meta-security/meta-tpm/recipes-tpm2/tpm2-pkcs11/files/0001-ssl-compile-against-OSSL-3.0.patch

From f7a2e90e80fd8b4c43042f8099e821b4118234d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 2021 11:24:40 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] ssl: compile against OSSL 3.0

Compile against OpenSSL. This moves functions non-deprecated things if
possible and ignores deprecation warnings when not. Padding manipulation
routines seem to have been marked deprecated in OSSL 3.0, so we need to
figure out a porting strategy here.

Fixes: #686

Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>

Upstream-Status: Backport
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>

---
 src/lib/backend_esysdb.c                |   5 +-
 src/lib/backend_fapi.c                  |   5 +-
 src/lib/encrypt.c                       |   2 +-
 src/lib/mech.c                          |  72 +---
 src/lib/object.c                        |   3 +-
 src/lib/sign.c                          |   2 +-
 src/lib/ssl_util.c                      | 531 ++++++++++++++++--------
 src/lib/ssl_util.h                      |  31 +-
 src/lib/tpm.c                           |   6 +-
 src/lib/utils.c                         |  35 +-
 src/lib/utils.h                         |  13 -
 test/integration/pkcs-sign-verify.int.c |  94 ++---
 12 files changed, 441 insertions(+), 358 deletions(-)

Index: git/src/lib/backend_esysdb.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/src/lib/backend_esysdb.c
+++ git/src/lib/backend_esysdb.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #include "config.h"
 #include "backend_esysdb.h"
 #include "db.h"
+#include "ssl_util.h"
 #include "tpm.h"
 
 CK_RV backend_esysdb_init(void) {
@@ -308,7 +309,7 @@ CK_RV backend_esysdb_token_unseal_wrappi
     }
 
     twist sealsalt = user ? sealobj->userauthsalt : sealobj->soauthsalt;
-    twist sealobjauth = utils_hash_pass(tpin, sealsalt);
+    twist sealobjauth = ssl_util_hash_pass(tpin, sealsalt);
     if (!sealobjauth) {
         rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
         goto error;
@@ -372,7 +373,7 @@ CK_RV backend_esysdb_token_changeauth(to
      */
     twist oldsalt = !user ? tok->esysdb.sealobject.soauthsalt : tok->esysdb.sealobject.userauthsalt;
 
-    twist oldauth = utils_hash_pass(toldpin, oldsalt);
+    twist oldauth = ssl_util_hash_pass(toldpin, oldsalt);
     if (!oldauth) {
         goto out;
     }
Index: git/src/lib/backend_fapi.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/src/lib/backend_fapi.c
+++ git/src/lib/backend_fapi.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include "backend_fapi.h"
 #include "emitter.h"
 #include "parser.h"
+#include "ssl_util.h"
 #include "utils.h"
 
 #ifdef HAVE_FAPI
@@ -793,7 +794,7 @@ CK_RV backend_fapi_token_unseal_wrapping
     }
 
     twist sealsalt = user ? tok->fapi.userauthsalt : tok->fapi.soauthsalt;
-    twist sealobjauth = utils_hash_pass(tpin, sealsalt);
+    twist sealobjauth = ssl_util_hash_pass(tpin, sealsalt);
     if (!sealobjauth) {
         rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
         goto error;
@@ -889,7 +890,7 @@ CK_RV backend_fapi_token_changeauth(toke
     }
     rv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
 
-    oldauth = utils_hash_pass(toldpin, user ? tok->fapi.userauthsalt : tok->fapi.soauthsalt);
+    oldauth = ssl_util_hash_pass(toldpin, user ? tok->fapi.userauthsalt : tok->fapi.soauthsalt);
     if (!oldauth) {
         goto out;
     }
Index: git/src/lib/encrypt.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/src/lib/encrypt.c
+++ git/src/lib/encrypt.c
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ void encrypt_op_data_free(encrypt_op_dat
 CK_RV sw_encrypt_data_init(mdetail *mdtl, CK_MECHANISM *mechanism, tobject *tobj, sw_encrypt_data **enc_data) {
 
     EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-    CK_RV rv = ssl_util_tobject_to_evp(&pkey, tobj);
+    CK_RV rv = ssl_util_attrs_to_evp(tobj->attrs, &pkey);
     if (rv != CKR_OK) {
         return rv;
     }
Index: git/src/lib/mech.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/src/lib/mech.c
+++ git/src/lib/mech.c
@@ -693,7 +693,7 @@ CK_RV ecc_keygen_validator(mdetail *m, C
     }
 
     int nid = 0;
-    CK_RV rv = ec_params_to_nid(a, &nid);
+    CK_RV rv = ssl_util_params_to_nid(a, &nid);
     if (rv != CKR_OK) {
         return rv;
     }
@@ -857,11 +857,11 @@ CK_RV rsa_pkcs_synthesizer(mdetail *mdtl
     }
 
     /* Apply the PKCS1.5 padding */
-    int rc = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(outbuf, padded_len,
-            inbuf, inlen);
-    if (!rc) {
+    CK_RV rv = ssl_util_add_PKCS1_TYPE_1(inbuf, inlen,
+            outbuf, padded_len);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK) {
         LOGE("Applying RSA padding failed");
-        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+        return rv;
     }
 
