 0 && dropquotes) {
/* we strip the trailing quote */
in += strlen(*quotx);
+ } else if (result < 0) {
+ *addr = in; *token = out; return result;
} else {
/* we copy the trailing quote */
for (i = strlen(*quotx); i > 0; --i) {
@@ -162,7 +193,7 @@ int nestlex(const char **addr, /* input
}
result =
- nestlex(&in, &out, len, endnest, hquotes, squotes, nests,
+ _nestlex(&in, &out, len, endnest, hquotes, squotes, nests,
false, c_esc, html_esc);
if (result == 0) {
/* copy endnest */
@@ -175,6 +206,8 @@ int nestlex(const char **addr, /* input
}
--i;
}
+ } else if (result < 0) {
+ *addr = in; *token = out; return result;
}
break;
}
@@ -211,7 +244,7 @@ int nestlex(const char **addr, /* input
}
*out++ = c;
--*len;
- if (*len == 0) {
+ if (*len <= 0) {
*addr = in;
*token = out;
return -1; /* output overflow */
@@ -222,7 +255,7 @@ int nestlex(const char **addr, /* input
/* just a simple char */
*out++ = c;
--*len;
- if (*len == 0) {
+ if (*len <= 0) {
*addr = in;
*token = out;
return -1; /* output overflow */
Index: socat-1.7.3.0/nestlex.h
===================================================================
--- socat-1.7.3.0.orig/nestlex.h
+++ socat-1.7.3.0/nestlex.h
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/* source: nestlex.h */
-/* Copyright Gerhard Rieger 2006 */
+/* Copyright Gerhard Rieger */
/* Published under the GNU General Public License V.2, see file COPYING */
#ifndef __nestlex_h_included
Index: socat-1.7.3.0/socat.spec
===================================================================
--- socat-1.7.3.0.orig/socat.spec
+++ socat-1.7.3.0/socat.spec
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
%define majorver 1.7
-%define minorver 3.0
+%define minorver 3.1
Summary: socat - multipurpose relay
Name: socat
Index: socat-1.7.3.0/test.sh
===================================================================
--- socat-1.7.3.0.orig/test.sh
+++ socat-1.7.3.0/test.sh
@@ -2266,8 +2266,8 @@ gentestcert () {
gentestdsacert () {
local name="$1"
if [ -s $name.key -a -s $name.crt -a -s $name.pem ]; then return; fi
- openssl dsaparam -out $name-dsa.pem 512 >/dev/null 2>&1
- openssl dhparam -dsaparam -out $name-dh.pem 512 >/dev/null 2>&1
+ openssl dsaparam -out $name-dsa.pem 1024 >/dev/null 2>&1
+ openssl dhparam -dsaparam -out $name-dh.pem 1024 >/dev/null 2>&1
openssl req -newkey dsa:$name-dsa.pem -keyout $name.key -nodes -x509 -config $TESTCERT_CONF -out $name.crt -days 3653 >/dev/null 2>&1
cat $name-dsa.pem $name-dh.pem $name.key $name.crt >$name.pem
}
@@ -10973,6 +10973,42 @@ CMD0="$TRACE $SOCAT $opts OPENSSL:localh
printf "test $F_n $TEST... " $N
$CMD0 </dev/null 1>&0 2>"${te}0"
rc0=$?
+if [ $rc0 -lt 128 ] || [ $rc0 -eq 255 ]; then
+ $PRINTF "$OK\n"
+ numOK=$((numOK+1))
+else
+ $PRINTF "$FAILED\n"
+ echo "$CMD0"
+ cat "${te}0"
+ numFAIL=$((numFAIL+1))
+ listFAIL="$listFAIL $N"
+fi
+fi # NUMCOND
+ ;;
+esac
+PORT=$((PORT+1))
+N=$((N+1))
+
+# socat up to 1.7.3.0 had a stack overflow vulnerability that occurred when
+# command line arguments (whole addresses, host names, file names) were longer
+# than 512 bytes and specially crafted.
+NAME=NESTEDOVFL
+case "$TESTS" in
+*%$N%*|*%functions%*|*%bugs%*|*%security%*|*%exec%*|*%$NAME%*)
+TEST="$NAME: stack overflow on overly long nested arg"
+# provide a long host name to TCP-CONNECT and check socats exit code
+if ! eval $NUMCOND; then :; else
+tf="$td/test$N.stdout"
+te="$td/test$N.stderr"
+tdiff="$td/test$N.diff"
+da="test$N $(date) $RANDOM"
+# prepare long data - perl might not be installed
+rm -f "$td/test$N.dat"
+i=0; while [ $i -lt 64 ]; do echo -n "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" >>"$td/test$N.dat"; i=$((i+1)); done
+CMD0="$TRACE $SOCAT $opts EXEC:[$(cat "$td/test$N.dat")] STDIO"
+printf "test $F_n $TEST... " $N
+$CMD0 </dev/null 1>&0 2>"${te}0"
+rc0=$?