     *outlen = padded_len;
@@ -893,22 +893,21 @@ CK_RV rsa_pkcs_unsynthesizer(mdetail *md
     size_t key_bytes = *keybits / 8;
 
     unsigned char buf[4096];
-    int rc = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(buf, sizeof(buf),
-                                       inbuf, inlen,
-                                       key_bytes);
-    if (rc < 0) {
+    CK_ULONG buflen = sizeof(buf);
+    CK_RV rv = ssl_util_check_PKCS1_TYPE_2(inbuf, inlen, key_bytes,
+            buf, &buflen);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK) {
         LOGE("Could not recover CKM_RSA_PKCS Padding");
-        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+        return rv;
     }
 
-    /* cannot be < 0 because of check above */
-    if (!outbuf || (unsigned)rc > *outlen) {
-        *outlen = rc;
+    if (!outbuf || buflen > *outlen) {
+        *outlen = buflen;
         return outbuf ? CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL : CKR_OK;
     }
 
-    *outlen = rc;
-    memcpy(outbuf, buf, rc);
+    *outlen = buflen;
+    memcpy(outbuf, buf, buflen);
 
     return CKR_OK;
 }
@@ -944,50 +943,21 @@ CK_RV rsa_pss_synthesizer(mdetail *mdtl,
         return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
     }
 
-    CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR exp_attr = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
-    if (!exp_attr) {
-        LOGE("Signing key has no CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT");
-        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
-    }
-
     if (modulus_attr->ulValueLen > *outlen) {
         LOGE("Output buffer is too small, got: %lu, required at least %lu",
                 *outlen, modulus_attr->ulValueLen);
         return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
     }
 
-    BIGNUM *e = BN_bin2bn(exp_attr->pValue, exp_attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
-    if (!e) {
-        LOGE("Could not convert exponent to bignum");
-        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
-    }
-
-    BIGNUM *n = BN_bin2bn(modulus_attr->pValue, modulus_attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
-    if (!n) {
-        LOGE("Could not convert modulus to bignum");
-        BN_free(e);
-        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
-    }
-
-    RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
-    if (!rsa) {
-        LOGE("oom");
-        return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
-    }
-
-    int rc = RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, NULL);
-    if (!rc) {
-        LOGE("Could not set modulus and exponent to OSSL RSA key");
-        BN_free(n);
-        BN_free(e);
-        RSA_free(rsa);
-        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    rv = ssl_util_attrs_to_evp(attrs, &pkey);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+        return rv;
     }
 
-    rc = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(rsa, outbuf,
-            inbuf, md, -1);
-    RSA_free(rsa);
-    if (!rc) {
+    rv = ssl_util_add_PKCS1_PSS(pkey, inbuf, md, outbuf);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK) {
         LOGE("Applying RSA padding failed");
         return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
     }
Index: git/src/lib/object.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/src/lib/object.c
+++ git/src/lib/object.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include "object.h"
 #include "pkcs11.h"
 #include "session_ctx.h"
+#include "ssl_util.h"
 #include "token.h"
 #include "utils.h"
 
@@ -121,7 +122,7 @@ CK_RV tobject_get_min_buf_size(tobject *
         }
 
         int nid = 0;
-        CK_RV rv = ec_params_to_nid(a, &nid);
+        CK_RV rv = ssl_util_params_to_nid(a, &nid);
         if (rv != CKR_OK) {
             return rv;
         }
Index: git/src/lib/sign.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/src/lib/sign.c
+++ git/src/lib/sign.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static sign_opdata *sign_opdata_new(mdet
     }
 
     EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-    rv = ssl_util_tobject_to_evp(&pkey, tobj);
+    rv = ssl_util_attrs_to_evp(tobj->attrs, &pkey);
     if (rv != CKR_OK) {
         return NULL;
     }
Index: git/src/lib/ssl_util.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/src/lib/ssl_util.c
+++ git/src/lib/ssl_util.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 #include <openssl/sha.h>
 
+#include "attrs.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "pkcs11.h"
 #include "ssl_util.h"
@@ -19,194 +20,228 @@
 #include <openssl/evperr.h>
 #endif
 
-#if defined(LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_PRE11)
+#if defined(LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_POST300)
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#endif
 
 /*
- * Pre openssl 1.1 doesn't have EC_POINT_point2buf, so use EC_POINT_point2oct to
- * create an API compatible version of it.
+ * TODO Port these routines
+ * Deprecated function block to port
+ *
+ * There are no padding routine replacements in OSSL 3.0.
+ *   - per Matt Caswell (maintainer) on mailing list.
+ * Signature verification can likely be done with EVP Verify interface.
  */
-size_t EC_POINT_point2buf(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
-                          point_conversion_form_t form,
-                          unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx) {
-
-    /* Get the required buffer length */
-    size_t len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, point, form, NULL, 0, NULL);
-    if (!len) {
-        return 0;
-    }
+#if defined(LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_POST300)
+#pragma GCC diagnostic push
+#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wdeprecated-declarations"
+#endif
 
-    /* allocate it */
-    unsigned char *buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
-    if (!buf) {
-        return 0;
-    }
+CK_RV ssl_util_add_PKCS1_PSS(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+        const CK_BYTE_PTR inbuf, const EVP_MD *md,
+        CK_BYTE_PTR outbuf) {
 
-    /* convert it */
-    len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, point, form, buf, len, ctx);
-    if (!len) {
-        OPENSSL_free(buf);
-        return 0;
+    RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
+    if (!rsa) {
+        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
     }
 
-    *pbuf = buf;
-    return len;
-}
+    int rc = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(rsa, outbuf,
+        inbuf, md, -1);
 
-size_t OBJ_length(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) {
+    return rc == 1 ? CKR_OK : CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+}
 
-    if (!obj) {
-        return 0;
-    }
+CK_RV ssl_util_add_PKCS1_TYPE_1(const CK_BYTE_PTR inbuf, CK_ULONG inlen,
+        CK_BYTE_PTR outbuf, CK_ULONG outbuflen) {
 
-    return obj->length;
+    return RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(outbuf, outbuflen,
+            inbuf, inlen) == 1 ? CKR_OK : CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
 }
 
-const unsigned char *OBJ_get0_data(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) {
+CK_RV ssl_util_check_PKCS1_TYPE_2(const CK_BYTE_PTR inbuf, CK_ULONG inlen, CK_ULONG rsa_len,
+        CK_BYTE_PTR outbuf, CK_ULONG_PTR outbuflen) {
 
-    if (!obj) {
-        return NULL;
+    int rc = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(outbuf, *outbuflen,
+               inbuf, inlen, rsa_len);
+    if (rc < 0) {
+        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
     }
 
-    return obj->data;
+    /* cannot be negative due to check above */
+    *outbuflen = rc;
+    return CKR_OK;
 }
 
-const unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_get0_data(const ASN1_STRING *x) {
-    return ASN1_STRING_data((ASN1_STRING *)x);
-}
+#if defined(LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_POST300)
+#pragma GCC diagnostic pop
+#endif
 
-int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) {
+#if defined(LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_POST300)
 
-    if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL) || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL)) {
-        return 0;
-    }
+static CK_RV get_RSA_evp_pubkey(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR e_attr, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR n_attr, EVP_PKEY **out_pkey) {
+
+    OSSL_PARAM params[] = {
+        OSSL_PARAM_BN("n", n_attr->pValue, n_attr->ulValueLen),
+        OSSL_PARAM_BN("e", e_attr->pValue, e_attr->ulValueLen),
+        OSSL_PARAM_END
+    };
 
-    if (n != NULL) {
-        BN_free(r->n);
-        r->n = n;
+    /* convert params to EVP key */
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *evp_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_RSA, NULL);
+    if (!evp_ctx) {
+        SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id");
+        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
     }
 
-    if (e != NULL) {
-        BN_free(r->e);
-        r->e = e;
+    int rc = EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(evp_ctx);
+    if (rc != 1) {
+        SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init");
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
+        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
     }
 
-    if (d != NULL) {
-        BN_free(r->d);
-        r->d = d;
+    rc = EVP_PKEY_fromdata(evp_ctx, out_pkey, EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params);
+    if (rc != 1) {
+        SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_fromdata");
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
+        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
     }
 
-    return 1;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
+
+    return CKR_OK;
 }
 
-int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s) {
+static CK_RV get_EC_evp_pubkey(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecparams, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecpoint, EVP_PKEY **out_pkey) {
+
+    /*
+     * The simplest way I have found to deal with this is to convert the ASN1 object in
+     * the ecparams attribute (was done previously with d2i_ECParameters) is to a nid and
+     * then take the int nid and convert it to a friendly name like prime256v1.
+     * EVP_PKEY_fromdata can handle group by name.
+     *
+     * Per the spec this is "DER-encoding of an ANSI X9.62 Parameters value".
+     */
+    int curve_id = 0;
+    CK_RV rv = ssl_util_params_to_nid(ecparams, &curve_id);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+        LOGE("Could not get nid from params");
+        return rv;
+    }
 
-    if (!r || !s) {
-        return 0;
+    /* Per the spec CKA_EC_POINT attribute is the "DER-encoding of ANSI X9.62 ECPoint value Q */
+    const unsigned char *x = ecpoint->pValue;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &x, ecpoint->ulValueLen);
+    if (!os) {
+        SSL_UTIL_LOGE("d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING: %s");
+        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
     }
 
-    BN_free(sig->r);
-    BN_free(sig->s);
+    OSSL_PARAM params[] = {
+        OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, (char *)OBJ_nid2sn(curve_id), 0),
+        OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, os->data, os->length),
+        OSSL_PARAM_END
+    };
 
-    sig->r = r;
-    sig->s = s;
+    /* convert params to EVP key */
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *evp_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
+    if (!evp_ctx) {
+        SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id");
+        OPENSSL_free(os);
+        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+    }
 
-    return 1;
-}
+    int rc = EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(evp_ctx);
+    if (rc != 1) {
+        SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init: %s");
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
+        OPENSSL_free(os);
+        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+    }
 
-EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
-    if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
-        return NULL;
+    rc = EVP_PKEY_fromdata(evp_ctx, out_pkey, EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params);
+    if (rc != 1) {
+        SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_fromdata");
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
+        OPENSSL_free(os);
+        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
     }
 
-    return pkey->pkey.ec;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(os);
+
+    return CKR_OK;
 }
-#endif
 