if [ $rc0 -lt 128 ] || [ $rc0 -eq 255 ]; then
$PRINTF "$OK\n"
numOK=$((numOK+1))
Index: socat-1.7.3.0/xio-openssl.c
===================================================================
--- socat-1.7.3.0.orig/xio-openssl.c
+++ socat-1.7.3.0/xio-openssl.c
@@ -912,20 +912,27 @@ int
}
{
- static unsigned char dh1024_p[] = {
- 0xCC,0x17,0xF2,0xDC,0x96,0xDF,0x59,0xA4,0x46,0xC5,0x3E,0x0E,
- 0xB8,0x26,0x55,0x0C,0xE3,0x88,0xC1,0xCE,0xA7,0xBC,0xB3,0xBF,
- 0x16,0x94,0xD8,0xA9,0x45,0xA2,0xCE,0xA9,0x5B,0x22,0x25,0x5F,
- 0x92,0x59,0x94,0x1C,0x22,0xBF,0xCB,0xC8,0xC8,0x57,0xCB,0xBF,
- 0xBC,0x0E,0xE8,0x40,0xF9,0x87,0x03,0xBF,0x60,0x9B,0x08,0xC6,
- 0x8E,0x99,0xC6,0x05,0xFC,0x00,0xD6,0x6D,0x90,0xA8,0xF5,0xF8,
- 0xD3,0x8D,0x43,0xC8,0x8F,0x7A,0xBD,0xBB,0x28,0xAC,0x04,0x69,
- 0x4A,0x0B,0x86,0x73,0x37,0xF0,0x6D,0x4F,0x04,0xF6,0xF5,0xAF,
- 0xBF,0xAB,0x8E,0xCE,0x75,0x53,0x4D,0x7F,0x7D,0x17,0x78,0x0E,
- 0x12,0x46,0x4A,0xAF,0x95,0x99,0xEF,0xBC,0xA6,0xC5,0x41,0x77,
- 0x43,0x7A,0xB9,0xEC,0x8E,0x07,0x3C,0x6D,
+ static unsigned char dh2048_p[] = {
+ 0x00,0xdc,0x21,0x64,0x56,0xbd,0x9c,0xb2,0xac,0xbe,0xc9,0x98,0xef,0x95,0x3e,
+ 0x26,0xfa,0xb5,0x57,0xbc,0xd9,0xe6,0x75,0xc0,0x43,0xa2,0x1c,0x7a,0x85,0xdf,
+ 0x34,0xab,0x57,0xa8,0xf6,0xbc,0xf6,0x84,0x7d,0x05,0x69,0x04,0x83,0x4c,0xd5,
+ 0x56,0xd3,0x85,0x09,0x0a,0x08,0xff,0xb5,0x37,0xa1,0xa3,0x8a,0x37,0x04,0x46,
+ 0xd2,0x93,0x31,0x96,0xf4,0xe4,0x0d,0x9f,0xbd,0x3e,0x7f,0x9e,0x4d,0xaf,0x08,
+ 0xe2,0xe8,0x03,0x94,0x73,0xc4,0xdc,0x06,0x87,0xbb,0x6d,0xae,0x66,0x2d,0x18,
+ 0x1f,0xd8,0x47,0x06,0x5c,0xcf,0x8a,0xb5,0x00,0x51,0x57,0x9b,0xea,0x1e,0xd8,
+ 0xdb,0x8e,0x3c,0x1f,0xd3,0x2f,0xba,0x1f,0x5f,0x3d,0x15,0xc1,0x3b,0x2c,0x82,
+ 0x42,0xc8,0x8c,0x87,0x79,0x5b,0x38,0x86,0x3a,0xeb,0xfd,0x81,0xa9,0xba,0xf7,
+ 0x26,0x5b,0x93,0xc5,0x3e,0x03,0x30,0x4b,0x00,0x5c,0xb6,0x23,0x3e,0xea,0x94,
+ 0xc3,0xb4,0x71,0xc7,0x6e,0x64,0x3b,0xf8,0x92,0x65,0xad,0x60,0x6c,0xd4,0x7b,
+ 0xa9,0x67,0x26,0x04,0xa8,0x0a,0xb2,0x06,0xeb,0xe0,0x7d,0x90,0xdd,0xdd,0xf5,
+ 0xcf,0xb4,0x11,0x7c,0xab,0xc1,0xa3,0x84,0xbe,0x27,0x77,0xc7,0xde,0x20,0x57,
+ 0x66,0x47,0xa7,0x35,0xfe,0x0d,0x6a,0x1c,0x52,0xb8,0x58,0xbf,0x26,0x33,0x81,
+ 0x5e,0xb7,0xa9,0xc0,0xee,0x58,0x11,0x74,0x86,0x19,0x08,0x89,0x1c,0x37,0x0d,
+ 0x52,0x47,0x70,0x75,0x8b,0xa8,0x8b,0x30,0x11,0x71,0x36,0x62,0xf0,0x73,0x41,
+ 0xee,0x34,0x9d,0x0a,0x2b,0x67,0x4e,0x6a,0xa3,0xe2,0x99,0x92,0x1b,0xf5,0x32,
+ 0x73,0x63
};
- static unsigned char dh1024_g[] = {
+ static unsigned char dh2048_g[] = {
0x02,
};
DH *dh;
@@ -938,8 +945,8 @@ int
}
Error("DH_new() failed");
} else {
- dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_p, sizeof(dh1024_p), NULL);
- dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_g, sizeof(dh1024_g), NULL);
+ dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh2048_p, sizeof(dh2048_p), NULL);
+ dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh2048_g, sizeof(dh2048_g), NULL);
if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL)) {
while (err = ERR_get_error()) {
Warn1("BN_bin2bn(): %s",