-static CK_RV convert_pubkey_RSA(RSA **outkey, attr_list *attrs) {
+#else
 
-    RSA *rsa = NULL;
-    BIGNUM *e = NULL, *n = NULL;
+static CK_RV get_RSA_evp_pubkey(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR e_attr, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR n_attr, EVP_PKEY **out_pkey) {
 
-    CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR exp = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
-    if (!exp) {
-        LOGE("RSA Object must have attribute CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT");
+    BIGNUM *e = BN_bin2bn(e_attr->pValue, e_attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
+    if (!e) {
+        LOGE("Could not convert exponent to bignum");
         return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
     }
 
-    CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR mod = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_MODULUS);
-    if (!mod) {
-        LOGE("RSA Object must have attribute CKA_MODULUS");
+    BIGNUM *n = BN_bin2bn(n_attr->pValue, n_attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
+    if (!n) {
+        LOGE("Could not convert modulus to bignum");
+        BN_free(e);
         return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
     }
 
-    rsa = RSA_new();
+    RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
     if (!rsa) {
-        SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Failed to allocate OpenSSL RSA structure");
-        goto error;
+        LOGE("oom");
+        return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
     }
 
-    e = BN_bin2bn(exp->pValue, exp->ulValueLen, NULL);
-    if (!e) {
-        SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Failed to convert exponent to SSL internal format");
-        goto error;
+    int rc = RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, NULL);
+    if (!rc) {
+        LOGE("Could not set modulus and exponent to OSSL RSA key");
+        BN_free(n);
+        BN_free(e);
+        RSA_free(rsa);
+        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
     }
 
-    n = BN_bin2bn(mod->pValue, mod->ulValueLen, NULL);
-    if (!n) {
-        SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Failed to convert modulus to SSL internal format");
-        goto error;
+    /* assigned to RSA key */
+    n = e = NULL;
+
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    if (!pkey) {
+        SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_new");
+        RSA_free(rsa);
+        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
     }
 
-    if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, NULL)) {
-        SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Failed to set RSA modulus and exponent components");
+    rc = EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+    if (rc != 1) {
         RSA_free(rsa);
-        BN_free(e);
-        BN_free(n);
-        goto error;
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
     }
 
-    *outkey = rsa;
+    *out_pkey = pkey;
 
     return CKR_OK;
-
-error:
-    RSA_free(rsa);
-    if (e) {
-        BN_free(e);
-    }
-    if (n) {
-        BN_free(n);
-    }
-
-    return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
 }
 
-static CK_RV convert_pubkey_ECC(EC_KEY **outkey, attr_list *attrs) {
+static CK_RV get_EC_evp_pubkey(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecparams, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecpoint, EVP_PKEY **out_pkey) {
 
-    EC_KEY *key = EC_KEY_new();
-    if (!key) {
+    EC_KEY *ecc = EC_KEY_new();
+    if (!ecc) {
         LOGE("oom");
         return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
     }
 
-    CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecparams = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_EC_PARAMS);
-    if (!ecparams) {
-        LOGE("ECC Key must have attribute CKA_EC_PARAMS");
-        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
-    }
-
-    CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecpoint = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_EC_POINT);
-    if (!ecpoint) {
-        LOGE("ECC Key must have attribute CKA_EC_POINT");
-        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
-    }
-
     /* set params */
     const unsigned char *x = ecparams->pValue;
-    EC_KEY *k = d2i_ECParameters(&key, &x, ecparams->ulValueLen);
+    EC_KEY *k = d2i_ECParameters(&ecc, &x, ecparams->ulValueLen);
     if (!k) {
         SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Could not update key with EC Parameters");
-        EC_KEY_free(key);
+        EC_KEY_free(ecc);
         return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
     }
 
@@ -215,22 +250,38 @@ static CK_RV convert_pubkey_ECC(EC_KEY *
     ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &x, ecpoint->ulValueLen);
     if (os) {
         x = os->data;
-        k = o2i_ECPublicKey(&key, &x, os->length);
+        k = o2i_ECPublicKey(&ecc, &x, os->length);
         ASN1_STRING_free(os);
         if (!k) {
             SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Could not update key with EC Points");
-            EC_KEY_free(key);
+            EC_KEY_free(ecc);
             return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
         }
     }
 
-    *outkey = key;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    if (!pkey) {
+        SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_new");
+        EC_KEY_free(ecc);
+        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    int rc = EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, ecc);
+    if (!rc) {
+        SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Could not set pkey with ec key");
+        EC_KEY_free(ecc);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    *out_pkey = pkey;
     return CKR_OK;
 }
+#endif
 
-CK_RV ssl_util_tobject_to_evp(EVP_PKEY **outpkey, tobject *obj) {
+CK_RV ssl_util_attrs_to_evp(attr_list *attrs, EVP_PKEY **outpkey) {
 
-    CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR a = attr_get_attribute_by_type(obj->attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR a = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
     if (!a) {
         LOGE("Expected object to have attribute CKA_KEY_TYPE");
         return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
@@ -253,44 +304,52 @@ CK_RV ssl_util_tobject_to_evp(EVP_PKEY *
            return CKR_OK;
     }
 
-    EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
-    if (!pkey) {
-        LOGE("oom");
-        return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
-    }
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
 
     if (key_type == CKK_EC) {
-        EC_KEY *e = NULL;
-        rv = convert_pubkey_ECC(&e, obj->attrs);
-        if (rv != CKR_OK) {
-            return rv;
+
+        CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecparams = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_EC_PARAMS);
+        if (!ecparams) {
+            LOGE("ECC Key must have attribute CKA_EC_PARAMS");
+            return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
         }
-        int rc = EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, e);
-        if (!rc) {
-            SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Could not set pkey with ec key");
-            EC_KEY_free(e);
-            EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+
+        CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecpoint = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_EC_POINT);
+        if (!ecpoint) {
+            LOGE("ECC Key must have attribute CKA_EC_POINT");
             return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
         }
-    } else if (key_type == CKK_RSA) {
-        RSA *r = NULL;
-        rv = convert_pubkey_RSA(&r, obj->attrs);
+
+        rv = get_EC_evp_pubkey(ecparams, ecpoint, &pkey);
         if (rv != CKR_OK) {
             return rv;
         }
-        int rc = EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, r);
-        if (!rc) {
-            SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Could not set pkey with rsa key");
-            RSA_free(r);
-            EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+
+    } else if (key_type == CKK_RSA) {
+
+        CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR exp = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
+        if (!exp) {
+            LOGE("RSA Object must have attribute CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT");
             return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
         }
+
+        CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR mod = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_MODULUS);
+        if (!mod) {
+            LOGE("RSA Object must have attribute CKA_MODULUS");
+            return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        rv = get_RSA_evp_pubkey(exp, mod, &pkey);
+        if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+            return rv;
+        }
+
     } else {
         LOGE("Invalid CKA_KEY_TYPE, got: %lu", key_type);
-        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
         return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
     }
 
+    assert(pkey);
     *outpkey = pkey;
 
     return CKR_OK;
@@ -406,10 +465,12 @@ CK_RV ssl_util_setup_evp_pkey_ctx(EVP_PK
         }
     }
 
-    rc = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pkey_ctx, md);
-    if (!rc) {
-        SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md failed");
-        goto error;
+    if (md) {
+        rc = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pkey_ctx, md);
+        if (!rc) {
+            SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md failed");
+            goto error;
+        }
     }
 
     *outpkey_ctx = pkey_ctx;
@@ -421,21 +482,12 @@ error:
     return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
 }
 
-static CK_RV do_sig_verify_rsa(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
-        int padding, const EVP_MD *md,
-        CK_BYTE_PTR digest, CK_ULONG digest_len,
-        CK_BYTE_PTR signature, CK_ULONG signature_len) {
+static CK_RV sig_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+        const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
+        const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) {
 
     CK_RV rv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
-
-    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
-    rv = ssl_util_setup_evp_pkey_ctx(pkey, padding, md,
-            EVP_PKEY_verify_init, &pkey_ctx);
-    if (rv != CKR_OK) {
-        return rv;
-    }
-
-    int rc = EVP_PKEY_verify(pkey_ctx, signature, signature_len, digest, digest_len);
+    int rc = EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx, sig, siglen, tbs, tbslen);
     if (rc < 0) {
         SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_verify failed");
     } else if (rc == 1) {
@@ -444,11 +496,11 @@ static CK_RV do_sig_verify_rsa(EVP_PKEY
         rv = CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
     }
 
-    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
     return rv;
 }
 
-static CK_RV create_ecdsa_sig(CK_BYTE_PTR sig, CK_ULONG siglen, ECDSA_SIG **outsig) {
+static CK_RV create_ecdsa_sig(CK_BYTE_PTR sig, CK_ULONG siglen,
+        unsigned char  **outbuf, size_t *outlen) {
 
     if (siglen & 1) {
         LOGE("Expected ECDSA signature length to be even, got : %lu",
@@ -487,21 +539,48 @@ static CK_RV create_ecdsa_sig(CK_BYTE_PT
         return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
     }
 
-    *outsig = ossl_sig;
+    int sig_len =i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ossl_sig, NULL);
+    if (sig_len <= 0) {
+        if (rc < 0) {
+            SSL_UTIL_LOGE("ECDSA_do_verify failed");
+        } else {
+            LOGE("Expected length to be greater than 0");
+        }
+        ECDSA_SIG_free(ossl_sig);
+        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    unsigned char *buf = calloc(1, sig_len);
+    if (!buf) {
+        LOGE("oom");
+        ECDSA_SIG_free(ossl_sig);
+        return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+    }
+
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+    int sig_len2 = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ossl_sig, &p);
+    if (sig_len2 < 0) {
+        SSL_UTIL_LOGE("ECDSA_do_verify failed");
+        ECDSA_SIG_free(ossl_sig);
+        free(buf);
+        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    assert(sig_len == sig_len2);
+
+    ECDSA_SIG_free(ossl_sig);
+
+    *outbuf = buf;
+    *outlen = sig_len;
 
     return CKR_OK;
 }
 
 static CK_RV do_sig_verify_ec(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+        const EVP_MD *md,
         CK_BYTE_PTR digest, CK_ULONG digest_len,
         CK_BYTE_PTR signature, CK_ULONG signature_len) {
 
-    EC_KEY *eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
-    if (!eckey) {
-        LOGE("Expected EC Key");
-        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
-    }
-
     /*
      * OpenSSL expects ASN1 framed signatures, PKCS11 does flat
      * R + S signatures, so convert it to ASN1 framing.
@@ -509,21 +588,47 @@ static CK_RV do_sig_verify_ec(EVP_PKEY *
      *   https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-pkcs11/issues/277
      * For details.
      */
-    ECDSA_SIG *ossl_sig = NULL;
-    CK_RV rv = create_ecdsa_sig(signature, signature_len, &ossl_sig);
+    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+    size_t buflen = 0;
+    CK_RV rv = create_ecdsa_sig(signature, signature_len, &buf, &buflen);
     if (rv != CKR_OK) {
         return rv;
     }
 
-    int rc = ECDSA_do_verify(digest, digest_len, ossl_sig, eckey);
-    if (rc < 0) {
-        ECDSA_SIG_free(ossl_sig);
-        SSL_UTIL_LOGE("ECDSA_do_verify failed");
-        return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
+    rv = ssl_util_setup_evp_pkey_ctx(pkey, 0, md,
+            EVP_PKEY_verify_init, &pkey_ctx);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+        free(buf);
+        return rv;
     }
-    ECDSA_SIG_free(ossl_sig);
 
-    return rc == 1 ? CKR_OK : CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+    rv = sig_verify(pkey_ctx, buf, buflen, digest, digest_len);
+
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+    free(buf);
+
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static CK_RV do_sig_verify_rsa(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+        int padding, const EVP_MD *md,
+        CK_BYTE_PTR digest, CK_ULONG digest_len,
+        CK_BYTE_PTR signature, CK_ULONG signature_len) {
+
+    CK_RV rv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
+    rv = ssl_util_setup_evp_pkey_ctx(pkey, padding, md,
+            EVP_PKEY_verify_init, &pkey_ctx);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+        return rv;
+    }
+
+    rv = sig_verify(pkey_ctx, signature, signature_len, digest, digest_len);
+
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+    return rv;
 }
 
 CK_RV ssl_util_sig_verify(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
@@ -538,7 +643,7 @@ CK_RV ssl_util_sig_verify(EVP_PKEY *pkey
                 digest, digest_len,
                 signature, signature_len);
     case EVP_PKEY_EC:
-        return do_sig_verify_ec(pkey, digest, digest_len,
+        return do_sig_verify_ec(pkey, md, digest, digest_len,
                 signature, signature_len);
     default:
         LOGE("Unknown PKEY type, got: %d", type);
@@ -577,3 +682,65 @@ CK_RV ssl_util_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY *
     EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
     return rv;
 }
+
+twist ssl_util_hash_pass(const twist pin, const twist salt) {
+
+
+    twist out = NULL;
+    unsigned char md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (!ctx) {
+        SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_MD_CTX_new");
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    int rc = EVP_DigestInit(ctx, EVP_sha256());
+    if (rc != 1) {
+        SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_DigestInit");
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    rc = EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, pin, twist_len(pin));
+    if (rc != 1) {
+        SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_DigestUpdate");
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    rc = EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, salt, twist_len(salt));
+    if (rc != 1) {
+        SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_DigestUpdate");
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    unsigned int len = sizeof(md);
+    rc = EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, md, &len);
+    if (rc != 1) {
+        SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_DigestFinal");
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    /* truncate the password to 32 characters */
+    out = twist_hex_new((char *)md, sizeof(md)/2);
+
+error:
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    return out;
+}
+
+CK_RV ssl_util_params_to_nid(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecparams, int *nid) {
+
+    const unsigned char *p = ecparams->pValue;
+
+    ASN1_OBJECT *a = d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(NULL, &p, ecparams->ulValueLen);
+    if (!a) {
+        LOGE("Unknown CKA_EC_PARAMS value");
+        return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+    }
+
+    *nid = OBJ_obj2nid(a);
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(a);
+
+    return CKR_OK;
+}
Index: git/src/lib/ssl_util.h
===================================================================
--- git.orig/src/lib/ssl_util.h
+++ git/src/lib/ssl_util.h
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@
 
 #include "pkcs11.h"
 
+#include "attrs.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "object.h"
 #include "twist.h"
 
 #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1010000fL && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)) || (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L) /* OpenSSL 1.1.0 */
@@ -22,6 +22,10 @@
 #define LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_POST111 0x1010100f
 #endif
 
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000) /* OpenSSL 3.0.0 */
+#define LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_POST300 0x1010100f
+#endif
+
 /* OpenSSL Backwards Compat APIs */
 #if defined(LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_PRE11)
 #include <string.h>
@@ -58,7 +62,7 @@ static inline void *OPENSSL_memdup(const
 
 #define SSL_UTIL_LOGE(m) LOGE("%s: %s", m, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
 
-CK_RV ssl_util_tobject_to_evp(EVP_PKEY **outpkey, tobject *obj);
+CK_RV ssl_util_attrs_to_evp(attr_list *attrs, EVP_PKEY **outpkey);
 
 CK_RV ssl_util_encrypt(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
         int padding, twist label, const EVP_MD *md,
@@ -82,4 +86,27 @@ CK_RV ssl_util_setup_evp_pkey_ctx(EVP_PK
         fn_EVP_PKEY_init init_fn,
         EVP_PKEY_CTX **outpkey_ctx);
 
+CK_RV ssl_util_add_PKCS1_PSS(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+        const CK_BYTE_PTR inbuf, const EVP_MD *md,
+        CK_BYTE_PTR outbuf);
+
+CK_RV ssl_util_add_PKCS1_TYPE_1(const CK_BYTE_PTR inbuf, CK_ULONG inlen,
+        CK_BYTE_PTR outbuf, CK_ULONG outbuflen);
+
+CK_RV ssl_util_check_PKCS1_TYPE_2(const CK_BYTE_PTR inbuf, CK_ULONG inlen, CK_ULONG rsa_len,
+        CK_BYTE_PTR outbuf, CK_ULONG_PTR outbuflen);
+
+twist ssl_util_hash_pass(const twist pin, const twist salt);
+
+/**
+ * Given an attribute of CKA_EC_PARAMS returns the nid value.
+ * @param ecparams
+ *  The DER X9.62 parameters value
+ * @param nid
+ *  The nid to set
+ * @return
+ *  CKR_OK on success.
+ */
+CK_RV ssl_util_params_to_nid(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecparams, int *nid);
+
 #endif /* SRC_LIB_SSL_UTIL_H_ */
Index: git/src/lib/tpm.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/src/lib/tpm.c
+++ git/src/lib/tpm.c
@@ -3099,7 +3099,7 @@ static CK_RV handle_ecparams(CK_ATTRIBUT
     tpm_key_data *keydat = (tpm_key_data *)udata;
 
     int nid = 0;
-    CK_RV rv = ec_params_to_nid(attr, &nid);
+    CK_RV rv = ssl_util_params_to_nid(attr, &nid);
     if (rv != CKR_OK) {
         return rv;
     }
@@ -3451,7 +3451,7 @@ static EC_POINT *tpm_pub_to_ossl_pub(EC_
         goto out;
     }
 
-    int rc = EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group,
+    int rc = EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(group,
             pub_key_point_tmp,
             bn_x,
             bn_y,
@@ -4579,7 +4579,7 @@ CK_RV tpm_get_pss_sig_state(tpm_ctx *tct
         goto out;
     }
 
-    rv = ssl_util_tobject_to_evp(&pkey, tobj);
+    rv = ssl_util_attrs_to_evp(tobj->attrs, &pkey);
     if (rv != CKR_OK) {
         goto out;
     }
Index: git/src/lib/utils.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/src/lib/utils.c
+++ git/src/lib/utils.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 #include <openssl/sha.h>
 
 #include "log.h"
+#include "ssl_util.h"
 #include "token.h"
 #include "utils.h"
 
@@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ CK_RV utils_setup_new_object_auth(twist
         pin_to_use = newpin;
     }
 
-    *newauthhex = utils_hash_pass(pin_to_use, salt_to_use);
+    *newauthhex = ssl_util_hash_pass(pin_to_use, salt_to_use);
     if (!*newauthhex) {
         goto out;
     }
@@ -330,22 +331,6 @@ out:
 
 }
 
-twist utils_hash_pass(const twist pin, const twist salt) {
-
-
-    unsigned char md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-
-    SHA256_CTX sha256;
-    SHA256_Init(&sha256);
-
-    SHA256_Update(&sha256, pin, twist_len(pin));
-    SHA256_Update(&sha256, salt, twist_len(salt));
-    SHA256_Final(md, &sha256);
-
-    /* truncate the password to 32 characters */
-    return twist_hex_new((char *)md, sizeof(md)/2);
-}
-
 size_t utils_get_halg_size(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mttype) {
 
     switch(mttype) {
@@ -448,22 +433,6 @@ CK_RV utils_ctx_wrap_objauth(twist wrapp
 
     return CKR_OK;
 }
-
-CK_RV ec_params_to_nid(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecparams, int *nid) {
-
-    const unsigned char *p = ecparams->pValue;
-
-    ASN1_OBJECT *a = d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(NULL, &p, ecparams->ulValueLen);
-    if (!a) {
-        LOGE("Unknown CKA_EC_PARAMS value");
-        return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
-    }
-
-    *nid = OBJ_obj2nid(a);
-    ASN1_OBJECT_free(a);
-
-    return CKR_OK;
-}
 
 CK_RV apply_pkcs7_pad(const CK_BYTE_PTR in, CK_ULONG inlen,
         CK_BYTE_PTR out, CK_ULONG_PTR outlen) {
Index: git/src/lib/utils.h
===================================================================
--- git.orig/src/lib/utils.h
+++ git/src/lib/utils.h
@@ -45,8 +45,6 @@ static inline void _str_padded_copy(CK_U
     memcpy(dst, src, src_len);
 }
 
-twist utils_hash_pass(const twist pin, const twist salt);
-
 twist aes256_gcm_decrypt(const twist key, const twist objauth);
 
 twist aes256_gcm_encrypt(twist keybin, twist plaintextbin);
@@ -77,17 +75,6 @@ CK_RV utils_ctx_unwrap_objauth(twist wra
 CK_RV utils_ctx_wrap_objauth(twist wrappingkey, twist objauth, twist *wrapped_auth);
 
 /**
- * Given an attribute of CKA_EC_PARAMS returns the nid value.
- * @param ecparams
- *  The DER X9.62 parameters value
- * @param nid
- *  The nid to set
- * @return
- *  CKR_OK on success.
- */
-CK_RV ec_params_to_nid(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecparams, int *nid);
-
-/**
  * Removes a PKCS7 padding on a 16 byte block.
  * @param in
  *  The PKCS5 padded input.
Index: git/test/integration/pkcs-sign-verify.int.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/test/integration/pkcs-sign-verify.int.c
+++ git/test/integration/pkcs-sign-verify.int.c
@@ -1061,70 +1061,13 @@ static void test_double_sign_final_call_
     assert_int_equal(rv, CKR_OK);
 }
 
-static CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR get_attr(CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attrs, CK_ULONG attr_len) {
-
-    CK_ULONG i;
-    for (i=0; i < attr_len; i++) {
-        CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR a = &attrs[i];
-        if (a->type == type) {
-            return a;
-        }
-    }
-
-    return NULL;
-}
-
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1010000fL && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)) || (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L) /* OpenSSL 1.1.0 */
-#define LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_PRE11
-#endif
-
-RSA *template_to_rsa_pub_key(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attrs, CK_ULONG attr_len) {
-
-    RSA *ssl_rsa_key = NULL;
-    BIGNUM *e = NULL, *n = NULL;
-
-    /* get the exponent */
-    CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR a = get_attr(CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, attrs, attr_len);
-    assert_non_null(a);
-
-    e = BN_bin2bn((void*)a->pValue, a->ulValueLen, NULL);
-    assert_non_null(e);
-
-    /* get the modulus */
-    a = get_attr(CKA_MODULUS, attrs, attr_len);
-    assert_non_null(a);
-
-    n = BN_bin2bn(a->pValue, a->ulValueLen,
-                  NULL);
-    assert_non_null(n);
-
-    ssl_rsa_key = RSA_new();
-    assert_non_null(ssl_rsa_key);
-
-#if defined(LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_PRE11)
-    ssl_rsa_key->e = e;
-    ssl_rsa_key->n = n;
-#else
-    int rc = RSA_set0_key(ssl_rsa_key, n, e, NULL);
-    assert_int_equal(rc, 1);
-#endif
-
-    return ssl_rsa_key;
-}
-
-static void verify(RSA *pub, CK_BYTE_PTR msg, CK_ULONG msg_len, CK_BYTE_PTR sig, CK_ULONG sig_len) {
-
-    EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
-    assert_non_null(pkey);
-
-    int rc = EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, pub);
-    assert_int_equal(rc, 1);
+static void verify(EVP_PKEY *pkey, CK_BYTE_PTR msg, CK_ULONG msg_len, CK_BYTE_PTR sig, CK_ULONG sig_len) {
 
     EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
     const EVP_MD* md = EVP_get_digestbyname("SHA256");
     assert_non_null(md);
 
-    rc = EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL);
+    int rc = EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL);
     assert_int_equal(rc, 1);
 
     rc = EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey);
@@ -1136,7 +1079,6 @@ static void verify(RSA *pub, CK_BYTE_PTR
     rc = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sig, sig_len);
     assert_int_equal(rc, 1);
 
-    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
     EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
 }
 
@@ -1170,20 +1112,38 @@ static void test_sign_verify_public(void
     assert_int_equal(siglen, 256);
 
     /* build an OSSL RSA key from parts */
-    CK_BYTE _tmp_bufs[2][1024];
+    CK_BYTE _tmp_bufs[3][1024];
     CK_ATTRIBUTE attrs[] = {
-        { .type = CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, .ulValueLen = sizeof(_tmp_bufs[0]), .pValue = &_tmp_bufs[0] },
-        { .type = CKA_MODULUS,         .ulValueLen = sizeof(_tmp_bufs[1]), .pValue = &_tmp_bufs[1] },
+        { .type = CKA_KEY_TYPE,        .ulValueLen = sizeof(_tmp_bufs[0]), .pValue = &_tmp_bufs[0] },
+        { .type = CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, .ulValueLen = sizeof(_tmp_bufs[0]), .pValue = &_tmp_bufs[1] },
+        { .type = CKA_MODULUS,         .ulValueLen = sizeof(_tmp_bufs[1]), .pValue = &_tmp_bufs[2] },
     };
 
     rv = C_GetAttributeValue(session, pub_handle, attrs, ARRAY_LEN(attrs));
     assert_int_equal(rv, CKR_OK);
 
-    RSA *r = template_to_rsa_pub_key(attrs, ARRAY_LEN(attrs));
-    assert_non_null(r);
+    CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKA_KEY_TYPE_BAD;
+    rv = attr_CK_KEY_TYPE(&attrs[0], &key_type);
+    assert_int_equal(rv, CKR_OK);
+
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    attr_list *l = attr_list_new();
+
+    bool res = attr_list_add_int(l, CKA_KEY_TYPE, key_type);
+    assert_true(res);
 
-    verify(r, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1, sig, siglen);
-    RSA_free(r);
+    res = attr_list_add_buf(l, attrs[1].type, attrs[1].pValue, attrs[1].ulValueLen);
+    assert_true(res);
+
+    res = attr_list_add_buf(l, attrs[2].type, attrs[2].pValue, attrs[2].ulValueLen);
+    assert_true(res);
+
+    rv = ssl_util_attrs_to_evp(l, &pkey);
+    assert_int_equal(rv, CKR_OK);
+    attr_list_free(l);
+
+    verify(pkey, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1, sig, siglen);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
 }
 
 static void test_sign_verify_context_specific_good(void **state) {